

*Werner Stegmaier*

An Orientation  
to the Philosophy of  
Friedrich Nietzsche



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Translated by Reinhard G. Mueller and Werner Stegmaier

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# Introduction

Nietzsche is easy to read but difficult to understand. His texts captivate and surprise to this day, in their style and wealth of ideas, though one does not simply believe and accept them – they irritate more than they convince. He wanted it that way. He ploughed the entire field of philosophy anew and undermined everything that was believed in for centuries and millennia: truth, reason, logic and science, morals and religion, law and state, substance and subject, cause and effect, consciousness, will and freedom, self-preservation and progress, etc., without trying to offer a new hold in new certainties, a theory, or a system. With blunt openness and toughness, he confronts his readers with the realities of human life, knowing quite well that reality can only seemingly be fixed and ultimately cannot be determined, and for this he accepted paradoxes. He disorients even where he orients his readers. Human orientation cannot – from all we know – rely on any ultimate certainties. They only become possible if one takes a theoretical (transcendent or transcendental) standpoint beyond life, in order to grasp it in allegedly pure terms. But even philosophers are living beings with needs and hardships that involuntarily guide their reflections. Nietzsche put the will to something unconditional back under the conditions of life; his philosophy literally gets under the skin. According to Nietzsche, one has a philosophy in one's body before one makes a theory out of it; and one only makes a theory out of it if one needs it. What kind of theory someone puts forward therefore reveals who he or she is; a philosophical theory is not simply true or false, but at the same time, it is a symptom of what somebody wants to overcome. Nietzsche likewise questioned his own life in this way without reservation. Philosophizing must begin with the philosophizing person him or herself, with his or her horizons, perspectives, and orientations; only from them can he or she explore, and oftentimes only guess, the orientations of others; philosophical claims to universality are presumptuous. In place of apparent philosophical objectivity, Nietzsche puts forth the wealth of perspectives someone

can adopt. He tries out this wealth in ever-new contexts and in rich forms of philosophical writing, more than any of his great predecessors. Especially through books of aphorisms, which compile diverse ‘stand-alone’ texts in their specifically arranged contexts, he develops an alternative to the closed system based on a single principle. If you engage with Nietzsche, you cannot expect a final or fixed hold in your orientation, but can experience all the more the wants and needs of your own orientation. When reading Nietzsche, you can observe how much Nietzsche you can bear, how far you can go along with his mistrust against all apparently ultimate certainties, and discover at which point you can no longer endure it, where you eventually need something final, fixed, timeless to hold onto, some metaphysics, which does not even have to appear explicitly or systematically, but which may also be hidden in religion, morality, politics, science and logic, or even in the mere fatigue of questioning. Nietzsche’s philosophizing is an incessant experiment on the extent to which human orientation is possible without such metaphysics – both for himself and his readers. He deepens critical philosophizing by inquiring into the conditions of the possibility of the apparently self-evident, making alternatives to it visible, and thus expanding the leeways of human orientation; and this is both frightening and liberating. No one has ever gone as far in this as Nietzsche. He took philosophy seriously as an experiment in radical self-critique of humankind; an experiment that does not close us off from life and its incessant change, but that opens it up; one that does not darken and fix us to apparently stable grounds, but that builds on our strength to confidently and cheerfully go with the times and use their surprises for new orientations.

This introductory book is meant to help with understanding Nietzsche in this respect. It does not fix his philosophy through doctrines, but tries to portray his philosophizing itself: the sources he drew from; the connections he sought; the forms of philosophical writing he tried out; his expectations for reading him; the ‘task’ he set himself and the guiding distinctions with which he approached it; his critique of illusionary orientations; the clues, indicators, footholds and standards of a self-critical orientation; the paths of his ‘transvaluation of all values’ and his affirmations of ‘yes-saying.’ This introduction intends to make clear that Nietzsche’s philosophy is not confined to the famous doctrines of the overman (*Übermensch*), the will to power, and the eternal recurrence of the same, which he – among many others – put into the mouth of his Zarathustra; they too are much better understood in light of his critical philosophizing. Nietzsche’s



philosophy is also not confined to the alleged systematic doctrines of ‘naturalism’ or ‘perspectivism.’ We quote Nietzsche’s own words as far as a short introduction permits doing so (we draw on the Cambridge translations, often modifying them; notes are translated by ourselves, if they are not published in: *Friedrich Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks*, ed. by Rüdiger Bittner, trans. by Kate Sturge, Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2003, or *Nietzsche: Writings from the Early Notebooks*, ed. by Raymond Geuss and Alexander Nehamas, trans. by Ladislaus Löb, Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Since Nietzsche’s philosophizing cannot be understood without knowing some of his life circumstances and experiences – though certainly not from them alone – we outline them at the beginning in a stenographic manner: they may provide some footholds for recognizing his character and his ethical stance, while also undermining common interpretations, which still want to stylize him as a mindless proto-fascist warrior. The second chapter shows how Nietzsche himself assessed his experiences’ influence on his work.

For the sake of brevity, we refrain from summaries of Nietzsche’s works: on the one hand, they can be found everywhere in encyclopedias and guidebooks; on the other hand, such summaries ineluctably aim at positive ‘doctrines’ – which is precisely what Nietzsche critically undermines. We also largely leave out research debates: Nietzsche scholarship has grown so diverse and ramified that including even the most influential research opinions, their pros and cons on respective topics, would have required a second introduction. A list of only a few internationally significant studies on Nietzsche would be biased; to give a long list would enlarge this volume too much. Instead, we offer, in the appendix, a list of the most important tools and resources for your own study of Nietzsche.



# I.

## Nietzsche's Life Experiences

### 1844-1864

1844: 15 October: Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (N) born as the first son of the pastor Carl Ludwig Nietzsche (1813-1849) and his wife Franziska, née Oehler (1826-1897), in Röcken, near Leipzig. Both of N's grandfathers were pastors as well. 1846: 10 July: Birth of his sister Elizabeth (she survived N by 35 years, died on 8 November 1935). 1849: 27 February: birth of his brother Ludwig Joseph. – 30 July: death of his venerated and loved father due to "softening of the brain." N's younger brother dies on 4 January 1850. On the previous day, N dreams that his father drags him into his grave. N now lives in a completely female environment (his mother, sister, grandmother, aunts, maid). 1850: the entire family relocates to Naumburg. – N attends the boys' citizen's school; his schoolmates call him, for his solemn seriousness, "little pastor." He considers himself "unhandy." 1851: Together with his equally ambitious friends Gustav Krug and Wilhelm Pinder, N switches to a private institution. Takes piano lessons. Gives up his native Saxonian dialect. 1854: N is supposed to receive a spot in Halle's orphanage. His mother declines the offer. Instead, N enters the prestigious *Dom-Gymnasium*. He desires being creative himself; attempts to produce compositions, poems, and plays. Prefers fortress and soldier games. Writes notes *On Fortresses-Building*. Has a disciplining effect on his classmates. In his heart, he remains lonely and loves his solitude. Takes leave from school due to serious headaches, which worsen and frequently return. Learns how to swim and loves to ice-skate. His younger sister idolizes him. 1856: First philosophical treatise *On the Origin of Evil*. 1858: First autobiography *From My Life*. N passes the swimming exam. The family moves to the house at Weingarten 18, where his mother continues to live until the end of her life (1897). 1858-1864: N attends the royal *Landesschule Schulpforta* (near Naumburg) when a spot opens up. Classical languages take up almost half of the curriculum, while little

attention is given to philosophy. Very detailed school regulations, encompassing 247 laws. Strict daily schedules (getting up at 5am, at the latest). Diverse social duties for students, who are divided into “families.” A refined system of punishments (e.g., memorizing 80 verses of Homer). Every ‘alumnus’ chooses his tutor from the 15 teachers. Vacation only in the summer and for Christmas. When commemorating the dead, one celebrates an “*Ecce*.” N lives now in a completely male environment. Students address each other formally (the formal German *Sie*). N finds a close friend (“*Duzfreund*”) in Paul Deussen (1845-1919), who later studies with him in Bonn, likewise swears on Schopenhauer, and, after they grow apart, becomes professor of philosophy and especially Indian philosophy. N frequently in the infirmary. 1859: On his 15<sup>th</sup> birthday, N notes down to himself: “I have been seized by a tremendous urge for knowledge, for universal education.” A doctor tells him that he may go completely blind one day. 1860: Together with his friends Krug and Pinder, N founds the club *Germania*, in which they commit themselves to regularly produce poetic and scholarly works, later even musical and contemporary historical ones, which they mutually criticize. *Germania* establishes strict bylaws. They acquire a piano score of Wagner’s *Tristan and Isolde*, which they enthusiastically play and sing. In summer 1863, *Germania* silently dies out after the others no longer deliver their obligatory pieces. 1861: Partially in light of the historical-critical approach to the Bible that he is taught at Schulpforta, N distances himself from Christianity. His “favorite poet” is Hölderlin. A teacher urges him to “stick to a healthier, clearer, more German poet.” The late N considers Hölderlin as pathologically unhealthy. 1862: He produces outstanding works in Greek and Latin. In mathematics, N is notoriously weak (“an all too rational science”; “too boring” – he writes for himself upon graduating from Schulpforta). Untalented in drawing too. Gives a presentation at school *On the Demonic in Music*. Writes essays on *Fatum and History* and *Freedom of Will and Fatum*. On school trips, N usually drinks hot chocolate instead of beer. Can improvise masterfully on the piano but is not well-suited for acting in students’ performances. Once he gets drunk, is punished and feels contrite. 1863: Writes a treatise about the legend of Ermanaric (the only piece of work “that I was almost satisfied with during my school career”); for a long time fascinated by the unhappy king of the Ostrogoths who were conquered by the Huns. Friendship with Carl of Gersdorff (1844-1904), son of an estate owner. In Leipzig and Basel, Gersdorff and N become especially close friends. N then dictates to him many of his early

writings. In 1877, they part ways. In 1878, Gersdorff takes over his father's estate and becomes royal chamberlain and honorary knight of the Order of St. John. N always places friendship high above "the ugly and greedy sexual love." 1864: N writes his Latin thesis on the Greek elegiac poet Theognis of Megara, who in the struggles of the 6<sup>th</sup> century B.C. took the side of the nobility (with complaints that the noble no longer counted for anything), but also suggested one prudently adapt to the new conditions and paid homage to the enjoyment of life and pederasty. Theognis continues to occupy N during his college years. N's "favorite literature" was then Plato's *Symposium*.

### 1864-1865

N studies theology (for two semesters at his mother's wish) and philology (at his own) in Bonn. Deussen and others convince him to enter the fraternity *Frankonia*, where he passes a (harmless) fencing duel (a *Mensur*); for an anniversary celebration, he writes a "magic farce with patriotic conclusion"; however, he remains an outsider. In meetings, he insists on more science. Avoids carnival celebrations. Persistent shortage of money, unwanted debts. Seriously ill again ("rheumatism"). Attends Carl Schaarschmidt's philosophical lectures, which, however, do not appear to bear much weight on him. Continues his work on Theognis. Gives up theology and intends to give up musical compositions as well. Deussen later reports that a coachman unexpectedly took N to a brothel during a city tour of Cologne, where he saved himself from the girls by improvising on the piano. The brothel visit has often been connected to a possible infection with syphilis, but this is now considered rather unlikely. During his vacations in Naumburg, N no longer accompanies his mother to communion. Nevertheless, he misses his family while in Bonn. He then follows his famous philological teacher Friedrich Ritschl (1806-1876) from Bonn to Leipzig. As a farewell, N notes: "Everything was forced upon me."

### 1865-1867

In Leipzig, where he starts to feel very comfortable, N leads a social student life and makes close friends. At the antiquarian bookseller Rohn's, in whose house he lives, he discovers Schopenhauer's *World as Will and Representation*. Lets that book, with its "energetic dark genius," drive him for weeks into deep "self-contempt," violent "self-harvest" and even "physical torment": "I understood him

as if he had written for me.” Returning to his student life, he finds, on Ritschl’s suggestion, a philological association, whose bylaws are officially sanctioned by the university judge. There he presents his work on Theognis with great success; when Ritschl sees it, he declares that he has never seen anything similar by a third-year student and encourages N to write a book. N is ashamed of his pride. Now in close personal contact with Ritschl, who becomes “a kind of scientific conscience” for him, but who tries to keep N away from philosophy. N joins Ritschl’s Philological Society, where each week a member’s work is discussed in Latin. Continues with undeterred “propaganda” for Schopenhauer. Lives like a saint, allows himself only cakes and tarts. Friendship with Heinrich Romundt (1845-1919). N later brings him to Basel, tries to get him into philosophy. Romundt will later become a private lecturer of philosophy without ever getting a position as a Schopenhauerian, but making a name for himself with books on Kant. Friendship also with Erwin Rohde (1845-1898), who likewise followed Ritschl from Bonn to Leipzig and becomes a member of the Philological Society and worships Schopenhauer, too (N: “I have so far experienced only this one time that a developing friendship had an ethical-philosophical background.” – “Otherwise, we used to get into each other’s hair.”) Rohde, whom N will court most intimately during his time in Basel and who will always support N loyally and selflessly, will belong to the closest circle of Wagner’s supporters in Bayreuth, become a very successful professor of Classical Philology, but after N’s break with Wagner grow estranged from him. N characterizes him as a man of “criticism and discipline;” Rohde considers the later adventures of N’s ‘gay’ science witty aberrations. In the war of Prussia and the smaller North German states against Austria and the South German states, N declares himself to be a “passionate Prussian”; Bismarck gives him “undue pleasure.” (“Never in 50 years have we been so close to the fulfillment of our German hopes. I am gradually beginning to understand that there was surely no other, milder way than the horrible one of an annihilating war.”) But he does not yet take up arms (“We serve our homeland also in our studies”). *The Final Edition of the Theognidea. About the Literary and Historical Sources of Suidas: On the History of the Collected Writings of Theognis* appears in the renowned *Rheinisches Museum for Philology*. N reads Friedrich Albert Lange’s newly published *History of Materialism and Critique of its Present Importance*, which will remain one of his most important sources (“Kant, Schopenhauer and this book by Lange – that’s all I need.”) Writes a study on the sources of Diogenes Laërtius, a topic on which Ritschl

also organizes a prize question for the university; N wins the prize award. When the work appears in the *Rheinisches Museum*, it, like the previous article, does not give him any pleasure (“So many things are downright wrong, even more audacious stammering and the whole thing expressed immaturely”). Inspired by Valentin Rose’s book on Aristotle, from which N also takes the motto “*sibi quisque scribit*” (everyone writes for himself), N gives a lecture on Diogenes Laërtius’ Pinakes (bibliographies) of Aristotle’s writings at the Philological Society. Pursues the question of Homer and the alleged competition between Homer and Hesiod, discovering in the competition (*agon*) an essential feature of the ancient Greeks. Determined to improve his German style of writing. Complains about being oversaturated with books. Takes lessons in horseback riding with Rohde. Engaged in studies on the fake writings of Democritus, an author strongly preferred by Lange.

### 1867-1868

Military service as a so-called voluntary “one-year” gunner in the cavalry division of a field artillery regiment in Naumburg, which is considered the hardest. Proves to be brave and a talented horseman; enjoys the soldier’s life as an “antidote” to the “paralyzing skepticism” of his studies and the philological “factory worker” in himself. Suffers “terrible pain” from a severe sternum injury after jumping on his horse. Receives morphine. Five months of medical treatment. “One deep scar in the middle of the chest, fused to the bone,” remains. Continues to work on his philological studies. Promoted to corporal, but declared to be “temporarily unfit” for military service. Discharged on his 24<sup>th</sup> birthday.

### 1868-1869

Back in Leipzig, N writes book reviews about new philological publications in *Literarisches Centralblatt*. Plans for a philological dissertation on the simultaneity of Homer and Hesiod and, after reading Kuno Fischer’s work on Kant and (parts of) Kant’s *Critique of Judgement*, for a philosophical dissertation on *The Concept of the Organic since Kant*. Abandons both plans quickly. N clearly rejects metaphysics, which since Kant is like poetry and religion. Schopenhauer, for N, merely puts the ‘will’ in place of the Kantian unknown X; nevertheless, he is a “great man”; N respects his truthfulness, his courage, and his style. For practical reasons, N decides to become a professor of philology. Plans to

spend a year in Paris before, studying together with Rohde. Overwhelmed by the preludes of *Tristan* and *Meistersingers*. Meets the “master” himself in the house of the orientalist Hermann Brockhaus, who is married to Wagner’s sister, who in turn is friends with Ritschl’s wife, to whom N already played from *Meistersingers*, which made Wagner curious about him. During the meeting, Richard Wagner (1813-1883) performs from the *Meistersingers*; they discuss Schopenhauer. The “friendship of stars” between him and N begins. When saying their goodbyes, Wagner invites N to his home; N reads Wagner’s poems and aesthetic writings, recognizes in him the genius in Schopenhauer’s sense of the word, writes to Rohde: “This is now the second time that we, almost unconcerned about any prevailing opinions, especially those of the educated, set up our own idols.” Nevertheless, he keeps an ironic distance (“the old high priest Schopenhauer swings the holy stoup of his philosophy for this purpose”), detests simple Schopenhauerians and Wagnerians. He is welcome in Leipzig’s society and is, at the same time, according to Ritschl, “the idol and (without intent) the leader of the entire young philology world here in Leipzig.” N will continue to mingle in the ‘high society,’ among academics, patricians, nobility, and artists, and will especially love the intimate contact with nobly reserved, educated and oftentimes older women.

## 1869

When N has already given up on the classics in order to study the modern sciences, ideally in Paris, Ritschl secretly prepares N’s appointment as chair of Greek language and literature at the University of Basel. At this time, the university faces serious difficulties (in 1870, there are altogether only 116 students), but is strongly supported by the city’s industrial, commercial and educational aristocracy. The university is considered a springboard for young professors; N’s predecessor was likewise only 25 years old when he was appointed. N is also obliged to teach the top class at the Basel *Gymnasium* (called *Pädagogium*). N’s sister reports, everyone “danced a true jubilation and worship dance around the very young god or professor.” N himself fears the “philistinism” of the profession, perceiving it as a renunciation. The Leipzig Faculty of Philosophy awards him a doctorate without examination on the basis of his previously published work. Deussen does not join in on the jubilation; N accuses him in a letter draft of “not wanting to recognize a higher man,”



and ends their friendship on a business card. Later, he is eventually willing to reconcile. A *Meistersinger* performance in Dresden, an ecstatic experience. With the cooperation of his sister, N establishes, with much laughter, a register of the *Rheinisches Museum*, for which Ritschl commissions him. Gives up his Prussian citizenship to avoid being drafted in the case of war; remains stateless thereafter or, in Swiss terminology, “homeless” (*heimatlos*). Leaves Germany in mid-April by train and by ship via Cologne, Heidelberg, and Karlsruhe, where he once again listens to the *Meistersinger*. Writes on the way his inaugural address on *Homer and Classical Philology*. He concludes it with a “confession of faith” that also signifies a farewell to Ritschl’s school: “*philosophia facta est quae philologia fuit*’ (philosophy has become what used to be philology).”

Introduced to Basel’s society, N is soon bored by its conventionality; nevertheless, he continues attending social events. Desires to go to Tribschen on Lake Lucerne, where Richard Wagner resides with Cosima von Bülow (1837-1930) and her children in a manorial style. Once when N, unannounced, hesitates in front of the house, he hears, as he later reports, the chords to the verses “For he who woke me deals me the wound!” from *Siegfried*. Grows close with the Wagner family, “a delightful connection of the warmest and most soulful kind with Richard Wagner, that is to say: the *greatest genius* and *greatest man* of this time, quite incommensurable! Every two or three weeks I spend a few days on his estate on Lake Lucerne and consider this approach to be the greatest achievement of my life, besides what I owe to Schopenhauer.” Meets “the witty eccentric” Jacob Burckhardt (1818-1897), who holds the chair of history and art history and whose *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* is considered epoch-making. N discovers “a wonderful congruence of our aesthetic paradoxes” and seeks Burckhardt’s friendship. He, too, lost his father at an early age, composes music and poetry, has turned to Schopenhauer, initially studied theology, will remain unmarried throughout his life and always keeps his distance from others; Wagner, however, was anathema to him. Johann Jakob Bachofen (1815-1887), a man of the world with a well-kept house, who is also very young at the time, tries in his famous study on *Mother Right* in the ancient world to go beyond historically identifiable legal norms to explore their prehistoric origins. Both Burckhardt and Bachofen stem from old Basel families; both have a groundbreaking effect on N. Ludwig Rüttimeyer (1825-1895), his colleague for comparative anatomy and zoology, is a determined opponent of Darwin in his understanding of evolution. Under persistent financial difficulties, N’s

mother demands strict parsimony. His basic mood is melancholia: “I guess, I am not born for happiness or cheerfulness.” Wagner talks N out of vegetarianism, although it did his “bad stomach quite well.” N’s students appreciate him; he has a disciplining effect without using praise or admonition; but for his students, his lectures are not systematic enough; he increasingly aligns his teaching program to his own interests. He finishes the index of the *Rheinisches Museum*. Wagner sends him the beginnings of his “life story” in an “act of the most extravagant trust”; N runs errands for Cosima; the Wagners set up a “thinking chamber” for him in Tribschen. Here, they celebrate Christmas together.

## 1870

N gives lectures on *The Greek Music Drama* and *Socrates and Tragedy*, which colleague Karl Steffensen; the second lecture N has published as a private print. Doubts about his “philologist existence.” Wagner tells him: “You could now take much, indeed an entire half of my destiny from me. And in doing so, you may even fully pursue *your* destiny.” N gets appointed as full professor. Travels with his mother and sister to Lake Geneva and, accompanied by Rohde, to the Bernese Oberland. Listens three times to Bach’s *St Matthew Passion* “with the same feeling of immeasurable astonishment. Whoever has completely forgotten Christianity will hear it truly like a Gospel.” Franz Overbeck (1837-1905), born in Saint Petersburg, son of a merchant, seven years older than N, appointed at the university of Basel as a professor for early church history and the New Testament, moves into the house where N lives (*Schützengraben* 45, now 47); they call it “*Baumanns-Höhle*,” (Baumann’s Cave) live there together for five years until Overbeck gets married. Overbeck gives his inaugural lecture *On the Origin and Law of a Purely Historical Consideration of the New Testament Writings*, is very critical of the *Christianity of Our Contemporary Theology*, and eventually leaves the Church; he becomes N’s most reliable and indispensable friend. N plans to suspend his professorship for a few years in order to serve Wagner’s new Bayreuth project. Introduces his sister to Tribschen, who hesitates because of the (in her view) indecent situation there. Cosima calls her “a modest, well-behaved girl.” During the Franco-German War, N drafts the treatise *The Dionysiac World View*, from which *The Birth of Tragedy* will arise. Against Cosima’s urgent advice, N wants – since Switzerland will not permit more than that – to go “at least as a combat medic to the battlefield.” Receives medical

training in Erlangen together with the painter Adolf Mosengel, and is sent to Weissenburg in Alsace, to take care of the wounded and the dying. In the meantime, Richard Wagner and Cosima von Bülow get married. After one week on the battlefield, N is infected with dysentery and pharyngeal diphtheria while on a two-day transfer of the wounded to Karlsruhe, which ends his engagement. His brief war adventure is N's closest personal encounter with history. Drafts a drama called *Empedocles*, which in some ways prefigures *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Develops a new concept for Greek metrics and gives lectures on it at the university. Attends "with pleasure" Burckhardt's extemporaneous speech on "Historical Greatness" and takes part in his seminar "On the Study of History." N considers the triumphant Prussia "a power most dangerous to culture"; "we must be philosophers enough to remain calm in the general intoxication": "For the coming cultural period, fighters are necessary: for this we must preserve ourselves." Wants to found a monastery with friends for the "freedom of the spirit." Reads with great enthusiasm Wagner's manuscript on *Beethoven*, supervises the printing of his memoirs (written for "proven faithful friends" in 15 copies). Pressed by his professional workload; in addition, he is elected as secretary of the president. For Christmas, back to Tribschen; gives Richard Wagner Dürer's engraving "Knight, Death and Devil" and Cosima his own manuscript *Die Entstehung des tragischen Gedankens (The Origin of the Tragic Thought)*; Wagner has the "Siegfried Idyll" performed for Cosima; N receives an "opulent edition of the entire Montaigne" and a piano score of Act I of *Siegfried*.

## 1871

N, the philosophical autodidact and enthusiastic Schopenhauerian, applies for a position as professor of philosophy that was left vacant by Gustav Teichmüller (1832-1888) and which had previously been held by Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911); he argues that he always considered philosophy as his "real task" and that chance merely denied him "an important and truly stimulating philosophical teacher." "Pressed by nature to the strongest extent to think philosophically through something uniform and to remain with a problem via long trains of thought and undisturbed," his present position overburdens him, does not let him come to "a steady and cheerful fulfillment of his calling," and increasingly makes him physically ill. At the same time, he proposes Rohde as a successor for

his current position. He collapses, is granted leave of absence, recuperates for six weeks at the Hôtel du Parc in Lugano, together with his sister, who describes the stay as a happy “carnival dream.” N, in an “overconfident alienation” from philology, works on his essay *The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music* (still under the title *The Origin and Goal of Tragedy*), with which he wants to “philosophically identify and legitimize himself in a way.” “I am thus gradually living myself into my philosophical life and already believe in myself; indeed, if I should ever become a poet, I myself am prepared for this. I possess no compass of knowledge for what my destiny is.” But everything seems, for him, to fit together surprisingly well. He likewise regards the possible position as professor of philosophy “only as something provisional.” His application is rejected; Teichmüller’s student Rudolf Eucken (1846-1926) receives the position, which upsets N mainly because of Rohde. With little knowledge in the history of philosophy, he does not become a *teacher* of philosophy, but right away a *philosopher*. His *Birth of Tragedy* propagates the reawakening of Greek culture – which he radically reinterprets through the aesthetic contrast of the “Dionysian” and the “Apollonian” – in the expressly Germanic *Gesamtkunstwerk* of Wagner. The German war triumph drives N mad about the renewal of German culture; the fire of the Tuileries (and, as N believed, also of the Louvre) during the Paris Commune horrifies him (“It is the worst day of my life”). More recreational trips. Cosima complains of “a not quite natural reservation” in N’s behavior: “It is as if he resisted the overwhelming impression of Wagner’s personality.” He plays with the idea of going on an educational journey with a young nobleman. Growing distance to philology that also affects his teaching. Starts composing music again (*Echoes of a New Year’s Eve*, dedicated to Cosima): “What does it matter and whom does it harm if I buy myself free from the spell of music once every 6 years in a Dionysian way!” Wagner conducts for a few days in Mannheim; N accompanies Cosima. This time he stays in Basel for Christmas, perhaps because he fears the judgment of his composition, which is indeed laughed at.

## 1872

On behalf of the Voluntary Academic Society of Basel, N writes five lectures *On the Future of Our Educational Institutions*. He pleads for the targeted education of an intellectual aristocracy for the creation of a new ‘truly German’ culture that is oriented neither to the state nor to any external benefits; N fails to

write the sixth and final lecture. Rejects an offer for a position as professor of philology in Greifswald. Basel grants him a higher salary. *The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music* (BT) appears with Wagner's publisher Ernst Fritzsche (1840-1902), with Prometheus being freed from his shackles on the title page. Wagner, to whom the essay is addressed, emphatically praises it, as do Franz Liszt, Hans von Bülow and others. But it ruins N's reputation as a philologist. Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorf (1848-1931), his four years younger classmate at Schulpforta and later a leading classical philologist, considers it in his pamphlet *Future Philology! A Reply to Friedrich Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy* a disgrace to the "alma mater," demanding that N step down from his position. N responds: "Fight, fight, fight! I need war." Ritschl speaks to others of N's "megalomania" and his "founding of a religion"; Hermann Usener, according to N, one of the "greatly esteemed professors of philology" in Bonn, says in his college that "someone who wrote something like this is academically dead"; Jacob Bernays claims that N had simply adopted his views, but did so in a "greatly exaggerated" way; N reacts by calling Bernays' claim "divinely impudent by this educated and clever Jew." N's students keep away; he feels bad for the university. Rohde and Wagner stand by him with public responses ("I really live in the midst of a solar system of the love of friends"); BT is translated into French. The Wagner family moves to Bayreuth; N reports "melancholy days" as he loses the "world of Tribschen." Wants to take a break at the university, promote Wagner's work, then go "to the South" for two years and during that time leave his position to Rohde. At Bayreuth for the cornerstone ceremony of the *Festspielhaus*. Meets Malwida von Meysenbug (1816-1903), a Schopenhauerian and an open "idealist," a close acquaintance of Wagner and other leading heads of Europe, a pioneer of women's emancipation and the democratic movement in Germany. Like N, tormented by severe eye complaints and headaches, she too is constantly searching for a climate favorable to her; she becomes N's close confidante and motherly friend ("see in me someone who, as a son, needs such a mother, oh, who needs her so much"). N experiences *Tristan and Isolde* for the first time in Munich. Hans von Bülow (1830-1894), Cosima's first husband, who conducts the performance and to whom N sends his *Manfred Meditation*, criticizes N's piece of music as completely unprofessional and a "wallowing reminiscence of Wagnerian sounds." N agrees to friends ("I am without illusions – at least now," "I have no good taste," "I am now only as much a musician as is necessary for my philosophical home use.") Responds to von Bülow that he had no idea of

the “complete worthlessness” of his music; nobody had yet “roused him from his harmless imagination”: “You have helped me *a lot*.” Nevertheless, Liszt, as N comes to hear, judges his “Sylvesternachtsmusik” (‘New Year’s Eve Music’) “very favorably.” Works on the writings *Homer’s Contest* and *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*. Romundt, now a private lecturer for philosophy in Basel, also moves into the “*Baumanns-Höhle*.” In addition, N’s sister stays in Basel for four months. Pleasant journey by himself, but with attacks of illness, to Graubünden and on to Bergamo, and then suddenly right back (“disgusting soft air, no lights!”). End of November, N meets with the Wagner family in Strasbourg. For Christmas, he goes to Naumburg, not to Bayreuth. Gives his unfinished *Five Prefaces to Five Unwritten Books* as a (belated) birthday present to Cosima, who does not love them. For N points out the “kernel of the Hellenic idea of competition” as follows: “one abhors autocracy and fears its dangers; one desires, as preventive measure against the genius – a second genius.”

### 1873

N now pursues a clearly philosophical and, in Wagner’s sense, cultural-revolutionary direction. He writes *On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense* and the first *Untimely Meditation: David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer*. Attacks there the conceited “educational philistinism” in Germany as a sign of its madness, believing that the triumph in the Franco-German war was also a victory of German culture. Strauss (1808-1874) had, in his *The Life of Jesus, Critically Examined*, demythologized the Gospels in a historical-critical way and at the same time idealized Christ in a Hegelian fashion as the “idea of mankind.” He became the most scandalous theologian of his time and thus ruined his theological career. Finally, in *On the Old and New Faith* (1872), he fully destroyed the Christian dogmas and proclaimed a new faith in science and especially in Darwin’s theory of evolution. But a few years earlier, Strauss had publicly opposed Wagner, who for his part found Strauss’ book, which in many ways came close to N’s, “horribly shallow.” N wants to surprise Wagner with his polemic on his 60<sup>th</sup> birthday. He consciously sets it up for public “attack and dispute” and does so successfully. Karl Hillebrand (1829-1884) – who participated in the Baden Uprising as a student; was Heinrich Heine’s personal secretary for a time; later a known Parisian intellectual, professor, and diplomat; rejected all offers from German universities; and wrote essays as a

freelance writer for the most important European journals – recognizes N's talent and writes reviews not only for the first, but also for the following two *Untimely Meditations*, which fills N with pride even in *Ecce Homo*. They also meet personally and correspond with each other, sometimes with years of pause in between. Hillebrand invites him to collaborate on an Italian journal, which N rejects, as he always does when asked to collaborate on journals. He meets Paul Rée (1849-1901), who listens to N's lecture on the pre-Platonic philosophers. Rée, son of the owner of a knight's estate, of Jewish origin, Protestant, good-natured and amiable and gifted with a fine sense of humor, first studied law at his father's request before switching to philosophy, participated, like N, in the Franco-German War as a one-year volunteer, where he was soon wounded and left the army; later, he studied medicine and worked as a doctor of common people, first in the vicinity of his father's estate, and eventually in the Upper Engadin, N's favorite landscape. N's eye disease worsens so that he can hardly read or write anymore; Gersdorff supports him, and his sister comes back for several months. N works on his composition of the *Hymn to Friendship*. Fritzsche is willing to publish the first *Untimely Meditation*. The treatise *On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense*, though fundamental to N's philosophy, remains unpublished. The "ghost" Rosalie Nielsen, an "already quite old and half-mad-looking woman from Holstein" (Overbeck), a fervent admirer of the *Birth of Tragedy* and a "Dionysian person" (Carl Albrecht Bernoulli), harasses N and spreads disturbing rumors about Fritzsche and Wagner; N literally throws her out. Goes on vacation with Gersdorff and Romundt. New plans to establish a monastic educational institution. Commissioned by Wagner, N quickly composes a passionate *Admonition to the Germans* for the financial support of Bayreuth, for the "rouse" of the "highest and noblest art and cultural forces" of the "German nation"; but it is rejected by the Wagner Society as too bold. Gottfried Keller says N has been "run astray by Wagner-Schopenhauerism," a "speculator boy" driven by "megalomania"; others, among them Strauss, see hatred and rage in the piece. N himself sees his "intemperance," conceives of Overbeck and himself as "strange oddballs," who were only "outwardly horribly murderous and predatory animals." Christmas again in Naumburg, not in Bayreuth. In his second *Untimely Meditation: On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life*, N targets the hypertrophic historicism of his time, which weakens and threatens to destroy "the *plastic* power of a person, a people, a culture." This includes his own field of research. At the same time, he attacks the very

successful *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, written in the spirit of Schopenhauer, but also of Hegel, by the 25-year-old Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906), son of an officer and likewise a philosophical autodidact, who sees in the “world process” the logical idea and with it the “affirmation of the will to live” prevail over the blind will – and with whom N does not want to be confused. The fear of being mistaken with someone else will again and again drive him to sharp polemics. He writes the concluding part of the second *Untimely Meditation* when the first chapters already go to the press; this will continue to be his style of composition.

#### 1874

Appointment as vice dean of his college, which annoys him. Votes against the majority in favor of admitting women to doctoral programs. Studies numerous scientific works, especially those of the brilliant physicist Rugjer Josip Boscovich (1711-1787). Designs a theory of time atoms. Plans to write an *Untimely Meditation* concerning the current situation and task of philosophy under the title “The Predicament of Philosophy”: “From the outside: natural science, history,” “From the inside: the courage to live a philosophy is broken.” But instead, N writes the third *Untimely Meditation: Schopenhauer as Educator*, which addresses Schopenhauer not with respect to his teachings, but his life (“It does not matter what the sentences say, the *nature* of this man stands for a hundred systems”). For N, “to live at all means to live in danger,” and the dangers of the true philosopher are loneliness, despair at the dreadfulness of truth, and hardening toward one’s fate; he must be the “lawgiver as to the measure, stamp and weight of things,” and as such free from all institutions; he becomes an “educator” of others as the “liberator” of the “self.” N feels healthy for several months. He is aware that he deals in a “pretty dilettantly immature” way with his “effusions,” but wants to “first of all expel all the polemic-negative substance” in himself. “Seeks nothing more than some freedom,” is indignant about “the many, unspeakably many unfreedoms” he feels bound by. Wagner complains that N keeps away, urges him to get married. N will make several half-hearted attempts and then abandon them (“A married philosopher belongs to comedy, that is my proposition”). Marie Baumgartner from Lörrach (1831-1897), the mother of one of his students, translates the third (and later the fourth) *Untimely Meditation* into French and has a barely concealed affection



for N: she becomes for him “the best mother I know.” His sister comes again to Basel for several months. N again plans to withdraw “from all official relations with the state and the university into the most outrageous singular existence (*unverschämteste Singuläreexistenz*), miserably simple, but worthy.” Plays Brahms in Wahnfried, which enrages Wagner. After Fritzsche's bankruptcy, N finds a new publisher in Ernst Schmeitzner (1851-1895), who makes little money with N and who, from 1880 onward, falls deeply into the anti-Semitic movement, whereupon N tries to get away from him, in part with legal means. Attends the social “Tuesday Club” with August von Miaskowski, a professor for national economy, and his wife. For Christmas again in Naumburg. He finally reviews his musical compositions.

### 1875

N shocked when his friend Romundt wants to become a catholic priest. His sister runs the household of the Wagners in Bayreuth when they go on a tour for several weeks, and soon begins to take control. N himself again terribly ill; unclear diagnosis (“My stomach could not be tamed at all anymore, even with the ridiculously strictest diet; headaches of the most severe kind lasting several days that returned few days later; vomiting for hours without having eaten anything; in short, it seemed that the machine wanted to go to pieces, and I don't deny that I sometimes wished it had done so”). Wants to consistently avoid society; “a passion for living alone and walking alone.” However, he needs his sister with whom he, to Overbeck's regret, moves into a new apartment with six rooms (at Spalendorweg 48) and who now runs his household; “a good maid has been acquired.” Happy about “his own castle,” “from where one can observe and where one no longer feels so mistreated by life.” Must borrow money from Gersdorff for his furnishings. Relieving summer spa retreat (*Kur*) in Steinabad in the southern Black Forest; there his physician suspects a “significant enlargement of the stomach.” N has to follow a strict diet, goes swimming and on two-hour walks before breakfast; additional walks in the afternoon and evening. Deals with national economy (“We still must climb up a good distance, slowly, but always further, in order to have a quite free view *over our old culture*; and we have to walk through several tedious sciences, especially through the genuinely strict ones”). No writings for a while (“disgust at publications”). Unable to attend the rehearsals of *the Ring of the Nibelung*

in Bayreuth due to his illness. Instead, preparatory work on the fourth and long withheld *Untimely Meditation on Richard Wagner in Bayreuth*. To Rohde: This text has “only for me the value of a new orientation regarding the most difficult point of our previous experiences. I do not stand above it and realize that I myself have not completely succeeded in orienting myself – let alone that I could help others!” Reorientation concerning Schopenhauer, Wagner, and philology. Sees more and more clearly his “life’s task (*Lebensaufgabe*),” “without having had the courage to tell anyone.” Because of his “beloved friends” N still considers himself a “lucky man” who “yet escaped the hardest attacks of suffering.” Grows more satisfied with teaching at the *Pädagogium*; starts a “cycle of lectures for 7 years;” assesses his life in order. Reads Paul Rée’s *Psychological Observations* (1875), writes to him, Rée enjoys this ecstatically. The musician and composer Heinrich Köselitz (1854-1918), from Annaberg in Saxony, son of an industrialist, comes to Basel for his studies, produces a fair copy of *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth* for N and encourages him to publish it. He will subsequently prepare many of N’s manuscripts for printing, read the proof sheets and, until the end, make corrections himself, for which N gives him free reign (“You have unlimited authority to change!”). N will (over) appreciate him as a musician, call him his “maestro” Peter Gast, and as a kind of thanks – Köselitz will work for him with great effort (and with occasional secret grumblings and rebellion) without pay, which saddens N – sometimes connect him to influential conductors to perform his work. The two will again and again encourage each other to believe in the rank of their work. But they keep addressing each other in the formal *Sie* form; Köselitz, despite their close relation, will always address N as “Herr Professor” until the end. Köselitz’ life will remain completely determined by N. Later, he will temporarily become co-editor of N’s works at his sister’s *Nietzsche Archive* and back their arbitrariness and falsifications. For Christmas, N in Basel. Suffers a breakdown. Expects a “serious brain disease” and, like his father, an early death.

## 1876

N applies to get relieved from teaching at the *Pädagogium*. Due to his illness, he also must take a break from giving lectures. His mother is alarmed and comes to Basel. Recreational vacation with Gersdorff at Lake Geneva, and every day five to six hours of walking. They visit Voltaire’s house in Ferney. More and

more admirers, in Geneva, Vienna, and elsewhere. Malwida suggests a year on the Adriatic Sea together with her and the highly gifted student Albert Brenner (1856-1878), who is suffering from an incurable lung disease. N's request for leave of absence granted. The fourth *Untimely Meditation, Richard Wagner in Bayreuth*, with which N struggled for a long time, is published with Schmeitzner and received in Bayreuth in a friendly, enthusiastic manner; Wagner sends it to his patron, King Ludwig II of Bavaria. Set, with much pathos, as a "morning consecration on the day of battle," it elaborates Wagner's vision of a renewal of culture in the tension between "power" and "love," which he gives shape to in the figures of Wotan and Brünnhilde in *The Ring of the Nibelung*. N uses Wagner's own texts for long stretches, but also speaks, regarding the "antagonism" inherent in all contemplation, of Wagner's "nervous haste," his "passionate pleasure in almost pathological high-tension moods," of "dilettantism," an "original talent in acting" and "a fierce desire for power." The opening of the Bayreuth Festival, which, including a third rehearsal cycle and dress rehearsals, is scheduled to last four weeks and is attended first by N's sister, then by N himself and eventually even by N's friends, is celebrated as a world-historical event with the participation of numerous princes and even the German *Kaiser*; in the hustle and bustle of the festival and in the struggle for funds, Wagner has hardly any attention, only loud praise for N. Disgusted by the majority of Wagnerians, disappointed by the technically haphazard performances, and tormented by the music that now upset him, N flees for days to the countryside and writes his first sketch of *Human, All Too Human*, at that time still under the title *The Plowshare (Die Pflugschaar)*. In Basel, because of N's forthcoming trip to Italy, the shared household is given up again; N returns to the "*Baumanns-Höhle*," this time in Overbeck's room, who married. In October, N first goes with Rée to Bex on the Rhône (N: "together with Rée, the incomparable," Rée: "in a way, it was the honeymoon of our friendship"), then, under heavy convulsions, from Genoa by ship to Naples, where they meet Malwida and Brenner, and from there on to Sorrento, where the Wagners would reside for some time. Repeated meetings of the "Colony" with the Wagners, who are disturbed by the "Israelite" Rée; Cosima hardly mentions N anymore in her diary. These were their last encounters. Malwida stays with her "lads" (*Knäblein*), as Wagner calls them, in the modest guesthouse Villa Rubinacci, which is run by a German landlady, in order to study, write, and read to each other, and go for walks, now indeed "in a kind of monastery for freer spirits" and according to a strict schedule, until early May

1877. Rée and N go swimming in the sea. Excursions around the picturesque Gulf of Naples (Malwida: “N, too, forgot his sufferings and was ecstatic with admiration”). Due to his healthy eyes, Rée is mostly the one reading the texts out loud. Among other things, they discuss a transcript of Burckhardt’s lectures on Greek culture, Greek historians, Spanish poets, French moralists and the New Testament. Rée finishes *The Origin of the Moral Sentiments*; N, who is somewhat better off despite setbacks, takes notes for a book “Free Spirit,” which will become the book of aphorisms *Human, All Too Human*; Malwida, whose three-volume *Memoirs of an Idealist*, praised by N, were published in 1875/76, works on a novel *Phädra*, Brenner, who reveres Schopenhauer, Leopardi and Hölderlin, on a novella. There is also much laughter; N sometimes improvises on the piano, notes down aphorisms on his walks. He has good and bad days (“Completely gave up all work, even all dictating of writings and all disputes. What shall become!”). Unconfirmed report of a young Sorrentine woman who visited N “in regular intervals.”

## 1877

New plans for a “school of educators.” People close to N try to find a wife for him; his doctor recommends this, his mother and especially his sister continually make proposals regarding women they consider appropriate. In April, Rée and Brenner leave Sorrento; in May, N, whose condition has not improved and who is bored without Rée, leaves too. Another recreational spa in Bad Ragaz and, when this one does not help either, another one in Rosenlaubad in the Bernese Oberland, each by himself. Now considers Wagner’s “nerve-shattering music” and Schopenhauer’s “metaphysical philosophy” to be the causes of his illness. With his “detachment” from both, he also alienates himself from his old friends Rohde and Gersdorff; after temporary reconciliations, he will eventually break with them. In July, vacation with his sister. In Basel, N moves into a new apartment, which he shares with Köselitz, the “helpful writer-friend”; in mid-1878, N’s sister manages the household again. N revises and arranges with Köselitz the aphorisms for *Human, All Too Human*. Corresponds with the pianist and music writer Carl Fuchs (1838-1922) about music aesthetics; he met him in 1872 at Fritsch’s and severely reprimanded him in 1876 in Bayreuth because of his obtrusiveness; later, in 1890, Fuchs succeeds in getting a production of Peter Gast’s opera *The Lion of Venice* in Danzig at N’s long request. The impetuous

Siegfried Lipiner from Poland (1856-1911), whose verse epic *Prometheus Unbound* (after the title vignette of *The Birth of Tragedy*) was written in N's spirit, deeply impresses N and his friends; he is a member of a Viennese circle of N admirers and fervently wishes to meet him in person; N inquires whether he is Jewish and adds: "Recently, I have had many experiences that have aroused great expectations, especially among young people of that origin." Distances himself from Lipiner, who tries to "dispose my life from afar." Together with Reinhard von Seydlitz, who visited N in Sorrento, Lipiner made plans to place N in the hands of renowned Viennese neurologists. *Human, All Too Human* deters Lipiner in turn from N, whereupon Lipiner is for some time welcome in Bayreuth. Comprehensive medical examinations by Dr. Otto Eiser and colleagues in Frankfurt. Eiser is founder of a Wagner Society there, venerates N, approached him in Rosenlauibad, offered him his help and earned his trust. He attributes N's headaches to his eye condition and forbids N to read and write for years to come. His then newly discovered electrotherapy fails. At Wagner's request, Eiser also tells him his opinion of N's illness, whereupon Wagner responds with his suspicion that his illness may be rooted in masturbation – which N denied to Eiser. When N later learned of Wagner's suggestion, he connects the "unnatural excesses" with alleged pederasty; he is furious: Wagner, he supposes, gives "samples of a profound perfidy of revenge." At the end of 1877, N resumes his teaching activities under great misgivings, but only at the university. Rée sends a copy of *The Origin of the Moral Sensations* with the dedication: "To the father of this writing its most grateful mother."

## 1878

N receives, with a shudder, Wagner's *Parsifal* and sees him sink down before the Christian cross, like an actor. One month on an unsuccessful water spa trip to Baden-Baden; his sister and Köselitz join him in his last week. *Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits* appears on the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Voltaire's death on May 30, 1878, with new themes, in particular a fundamental critique of metaphysics as well as contributions to "the history of the moral sensations." Burckhardt calls it "the sovereign book"; Rée admires it; N's old friends are disturbed. Cosima, who does not even read it, sees "Israel," "the evil," "in the shape of Dr. Rée" at work; Dr. Eiser recognizes "the beginning of brain disruption." In the *Bayreuther Blätter*, Wagner, without mentioning his

name, has a severe pamphlet appear against N, but continues to inquire about N's condition with concern; N would not let go of the conflict with Wagner until the end. The breach is manifest, N stands by Rée, dares now "to *be* a philosopher myself; in former times I revered philosophers." Wants to be alone: "Now I shake off what doesn't belong to *me*, people, as friends and enemies, habits, conveniences, books; I live in solitude for years until I am *allowed* to (and then probably *must*) commune with others, as a philosopher of *life* and matured and complete." His sister back to Naumburg. For four weeks at the Bernese Oberland, over 6,500 feet altitude. Works on the *Assorted Opinions and Maxims*. Then three weeks in Naumburg. In Basel, N moves into a small furnished room outside the city, leads the life of "an old man and hermit: complete abstinence from any contact, including friends, is part of it." Nevertheless, he remains "courageous" and "proud," feels "completely free" regarding Wagner: "I have to live for my *office* and my *task*." In the winter semester, under agony, continues his lectures in front of an increased audience, which keeps him going ("I can still stand it"). Friends find N unfalteringly kind and gracious.

## 1879

"Half dead from pain and exhaustion." *Assorted Opinions and Maxims* finished; Marie Baumgartner prepares the manuscript for print; Köselitz, who moved to Venice, reads the corrections; N urges the publisher to hurry. Living and teaching in Basel becomes a complete "torture" for N: "My soul is more patient than ever in all of this, that is the best," and "*being alone* is the most precious part of my health spa method." Detailed plans to live in Venice, too ("Whether *I can travel?* The question I often had was: whether I will still be *alive* then?"). Fruitless health spa in Geneva; his illness even worse ("I do not believe in recovery anymore"). For the summer semester, N announces lectures, but is unable to give them. Asks to be dismissed from the university and experiences understanding and gratitude: he is paid a pension from various funds, two-thirds of his prior salary, initially for six years. In addition, he receives small inheritances and, on a regular basis, packets from Naumburg; this is sufficient for N's ascetic life. Asks his sister to completely give up his household. Like everything her brother wrote, she keeps the notebooks that he wants to be burned; large parts of his library are kept in Overbeck's mother-in-law's villa, others are sold, and some he always takes with him in two suitcases. His wandering life begins ("*formerly*

professor now *fugitivus errans*," i.e., a wandering refugee). Looking for places where he can tolerate living, he comes for the first time to the Upper Engadin, to St. Moritz ("It is as if I am in the promised land"; "I want to stay here for a long time"). Works on *The Wanderer and his Shadow*; there, N describes "*Nature as Doppelgänger*," which allows him to rediscover himself "in the whole charm and gravity of the hills, lakes and forests of this high plateau that has fearlessly stretched itself out beside the terrors of the eternal snow, here where Italy and Finland have entered into a union and all the silvery tones of nature seem to have made their home." Beginning in 1881, he will return to this area every summer, except for 1882. Reorientations, including the plan to move into the old tower at the Zwinger in Naumburg and to grow vegetables ("not at all unworthy of a future 'sage'") in order to do "real work," "which takes time and effort without straining the head." Again, no improvement in his state of health. Expects a "sudden death, by convulsions," in the consciousness of "*having done his life's work*." Bad winter in Naumburg; as a remedy "rest as much as possible from my constant inner work, *recovery* from myself, which I have not had for years." At first rejects Rée's offer to come to him. At the end of 1879, *The Wanderer and his Shadow* appears as the 2<sup>nd</sup> part of the 2<sup>nd</sup> volume of *Human, All Too Human*: "The entire 'humanity' with 2 appendices is from a time of the most bitter and lasting pain – and yet it seems to me a thing full of health. This is my *triumph*."

## 1880

In January, Rée nevertheless visits N in Naumburg for several days. In mid-February, travel via Bozen, where N is held up by severe convulsions, to Riva; there, meets Köselitz, whom Rée discreetly supports financially; when Köselitz plays from Wagner's *Götterdämmerung*, N feels devastated. Venice at last: N lives with a view of the sea and the Isle of the Dead, San Michele; discovers a good diet, including an intellectual one ("In this the doctors are completely powerless, only one's own reason can help and mine has already helped me a lot"); he tirelessly walks in the shades of the narrow alleys without specific aims; the Piazza di San Marco becomes his "most beautiful study room." Dictates to Köselitz, who tries to work on his own compositions, "L'ombra di Venezia," which will become *Daybreak*. In July and August, via Carinthia to Marienbad: "Certainly not so much has been thought here since Goethe, and even Goethe

would not have let such fundamental things go through his head as I did – I was far beyond myself.” In September again in Naumburg, at the beginning of October, a travel without a fixed destination to the Lago Maggiore; there again in the worst condition. Finally, although he wants to go to Castellamare on the Gulf of Naples, N stays in Genoa: “Here I have crowds and peace and high mountain paths and what is more beautiful than my dream of it, the campo santo.” After a long search for suitable accommodation, he finds “the most unknown attic existence” without an oven (the winter will be harsh). Lives, whenever possible, no longer in hotels, but in cheap pensions or private rooms and does not eat at the *tables d’hôte*, but by himself. Writes letters almost exclusively to his mother and sister, Köselitz and Franz and Ida Overbeck. Needs complete solitude for his work: “I am *passionate* about *independence*, I sacrifice everything to it – probably because I have the most dependent soul and am tormented more on all the smallest ropes than others on chains.” Is able to think, read and write more easily again: “I live as if the centuries were nothing and follow my thoughts without thinking about the date and the newspapers.”

### 1881

“When the sun shines, I always go to a lonely rock by the sea and lie there in the open air under my parasol, quiet as a lizard; this has helped my head back up several times. Sea and pure sky!” In Genoa, N is called, according to his sister, “il piccolo santo” (the little saint). Finishes *Daybreak*. From the end of April, together with Köselitz and at his suggestion, they go to Recoaro near Vicenza; both work on correcting the galley proofs. But too much music, too little shade during the walks. Köselitz leaves at the end of May to the relief of both. N keeps struggling for a diet that would allow him to live bearably; lives ascetically without an ideal. In July, back to the Engadin. From St. Moritz, where everything fails, a “serious and amiable Swiss” takes him to Sils-Maria, to a modest house with a sufficiently dark room facing the forest, behind which a path leads right up into the mountains – the present “Nietzsche-Haus”: “all 50 conditions of my poor life seem fulfilled here.” *Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality* appears; hardly any more reactions. N maintains an undeterred “wandering-existence” with seven to eight hours of intense hiking per day, during which he writes down his thoughts in notebooks; stays on safe paths because of his near-blindness and, if possible, under shady trees. Continues



to suffer severely, but: "I have heavier things on me than my health and I can cope with carrying them too." As his own doctor, puts together his own little pharmacy; reckons with "terrible influences of atmospheric electricity" on him. Discovers in Spinoza "a predecessor and what a predecessor!" (Postcard to Overbeck dated July 30, 1881); a fortnight later, "at a mighty pyramidally block piled up not far from Surlei," behind which a very similar mountain pyramid appears, the thought of the eternal recurrence of the same comes to him: "Thoughts have risen on my horizons that I have not yet seen – I do not want to let anything be said about this, and keep myself in unshakable silence" (Letter to Köselitz, 14 August 1881); before August 26, 1881, N starts writing the first lines for *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Considers now everyone, even Rée, "who interrupts my Engadin work-summer, i.e., the promotion of my task, my 'one is necessary,' as my enemy" (Letter to his Sister, August 18, 1881). Suffers new torture ("corporis cruciatus"); a cry of despair to Overbeck on a postcard in Latin ("*Sum in puncto desperationis*" – 'I am at the point of despair'). At the end of September, return trip to Genoa, possible "only through a cramp of energy." Laborious search for an apartment. N experiences for the first time Georges Bizet's *Carmen* and will become more and more enthusiastic about this opera: "an ironic *antithesis* to Wagner."

## 1882

Beautiful January in Genoa, after which N titles the fourth book of his *Gay Science* ("Sanctus Januarius"). Beginning of February, Rée visits him; "refreshing," but N initially pays for the visit with severe convulsions; then cheerful. The two friends go on excursions and bathe together in the sea. Rée brings along an expensive Danish Malling-Hansen writing ball, paid for by N's sister, the first mass-produced typewriter, from which N expects more rest for his eyes and an independent completion of his manuscripts; but it is damaged when it arrives, proves to be bulky in use and is useless for N's purposes. N wants to financially support the overworked and ill Köselitz, who rejects this offer; N pushes his efforts for performances of Köselitz' music. In mid-March, Rée travels to Rome to Malwida von Meysenbug and meets Lou von Salomé (1861-1937). Lou, daughter of a German general in the Russian army, lives in Zurich together with her mother, studies theology and art history, and is recovering in Italy after having fallen ill. Rée describes her as "an energetic, incredibly intelligent

being with the most girlish, even childlike qualities”: N must “definitely get to know her.” N, however, departs at the end of March with a cargo ship to Messina in order to spend the summer there; the Wagners are in Sicily, too, since November 1881, and most recently also in Messina. N stays for three weeks without meeting them, and spreads silence about this stay, reporting only: “my new fellow citizens spoil and corrupt me in the most amiable way.” *Idylls from Messina*, published with Schmeitzner’s *Internationaler Monatsschrift* (which N previously rejected for being anti-Semitic); later, he integrates them into the *Songs of Prince Vogelfrei*, which he will add to Book V of the *Gay Science* in 1887; they include *Das nächtliche Geheimniss* (a man rows N out to sea at night and he experiences abysmal happiness – but it is all a dream). Confidently longs for friends again, comes to Rome, meets Lou in St. Peter’s Basilica. Revives unexpectedly. Spontaneous plans to study in “trinity” – together with Lou and Rée – in Vienna or Paris. First, a trip in the company of Lou’s mother to Orta, where Lou and N climb the Monte Sacro (and make the others wait a long time), then to Tribschen, where N reminisces on the old idyll (and cries), then, without Lou’s mother, to Lucerne, where the famous photo, arranged by N himself, is taken (Rée and N harnessed to a cart, Lou with a lilac-decorated whip). Both friends propose to Lou (N does so twice, the first time going through Rée). N in Naumburg from mid-May to mid-June, where, together with his sister and a scribe, he produces the manuscript of *The Gay Science*, which is published in mid-August. Not a word from Lou; N has Ida Overbeck talk with her about him, writes glowing letters to her (“the golden opportunity at the horizons of all my future life” – as “teacher” and “guide on the way to scientific production”). From the end of June on, a recreational summer retreat in Tautenburg near Jena, which his sister prepares; N himself prepares his sister for Lou; N and Lou need her as a chaperon. The two women, who *could not* stand each other, attend the premiere of *Parsifal* in Bayreuth together; N did not introduce them to each other beforehand; they quickly get into violent arguments, then come to Tautenburg, where they have to live together in the rectory. N and Lou go on many walks together; exciting philosophical exchange, N will never experience a similar one. Composes *Hymn to Friendship* to underlay Lou’s *Prayer to Life*, but asks Köselitz to “keep the term of a love affair away from our relationship. We are *friends*.” His sister plots against him and Lou; his mother calls N “an ‘insult to the family’ and ‘a disgrace to my father’s grave’”; Malwida likewise turns away. N wavers. Attempts to disparage Rée to Lou in Leipzig; she leaves

Leipzig with Rée in order to live together with him in friendship, first in Stibbe, then in Berlin. Later she will marry the Orientalist Andreas and maintain close relations with Rilke and Freud, among others, and open a successful psychoanalytic practice in 1915. N is extremely disappointed, threatens to lose his noble attitude; he morally accuses his friends in letter drafts which he never sends. Eventually he breaks with Lou and Rée as well as with his mother and sister and their "Naumburg 'virtue.'" Gets back to the verge of suicide; takes opium to forget himself. Visits Overbecks in Basel to talk with them, travels via Genoa, where his last apartment is rented out to someone else, to Rapallo. From then on, he remains decidedly alone.

### 1883

In late January, after a period of severe insomnia, N writes in ten days (the first part of) *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None* (the "Prologue" and "The Speeches of Zarathustra"). Calls his new book, himself still undecided how to take it, "a strange kind of 'moral sermons'"; "in the greatest sharpness a picture of my being as it is, as soon as I have once thrown off all my burden"; his "will"; "a fifth 'gospel'"; "the *most unbound* of my products"; "my last folly," which will put him "even among the 'literati' and 'writers'"; his "*son*"; his "*deepest seriousness*" and his "*whole philosophy*"; "the long-promised 'Antichrist'"; "an explosion of powers"; "a prologue, an entrance hall"; "my book of edification and encouragement." Lives in the "terrible feeling of responsibility at the highest peak of knowledge." Produces the manuscript himself and urges for its printing, which is delayed to N's great annoyance – first because of "half a million Christian hymnals," then because of Schmeitzner's anti-Semitic activities. The first part will appear (without an indication that it is only the first part) in late August 1883, when the second part is already in its galley proofs, and N is drafting the third part. On February 13, when N finishes the first part, Wagner dies in Venice, which puts N into a "prolonged nervous fever." End of February to beginning of May, again in Genoa ("calm, but in the blackest melancholy. My life is *miserable* in all its foundations, I feel this in every moment – and also that it had to happen in this way, and that it is my only 'form of existence'"). Then in Rome until mid-June in order to reconcile with his sister, who again plots against Lou and Rée, which N again succumbs to (he envisages a "pistol duel"); another break and another half-hearted reconciliation ("I am not made

for enmity and hatred,” they are “incompatible with my whole philosophy and way of thinking”). Feelings of revenge and hatred, for which he condemns himself and which make him despair. Even fears of “insanity,” which he forbids himself to speak about. His beloved sister becomes the hardest case of his moral criticism and his ethics. At the end of June, again in Sils-Maria; in Naumburg in September. His mother and sister urge him to return to the university and associate with “respectable people.” In fact, N plans to give lectures on Greek culture at the University of Leipzig (“the urge to teach is *strong* in me”), but when he encounters concerns from Leipzig regarding his “*ideas of God* and especially of Christianity,” he resigns: “a thought of despair, – I wanted distraction by hardest daily work, without actually being thrown back on my last tasks” – and triumphs at the same time: “I am one of the most terrible opponents of Christianity and have invented a mode of attack of which even Voltaire had no idea.” His sister, now 37, gets engaged to high school teacher and leading anti-Semite Dr. Bernhard Förster (1843-1889), who praised her brother in lectures and in whose thoughts she feels “so at home”; they will marry in 1885 and in 1886 she will follow him to his “Aryan” colony “Nueva Germania” in Paraguay, which fails, whereupon Förster commits suicide. She then “maltreats” N with anti-Semitic confessions and the “most poisonous suspicions” of his character, in such a way that he wants to break with her for good, but again is not capable of it; he desires this “vengeful and anti-Semitic goose” be in Paraguay; later, she will drastically doctor many of N’s letters in her favor. In early October, feels “incredibly down.” Via Genoa, Spezia and Villafranca to Nice. Now he regularly spends the summers in Sils-Maria, the winters in Nice, and the springs and falls in alternate places. Keeps in touch only with Köselitz, who continues to work for him, and with the Overbecks, whom he visits again and again; still oftentimes returns to Naumburg. Health: until 1888 in bad condition, interrupted only by some rays of light.

#### 1884

In mid-January, N completes the third part of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*; the second part appears. “The whole thing thus came into being exactly in the course of one year: in the strict sense even in the course of 3 x 2 weeks. – The last two weeks were the happiest of my life: I have never gone with such sails over such an ocean.” His new project is “a great *frontal attack* on *all* kinds

of the *present* German obscurantism." Köselitz writes him that from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* one must "begin a new era of time"; N would one day be revered as the "founder of religion"; N takes this even further: "I want to urge mankind to make decisions which decide on the whole human future, and it *may* come about that one day whole millennia will make their highest vows in my name." In mid-April, via Genoa to Venice and via Basel (where he "with an eerie whispering voice" initiates Overbeck into the "secret doctrine" of eternal recurrence; Overbeck later considers this a sign of N's mental illness) again to Sils-Maria. At the end of August, Heinrich Freiherr von Stein (1857-1887) visits him in Sils-Maria; Rée had announced him in 1876 as a "young man of 19 years, with a soul of fire, a noble appearance, shining eyes and a deep receptivity for all great things," in short as a "splendid specimen." Stein, who earned his doctorate with his dissertation *On Perceptions* and habilitated with a writing on *The Significance of the Poetic Element in the Philosophy of Giordano Bruno*, was introduced into Malwida von Meysenbug's circle, was temporarily the teacher of Siegfried Wagner, co-edited a *Wagner Encyclopedia* in 1883 and a collection of essays (initiated by Wagner) on *Heroes and the World: Dramatic Images* and now gives lectures in Berlin; above all Wilhelm Dilthey had supported him. He arouses great hopes in N ("At last a new man who belongs to me and who instinctively feels awe for me"). But Stein evades him; N will heavily lament his early death in 1887 ("I really loved him; it seemed to me that he was saved for my later age"). More admirers, especially female ones. After N's visit to him, Gottfried Keller speculates: "that guy is crazy." Another month with his sister in Zurich. In a rehearsal, Friedrich Hegar, with his orchestra, performs the overture of Köselitz' opera *The Lion of Venice* for N; Köselitz comes to Zurich to conduct the piece himself. All in all, good weeks. N again takes heavy sleeping pills, which he partly prescribes himself (signing as Dr. Nietzsche). Via Mentone back to Nice.

## 1885

Nice, then again to Venice, Sils-Maria and, via Leipzig, Naumburg, Munich, Florence and Genoa, then back to Nice. In mid-February, N finishes the fourth part of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, which he initially entitles *Zarathustra's Temptation*. It appears – since N wants to get rid of Schmeitzner, who does little for his books and owes N a lot of money, and he cannot find another publisher

– with financial support from Gersdorff as a private print in 45 copies (20 were planned) at C. G. Naumann in Leipzig. Only a few copies of *Zarathustra IV* are sent out with the request for strict secrecy; N tries to get them back, too, at the end of 1888; a purchasable edition does not appear before 1892. The pension from Basel is granted for another three years, albeit reduced by one third. In “a kind of life settlement” on the occasion of her wedding and for the “direction” of their further relationship, N writes to his sister on May 20, that he “until now, from childhood on, had not found anyone with whom I would have the same distress on my heart and conscience,” that he had always been forced “to present myself, as well as possible, and often with a much worse mood, in any of the varieties of humanity permitted and understandable today,” and had only accepted this as long as he “could *absolutely no* longer bear the loneliness.” For this reason, he was never able to “declare himself”; for his words always had “different colors”: “Everything I have written so far is foreground; for myself it always starts with the dashes (*Gedankenstriche*). There are things of the most dangerous kind that I have to deal with; that I sometimes recommend Schopenhauer or Wagner to the Germans in a popular manner, sometimes invent Zarathustras, these are recreations for me, but above all also hiding places behind which I can sit for a while.” Makes plans about living with his mother, who is lonely now, in Venice. All in all, he feels content, “health decisively improved,” “a kind of halcyon state.”

### 1886

Similar travel routine as 1885: between Sils-Maria and Nice, this time for four weeks in Ruta Ligure, south of Genoa. His search for a new publisher remains difficult. *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*, “a terrible book, which this time has flowed from my soul, – very black, almost squid,” appears again at N’s expense with C.G. Naumann; 66 free copies are sent out, low sales, but several reviews, of which N relishes one, that of J.V. Widmann in Bern’s *Bund*: it provides the keyword “dynamite” for N’s thinking. In Hippolyte Taine (1828-1893) – an influential French publicist and professor of fine arts, who, as a positivist, sees social and intellectual phenomena as based on race, milieu, and historical situation; criticizes the French Revolution for blindly believing in ideas; and presents Napoleon I. as the great individual rising above the masses and founder of modern Europe – N discovers a like-minded spirit;

he will defend him bitterly against a derogatory remark by Rohde, with whom he will fully part ways over this issue. N's former publisher Fritzsich buys back the old holdings of N's books; N adds new prefaces to *The Birth of Tragedy*, *Human, All Too Human*, *Daybreak* and *The Gay Science* (without having all these works at hand) and tries to develop in them an initial genealogy of his own thinking; these new editions, of which he would not even receive free copies, will likewise sell poorly. Plans for "a four-volume major work," "the title is already frightening: '*The Will to Power. Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values.*'" A lot of plans of this kind; the 'main work' (*Hauptwerk*) never appears in this shape. At the end of 1886, the first three parts of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* are published in one volume with Fritzsich.

### 1887

Slightly changed travel routine: between Nice and Sils-Maria, Lago Maggiore, Chur and Lenzer Heide. N remembers "a whole afternoon where I felt healthy, and there is no doubt that every winter for 7 years I've made a hop in the direction where health lives"; but again, setbacks. In Monte Carlo, he listens for the first time to the prelude of *Parsifal*: in "purely aesthetic" terms, for him, the best that Wagner ever created, a "melancholy view of love." Causing a nuisance for N, the *Anti-Semitic Correspondence*, of all publications, regularly quotes from his *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Again, asks Köselitz to collaborate: "Don't be angry, dear friend, especially this time it won't work without you. Last October, I scribbled a fifth book as quickly as possible in addition to the aforementioned 'science' (in order to give it a kind of equivalence to *Daybreak*, namely from a *bookbinding* point of view –) and now I am somewhat curious myself about what I might have written this time. It's completely gone from my memory." When the publisher hesitates, N wants to leave the fifth book of the *Gay Science* "unprinted" and possibly incorporate it into a second edition of *Beyond Good and Evil*; the new edition with the fifth book and the *Songs of Prince Vogelfrei* will be published in June. Discovers Dostoevsky: "the sudden talking instinct of having met a relative here." On February 23, heavy earthquake in Nice; N's pension is affected too; he remains completely calm. "A strange fact": "In all radical parties (socialists, nihilists, anti-Semites, Christians, Orthodox, Wagnerians) I enjoy a strange and almost mysterious reputation. The extreme sincerity of the atmosphere in which I have placed myself is seductive ..." His "task" is still pending: "The necessity

on the other hand lies on me with the weight of a hundred centner to build up *a coherent construction of thought* in the next years – and for this I need five six conditions, all of which are still missing and seem unattainable to me!” (Letter to Overbeck, March 24, 1887). Waits four weeks in Chur, until the Engadine was no longer too cold; uses the time for studies in the library. Attempts his coherent construction of thought on June 7 in Lenzer Heide, the draft (not a fragment!) entitled “*European Nihilism*” (*Der europäische Nihilismus*) in 16 points. Follows this draft to some degree in his *On the Genealogy of Morality. A Polemic*; the first two treatises (*Abhandlungen*) are written between June 10 and 30, the third by August 28; the book is published in November again with C.G. Naumann (“Exactly like ‘*Beyond*’”). Meanwhile, in Sils-Maria, regularly meets with Meta von Salis, another women’s rights activist, and her friend Hedwig Kym (“In the summer of ’87, Nietzsche was sometimes very cheerful and in the mood for harmless jokes”), without sharing his insights with them (“I do as well as I can conversing with the two ladies”). The composition *Hymn to Life* appears under N’s name with Lou’s text and in Köselitz’ orchestration. The Danish Georg Brandes alias Morris Cohen (1842-1927) contacts N: He studied philosophy and wrote his habilitation thesis on Hippolyte Taine, but was for a long time denied a professorship in Denmark because of his struggle for the freedom of speech, went to Berlin, where he became acquainted with Rée and Lou and, through them, with the writings of N, who in turn sent him review copies of *Beyond Good and Evil* and *On the Genealogy of Morality*. After August Strindberg, at Brandes’ suggestion, likewise becomes interested in N, Brandes will give lectures on N first in Copenhagen and then in half of Europe. Makes N widely known under the label “aristocratic radicalism.” N’s fame begins: “*Sic incipit gloria mundi.*”

### 1888

In the winter “many radical problems and decisions.” In Nice until the beginning of April, then Turin (“They praise the *dry* air, the quiet streets”; one can “reach it from Nice in one day”). Takes the wrong train and arrives at San Pier d’Arena near Genoa, sick and without luggage. Turin makes him happy: “I like the city in an indescribable way” – “Here everything is free and far.” While the Engadine is *his* landscape, Turin is *his* city. Impressed by its “noblesse,” he equips himself with new clothes. Courtesy by the dean of Turin’s Faculty of



Philosophy. In the summer once again in Sils-Maria, “in a miserable state,” now “under the pressure of nervous exhaustion.” More courtesy: an anonymous donor sends him 2000 marks, which N accepts for the printing of his writings; musicians play for him “a piece by my Venice maestro” six times in a row. In mid-July, the “pamphlet” *The Case of Wagner: A Musician's Problem* (published in mid-September); at the beginning of September, draft of *Twilight of the Idols, or, How to Philosophize with a Hammer*: “the content of the very worst and most radical, although hidden under many finesses and mitigations. It is a complete overall introduction to my philosophy”; the title, coming from Köselitz, “another malice against Wagner” (additions until the beginning of October; *Twilight of the Idols* appears at the end of November, distributed at the end of January 1889). N prepares the manuscripts, Köselitz reads the galley proofs and suggests edits. Back in Turin at the end of September, N suddenly feels surprisingly painless; a tremendous boost in productivity: “All of a sudden, everything was in order. Wonderful clarity, autumn colors, an exquisite feeling of well-being in all things.” After only a few days, draft of *The Anti-Christ: A Curse on Christianity* (published only in 1895); N prepared it in Sils-Maria, considering it for a while as the first book of the “*Transvaluation of All Values*”: “I am now the most grateful man in the world – *autumnally* minded in every good sense of the word: it is my great *harvest time*. Everything becomes easy for me, everything comes to me, although hardly anyone has ever had such great things under his hands.” On his 44<sup>th</sup> birthday, N begins working on *Ecce Homo: How to Become What You Are*; provisionally completes it on November 4; he delays the printing; first wants to have it translated into all major languages and not “accelerate too much the *tragic catastrophe*” of his life; EH will be published only in 1908. “When I consider all the crimes I committed between September 3 and November 4, I fear that the earth will soon *tremble*.” He sees himself (ironically?) as “ripe for being the ‘world’s savior.’” Wants to buy back his “entire literature” from Fritzsche and entrust it to Naumann, but no agreement on a price. Reflects on gaining the Jewish “great capital” for his “*extermination strike against Christianity*”: “If we *win*, we have the government of the earth in our hands – including the world peace... We have overcome the absurd boundaries of race nation and estates: there is only rank order between human and human, and an enormously long ladder of rank order. / There you have the first paper in world history: *Great politics par excellence*” (letter draft to Georg Brandes, beginning of Dec. 1888). N considers himself the pinnacle of

the European spirit and therefore also politically responsibly for Europe: drafts letters to Kaiser Wilhelm II and to Bismarck for sending them *The Antichrist*; telegrams to the King and Queen of Italy in order to invite them to his room on the occasion of their visit to Turin. Calls friends and acquaintances to account who do not understand his philosophical rank, except for Overbeck. Brandes draws N's attention to Kierkegaard, but he no longer has the chance to read him. August Strindberg is enthusiastic about *The Case of Wagner*; N tries to win him over for the French translation of *Ecce Homo*. In France, he expects a better understanding for his anti-German attitude: It is "high time that I am reborn as a Frenchman." When a review of *The Case of Wagner* appears that seems inadequate to N, he compiles pieces of his previous Wagner criticism into *Nietzsche contra Wagner: From the Files of a Psychologist* (printed quickly in 100 copies, but N does not send them out). Compiles and revises songs (mainly taken) from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* as *Dionysian-Dithyrambs* (published only in 1891). Finally, he replaces the section *Why I am so Wise 3* in *Ecce Homo* with a text that was found only in 1969: "The way my mother and sister treat me to this very day is a source of unspeakable horror: a perfect infernal machine (*Höllmaschine*) is at work here, which can tell with unerring certainty the exact moment I can be hurt – in my highest moments, ... because at that point I do not have the strength to resist poisonous worms..." In a "heroic-aristophanic exuberance," N works "on a promemoria for the European courts for the purpose of an anti-German league." Finds himself honored all around, even by market women and waiters. The story of him embracing a beaten horse could just be a legend.

### 1889

Until January 5, the so-called "insanity notes," including a letter to Jacob Burckhardt, who alerts Overbeck, who immediately travels to Turin, finding N (according to C.A. Bernoulli's report) in a state of orgiastic frenzy, and who brings the fiercely reluctant N to Basel to the psychiatric clinic (Overbeck: "I've never seen such a horrible picture of destruction"). N states that he "feels so infinitely well that he can only express this in music" (Basel hospital journal). Diagnosis: progressive paralysis. His mother takes N to Jena's psychiatric clinic, and later to her home. Overbeck and Köselitz provisionally keep all his unpublished writings (the *Nachlass*) and make copies of *The Anti-Christ* and

*Ecce Homo*. Julius Langbehn (1851-1907), who in 1890 successfully publishes his anonymous *Rembrandt as Educator* – echoing N's *Schopenhauer as Educator* – spreading culturally pessimistic, nationalist, and anti-Semitic ideas, intends, without a pertinent education, to heal N, who visibly responds to him, through walks and conversations, and tries to become the conservator of N; eventually Overbeck prevents this. N is pronounced legally insane, his mother becomes his conservator, her brother, pastor Edmund Oehler, the counter conservator, although she suggests Overbeck; after Edmund Oehler's death in 1891, his son Adalbert follows.

### 1890-1900

After long negotiations, the publishing rights remain with Naumann; Köselitz begins a complete edition, including all four parts of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*; the first big royalties come in. Now, N quickly gains fame; the literature about him explodes; Lou Salomé's book *Friedrich Nietzsche in His Works* appears in 1894; from 1895 on, the three-volume biography of his sister. Walks with N in Naumburg become impossible. From 1893 on, N sits in a wheelchair, never leaves home. N's sister returns from Paraguay, first engages in propaganda for the "Renewal of the New Germania," then intervenes in the organization of N's *Nachlass*, founds a "Nietzsche Archive" in her mother's home, has N paint in his mother's absence, and exhibits the paintings. Since N does not remain calm, she moves with the archive to another, more representative house. Attempting to publish N's *Nachlass* as quickly as possible, she wears out numerous editors. She stops Köselitz' complete edition; after serious arguments and smear campaigns, she extorts the rights from her mother. After her mother's death in 1897, she gains complete control over her brother. Symptoms of paralysis, strokes; more and more often in bed. Meta von Salis, who recently supported the printing of N's works, gives the money for purchasing the Villa Silberblick in Weimar, where Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche houses the Nietzsche Archive and lives with her brother. She occasionally presents him to visitors. On August 25, 1900, N dies after a severe cold and a stroke. Non-church burial next to his father's grave along the wall of the church of Röcken. The church register records: "Born in Röcken on October 15, 1844, as son of the then pastor Nietzsche, and therefore Protestant, but according to his philosophical works *anti-Christian*."



## II.

### **Nietzsche's Assessment of His Life Experiences for His Philosophizing**

The reported life experiences of Nietzsche's, however, are only marginally mentioned in his works. And yet he very consciously brought his own person, the personal conditions of his philosophizing, into play, thereby courageously breaking a rule of philosophy as science, that for the sake of its objectivity and universal validity, everything personal must take a back seat. When he reissued some of his works in 1886, providing them with new prefaces, he explained in some detail the significance of his life on his work; and after completing *The Anti-Christ*, his "Curse on Christianity," he did so once more in a special text with a similarly startling title, *Ecce Homo* (EH). "Ecce homo" is what Pilate is supposed to have said about Jesus of Nazareth when he handed him over to the High Council of the Jewish People for sentencing, without having understood him, but also without finding any fault with him. EH is not an autobiography in the usual sense: as such, it would be incomplete in many respects, and fictional in others. Nietzsche attempted something else: He interpreted his life philosophically as a "great detachment" or "great liberation" ("grosse Loslösung") – a liberation from deeply incorporated bindings of thinking, which was only possible for him, Nietzsche. What seemed essential to him was that he had been able to give up what he believed in most strongly, what had bound him most firmly: at first philology, then Schopenhauer and his metaphysics of a blind will at the bottom of life, then Wagner and his idea of the renewal of culture through his music, and finally his friends on whom he had relied so much. He came to see the task of philosophy in this detachment, in the liberation from faith, from spiritual ties of all kinds, so as to become a 'free spirit,' one able to liberate itself from any new faith that imposes itself on it. What helped Nietzsche most strongly in doing so was, as he saw it, his own illness. But his self-liberation went beyond biographical matters; thus, one cannot understand his philosophizing without his life, but also not from it.

In the prefaces to the new editions of his books of aphorisms HH, D and GS, Nietzsche deals far more with his “great liberation” than with these books themselves. This liberation comes, he writes, “like the shock of an earthquake,” as “a sudden terror and suspicion” against everything that “the youthful soul” had loved up to that time, “a rebellious, arbitrary, volcanically erupting desire for travel, strange places, estrangements, coldness, soberness, frost, a hatred of love,” “where it formerly worshipped,” as simply “shame” over this liberating hatred, and as “a drunken inwardly exultant shudder which betrays that a victory has been won” (HH I, Preface 3). According to Nietzsche, such a detachment is preceded by “years of temptation and experiment” that lead to “morbid isolation” – he initially introduces his illness metaphorically, and only later more and more physiologically. The illness of loneliness could become the means of a “great health,” which is great because it gets stronger with every new attack of illness (see chap. XI.6); it could bring about a “mature freedom of the spirit,” which has “the dangerous privilege of living experimentally and of being allowed to offer itself to adventure.” One could then see all things in a new way, especially the “close and closest things,” learn to take health and illness in doses, in both a metaphorical and physiological sense, and begin to become “wise.” Such an “ever freer spirit” then understands what the great detachment frees one to do: to “unhook and hook” perspectives on life, no longer submitting to the “For and Against” of the dominant morals, but getting them under one’s “control.” This freedom, however, poses the most serious problem to dominant morals, “the problem of the order of rank” of people who do not have the same freedom and power to take responsibility for their own actions and make decisions about moral standards; even to accept this simple fact presupposes a higher moral rank (see chap. XI.4). In this regard, complete universality in philosophy is impossible or a mere illusion, especially in questions of morality (HH I, Pref. 4-8).

In the preface to HH II, Nietzsche speaks more personally, more openly of himself. He outlines with what and from what he had detached himself: with his UM from “cultural philistinism,” from the “historical sickness” and, despite all veneration, from Schopenhauer and Wagner – from his own Romanticism (see GS 370). With HH, he had experienced “long intervening years” of “an inner solitude and privation”: as part of his “precepts of health” he had undergone an “anti-romantic self-treatment.” But the separation from Wagner, the “decaying, despairing romantic,” had initially made him – again in the physiological-moral double sense – not healthy, but “sick,” “more than

sick, namely tired, from the unending disappointment with everything we modern men have left to inspire us, from the disappointment with the energy, labor, hope, youth, love everywhere dissipated." For then his "task," the only remedy left to him, withdrew. He continued to work, he writes, and his work preserved "an equilibrium and composure in the face of life and even a sense of gratitude towards it"; he had, "as physician and patient in one," forced himself for some time into a state of "optimism"; he had, by "a protracted wandering around" from one "clime of the soul" to another and by "an unchaining from all coarser desires," struggled for "independence in the midst of all kinds of unfavourable outward circumstances" – and in this way, he eventually regained his task and health. Thus the "experience" of his life was "the history of an illness and recovery." It was an individual's experience, which he shares with other individuals who understand it in their own way and who may either fall ill or recover from it. Freed from the usual longing for agreement in something common and vulgar, and for the reassurance it creates, he now had "the longing for a great enemy" (HH II, Pref. 1-7).

He found this enemy, as he then writes in the preface to D, in Western, or as Nietzsche called it, 'European' morality itself, which insists on universality and which was most strongly solidified by a metaphysics that it had created as its own foundation and which remained unshaken even by Kant's critique. He, Nietzsche, had undermined this bastion like a mole, alone and underground, and slowly dug himself up to a new "dawn" or "daybreak."

Eventually, in the new preface to GS, Nietzsche speaks of his book itself as an "experience," of the "gratitude of a convalescent," the "drunkenness of recovery," the "jubilation of returning strength" that emanates from this book – which can only be shared by those who themselves have "experienced something similar." At the same time, he distances himself from himself: "But let us leave Mr. Nietzsche: what is it to us that Mr. Nietzsche has got well again?"

He now introduces the universal, without which we cannot do, in a different way: not by stating that something universal is true, but rather that it is something that someone brings into play in order to get others to do something, others who can then accept it or not, on their own terms and on their own responsibility. In this regard, people necessarily follow their 'desires' or, if their circumstances leave them no other choice, their 'needs.' It is, according to Nietzsche, always "needs" that drive philosophy, especially in the case of ill thinkers, and all thinkers – he metaphorizes and universalizes

the concept of sickness – have been or are sick, if not in a physiological, then in a moral sense. It is precisely because they are or have been sick that they have been philosophizing. Nietzsche no longer assumes their proximity to being, but rather to being sick; their being sick forces philosophers into “self-questioning, self-temptation.” But “what will become of the thought that is itself subjected to the pressure of illness?” Could philosophy have “been no more than an interpretation of the body and a misunderstanding of the body”? A philosopher is, according to Nietzsche’s experience, which he now generalizes in his own way, a “physician” – first of all for oneself, as he, Nietzsche, had tried to be for himself. If philosophers succeed in fighting their way through to the great health, they will be free to go “through many kinds of health” and “through an equal number of philosophies,” and in turn they will bring them under control as perspectives on life. They then transform or ‘transfigure’ their life into thinking, and the coincidences that have contributed to this are left behind. Disease and pain are only the most spectacular and evident coincidences, but also the ones that most strongly make life into a “problem” and, for philosophers, into a philosophical problem. If they eventually succeed in dealing with these problems easily – but only few will succeed in this – they will then also get to know “a new happiness,” “the delight in the unknown X.” What they tell each is indeed something universal, but also something highly individual: an “art for artists” (GS, Pref. 1-4).

Just as Nietzsche’s new prefaces to his books of aphorisms were hardly prefaces anymore, so too did he invent with EH yet another new genre. After he asked in GM how, and under which conditions, ‘European’ morality had become possible – a morality which eventually produced the ‘scientific conscience’ – and showed that precisely the scientific discovery of these conditions and thus the ‘self-discovery’ of European morality had to lead to its ‘self-overcoming,’ he now consistently asks further why, under which conditions, this ‘self-discovery’ of European morality became possible for him, ‘Mr. Nietzsche.’ He attempts a genealogy of himself as the ‘discoverer’ of European morality. He questions his life regarding the circumstances and events that made possible the most profound revaluation that European philosophy had witnessed since Socrates. In his youth, from time to time, he had drawn up autobiographies but then abandoned them. Now he poses the autobiographical question “who I am” in the form of four genealogical questions: “Why I am so wise,” “Why I am so clever,” “Why I write such



good books” and “Why I am a destiny.” By common standards, Nietzsche was without question wise and clever; he indeed wrote good books and became a destiny of philosophy and perhaps even of mankind; nevertheless, this was improbable, and we must try to understand it in its improbability.

Nietzsche begins with the “greatness of my task” (EH, Pref. 1). He introduces himself not as a “monster of morality,” but as “a disciple of the philosopher Dionysus,” whom he himself had proclaimed to be the god of his philosophizing (see BGE 295). He did not want to “‘improve’” humanity, but “knock over idols (my word for ‘ideals’),” i.e., undermine humanity’s supposed right to have such idols. His loneliness in the midst of people, to which he had been exposed all his life with his thinking, freed him to “visit all the strange and questionable aspects of existence, everything banned by morality so far.” “How much truth can a spirit bear, how much truth is it willing to dare?” – this became his criterion for the rank order of people. And then he lets *Zarathustra*, the work, with which he “has given humanity the greatest gift it has ever received,” speak for itself (EH, Preface 2-4). Nietzsche’s life manifests itself in his work, creating the conditions for it.

To be wise means to have gained from the often-painful experiences of one’s life a kind of knowledge that makes one’s life calm and composed, which helps to lead it in a just manner concerning everyone and everything. Nietzsche was able to become wise, he writes, because even early on he was distinguished by “neutrality,” “that freedom from partisanship in relation to the overall problem of life.” He owes this neutrality to a certain “fatefulness: as my father I am already dead and as my mother I am still alive and growing old.” From his father he received a looming morbidity, from his mother, an indestructible vitality (see Hans Gerald Hödl, *Der letzte Jünger des Philosophen Dionysos: Studien zur systematischen Bedeutung von Nietzsches Selbstthematizierungen im Kontext seiner Religionskritik*, Berlin/New York: 2009, 538). He thus, he reports, lived on as a sick person, often on the verge of death. But this also meant that he was given a ‘task,’ a true life’s task: making his medically unmanageable suffering, which was physically difficult and emotionally deeply depressing, so fruitful for his philosophizing that he would in this way be able to survive. He had to try to learn from his experience of illness and, without wanting to, become wise in the process. The extreme tension between morbidity and vitality, a sign of physiological decadence, at the same time made him, he argues, clairvoyant in regard to the illness of his age: cultural decadence. For the “optics of sickness”

refine, for Nietzsche, “observation itself as well all organs of observation” to the utmost; they taught him, he claims, “that filigree art of grasping and comprehending in general, that finger for nuances, that psychology of ‘looking around the corner,’” which has distinguished him ever since. This art made him, he argues – and in referencing it Nietzsche recalls his new prefaces – a master of “switching perspectives: the first reason why a ‘revaluation of values’ is even possible, perhaps for me alone.” (EH, *Why I am so wise* 1) Since it made possible his detachments, for him “sickness” became “an energetic stimulus to life, to being more alive” (ibid., 2). As Nietzsche wrote to Overbeck on New Year’s Eve 1882, it challenged his “strongest force,” that of “self-overcoming” (KSB 6.314), and became the engine of his philosophizing: “I made my will to health, to life, into my philosophy ...” Because he knew how to make virtues out of necessity, he became, he writes, “a well-turned-out person” and “a principle of selection” – the principle of selection is the principle of the evolution of life itself – and thus he grew beyond the superficial opposition of good and evil, and no longer believed “in neither ‘bad luck’ nor ‘guilt’” (EH, *Why I am so wise* 2). Through his illness he approached what he called in GM “an autonomous, supra-moral individual” (*autonomes übersittliches Individuum*, GM II 2).

But this would require further conditions. Being capable of “accessing apparently separate worlds,” as he initially wrote in his manuscript, allowed him not only to bear his illness, but also to overcome politically limited perspectives, especially the German and hyper-German in favor of a European one: it did not cost him any effort to be “a ‘good European.’” For this, a German had to be more than just German and would have to be such not only in his thinking, but also corporeally, from birth. Nietzsche kept alive the legend he had been told in his childhood: that his “ancestors were Polish noblemen” who had given up their homeland and their nobility because they were Protestants. Because of his appearance, he had been addressed as a Pole, which he was very proud of as a child, and in Sorrento he was in fact called “il Polacco.” The Polish people (who, in Nietzsche’s time, were treated by many Germans with hostility out of a nationalistic mindset) were considered by him “the most talented and chivalrous among the Slavic peoples” and “the talent of the Slavs [...] higher than that of the Germans.” But what he particularly appreciated was the Polish people’s urge for personal independence, which was expressed in the Polish nobleman’s right “to overturn the decision of an assembly with his simple veto” and in the fact that Copernicus the Pole (whose

nationality was also the subject of dispute) had seized the right, “against the verdict and the impression of all other people,” not to have the sun rotate around the earth but the earth around the sun (N Summer 1882, 21[1]). Such strong, independent attitudes could, Nietzsche likewise held already in BGE 264, only have been grown and bred in a long sequence of strong independent ancestors, and in this sense the children’s fairy tale of his Polish ancestry gave a better account of what he was than the church books. His mother Franziska, née Oehler, and her family were, however, clearly German for him. The German great-grandmother on his father’s side, Erdmuthe Krause, on the other hand, could have been – here too, Nietzsche relies on a historically untenable legend – “Muthgen,” who was friends with (the good European) Goethe in 1778. Through his paternal grandmother, he sought to establish a connection to Napoleon, whom he considered the founder of modern Europe: she had given birth to his father “on the day of the major year of war 1813, when Napoleon with his general staff invaded Eilenburg, on October 10”: “She was, as a Saxon, a great admirer of Napoleon; it could be that I still am too.” And since his father, before Nietzsche’s birth, taught for some years the princesses of Saxony-Altenburg and gave Nietzsche, his first son, the name of the Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm IV, on whose birthday Nietzsche was born, he wanted to at least ensure that he was up to the standard among the Germans, even though he did not share his father’s piety at all and, regardless of his “Hohenzollern name,” made, when working on EH, a scathing attack on Kaiser Wilhelm II, who came to power in 1888 (N December 1888 – January 89, 25[13]-[16]). Nietzsche was clearly not interested in an autobiography based on documented facts.

Nevertheless, he did not publish any of this in that way. He eventually replaced the 3rd section of “Why I am so wise” with an even bolder one, in which he even claims: “I am a pure-blooded Polish nobleman without a single drop of bad blood, certainly not German blood.” Instead of providing any autobiographical facts, he openly expresses his aversion to them, and the most repulsive fact seems to him that he is related to his mother and sister. His horror at the morally well-meant infamies of these women, which hit him the hardest when he was with Lou von Salomé, the only person who could respond to him on his level and who was able to push him further with her questions, made him doubt the thought, be it serious or ironic, which he had considered as the heaviest weight in Za:

“But I will admit that the greatest objection to ‘eternal return,’ my truly abysmal thought, is always my mother and sister.” (EH, Why I am so wise 3)

He was willing to doubt his thinking if his experience contradicted it, and he conversely trusted it only if his experience did not contradict it. He even had his Zarathustra feel only weariness and disgust at the thought of eternal return, precisely because it also meant the return of the ‘little people’ (*kleinen Menschen*) who cling to their morals, through which they justify themselves and with which they poison everything that is superior and thus incomprehensible to them (see Za III, The Convalescent 2). The ‘infernal machine’ of little people like Nietzsche’s mother and sister (EH, Why I am so wise 3) requires, in order to endure it, extreme distance from their humanity, that is, in their sense, “divinity.” Against them, Nietzsche holds like a shield his “Tribschen days” with Cosima and Richard Wagner, which he, even after breaking with them, did not want to forget at any costs, “days of trust, of cheerfulness, of sublime chance – of profound moments . . .” (EH, Why I am so clever 5); in a sense, he is related to such people. It is thus fully clear what ‘kinship’ here means for him:

“People are least related to their parents: it would be the most extreme sign of vulgarity to be related to your parents. Higher natures have their origins infinitely further back; collecting, economizing, accumulating has gone on longest for their sake. Great individuals are the oldest: I do not understand it, but Julius Caesar could be my father – or Alexander, that Dionysus incarnate . . .” (EH, Why I am so wise 3)

It was Wagner who spoke in this way and who, despite his excessive, even megalomaniac sense of mission, eventually asserted himself. Nietzsche simply continues this notion of ‘kinship.’ From its beginnings, Western philosophy had invoked ‘divinity’: Parmenides, by creating a new goddess for his new truth; Socrates, by appealing to the god of Delphi’s oracle in his search for truth; subsequent philosophers by going, like Plato, beyond all individual living conditions and believing to see the world from a godlike theoretical standpoint.

Nietzsche, by contrast, brought out the very humanity of such a divinity. He speaks, again in memory of his father, of his humanity; his sociability and friendliness, with which he never made enemies; his sovereignty, with which

he always mastered even surprising situations; his “sensitivity for distances,” even in pity; his commitment to the “height of his task”; his resistance to any kind of “retaliation,” “defensive or ‘justificatory’ measures”; his “subtlety and courtesy of the heart,” which would rather answer with offensive coarseness than with cold silence and thus take the blame; in short: his nobility (EH, *Why I am so wise* 4-5). Just as he might have owed his nobility to his father, so did he owe his “freedom from resentment” to his illness, which made him, Nietzsche writes, so sensitive that it eventually allowed him to have no reaction at all: “Since any sort of reaction wears you out too quickly, you do not react at all: this is the reasoning. And nothing burns you up more quickly than the affects of resentment.” He consistently regarded his freedom from *ressentiment*, from the *ressentiment*-morality as his mother and sister exemplified it, not as moral virtue, but as a mere condition of survival in his extreme life situation, as “sureness of instinct in practice” (EH, *Why I am so wise* 6). And even if this was merely an interpretation, this interpretation for him was likewise a condition of survival, a strategy of the “great reason” of his body, which he had his Zarathustra distinguish from the “little reason” on which European philosophy had relied so much as a foundation of morality and metaphysics, but which was nevertheless only “a small work- and plaything” of far more complex survival strategies hardly accessible to it (Za I, *Of the Despisers of the Body*). In the case of a supersensitive sick person like him, great reason demands “fatalism,” to accept the given as it is, as inevitable fate, and therefore also “almost intolerable situations, places, lodgings, company, just because they happened to come my way, – this was better than changing them, than thinking that they could be changed – than rebelling against them . . .” (EH, *Why I am so wise* 6). Being able to do this, Nietzsche adds in the following section, is “amor fati,” his “formula for human greatness” (EH, *Why I am so clever* 10; see chap. XI.8).

That he was able to do so explained to him his noble “war practice.” First, he writes, he seeks out “opponents” that are “equal,” things that are “winning,” in order to overcome them. Secondly, he avoids “allies,” but relies on his own strength, with which one is “only comprising” oneself. Thirdly, he targets persons only so far as he can make visible in them “a general, though insidious and barely noticeable, predicament”; and fourthly he does this only “where there is no question of personal differences, where there has not been a history of bad experiences.” This applies also and especially to his “war” on Christianity: “I

have the right to wage war on Christianity because I have never been put out or harmed by it, – the most serious Christians have always been well disposed towards me.” (EH, *Why I am so wise* 7)

However, his ‘neutrality,’ which he does not claim in a metaphysical or transcendental-philosophical way, but which he gained with difficulty from his living conditions, also has its limits within these living conditions. These limits are, according to Nietzsche, where the great reason of his overgrown sensitivity becomes a “perfectly uncanny irritability of the instinct of cleanliness,” a “disgust” with every kind of dishonesty, of deception and self-deception, especially in philosophizing: “extreme purity with respect to myself is the condition for my existence, I die under unclean conditions.” This purity of reason, no longer imagined but experienced, does not permit him an apparently casual agreement with others, but forces him to “constant self-overcoming” and, where he runs out of strength to do so, to “recovery, a return to myself” (EH, *Why I am so wise* 8). His philosophical consequence is: all cognition, knowledge, and wisdom must be explored from a standpoint of solitude, i.e., seeking out their conditions in the inevitable solitude into which all individuals are “thrown” just because of their special existence (WB 3, HH I 292) and which they can only transcend by “self-overcoming,” for which they have only limited strength. Nietzsche ‘compromises’ himself in order to show by his example how a ‘wise’ and ‘neutral’ philosophizing is possible, toward everyone and everything, without resorting to morals or metaphysics. He does not instruct his readers on this, but has them observe and experience it for themselves – and compromise themselves if they cannot understand his philosophizing without resorting to new morals or metaphysics. ‘Ecce homo’ thus becomes a formula for the other human being as such, who one sees and experiences, about whom one is astonished, as, according to the Gospels, Pilate was astonished about Jesus of Nazareth, and to whom one compromises oneself if one believes one can blame him or her according to one’s own terms. In AC and in prior writings, Nietzsche calls the respect concerning the other’s inaccessibility the ‘pathos of distance’ (see chap. XI.5). It is this pathos of distance which Nietzsche involuntarily evoked in his life and which he deliberately evoked with his writings, including, and above all, EH.

While the first section of EH deals with the conditions under which Nietzsche became wise, his history of suffering, the second section “*Why I am so wise*” addresses what he was able to learn under these conditions, his history

of education. This is not the history of his schooling or academic education, but the history of how he learned to live bearably with time. Here he elaborates in detail his discoveries of a diet appropriate to him, the climate tolerable for him, and the recreation suitable for him, including books and music (see chap. III.3-9), and finally his wisdom of self-protection. In this, he includes his ingrained taste that keeps him away from everything that he would otherwise have to ward off with great effort, as well as the temporary concealment of the “destiny of the task” (EH, *Why I am so clever* 9) of a revaluation of values that he saw himself confronted with, concealing it at least so long as he was not ready for it. He kept his task away from himself so as not to be frightened into rejecting it, but so as to endure it in the long run. His aim was to detach philosophical thinking at last from the traditional idealisms and to bring it near to the ‘close things.’ Here, too, Nietzsche writes, it was his illness that “forced me to be rational, to think about reason in reality.” For a sick person like himself must find ways to deal intelligently with his situation and learn to avoid “mistakes”; he had experienced the “damned ‘idealism’” in his own body as “ignorance in physiologicis,” as the “fundamental unreason of my life.” Nietzsche goes into detail here, telling about his experiences with typical regional dishes (German and English cuisine are bad for him; he appreciates only the Piedmontese cuisine), with alcohol (preferably none: “as far as I am concerned, spirit hovers over the water”) and with coffee (also none: “coffee darkens things”; instead, occasionally strong tea as well as “thick, oil-free cocoa”); on this occasion he mentions his years at the Landesschule Schulpforta and his university years in Leipzig. What did him and his philosophy good was above all plain clear water and walking: “All prejudices come from the intestines.” Likewise, he observed the “influence of climate on metabolism,” which could trigger or prevent that “freedom” which “overflows into the most spiritual things”: “Metabolic tempo is in precise relation to the agility or paralysis of the spirit’s feet; in fact, ‘spirit’ itself is just a type of metabolism” (EH, *Why I am so wise* 1-2). All this fell to him more than he made any effort for it – just like, he adds on this occasion, his professorship in Basel. He does not interpret it via a will to power; quite the contrary: “I do not have the slightest wish for anything to be different from how it is; I do not want to become anything other than what I am. But this is how my life has always been. I have never wished for anything.” (ibid., 9) The doctrine of the will to power is not one that he draws out of his life.

The section “Why I write such good books” of EH begins with the sentence: “I am one thing, my writings are another.” In a final step, Nietzsche detaches his work from himself. His work now stands for itself and is to be understood in its own way. However, Nietzsche initially did not expect any understanding of his writings. He once again poses (see BGE 27, GS 371, GS 381, and others) “the question” of “being understood or not understood,” knowing that even this question’s “time has certainly not come” yet: not only his “truths,” but also the forms of his philosophical writing that he creates for them are still too strange; “ears and hands” are not yet ready for it; the senses have not yet developed properly. Perhaps one day professorial “chairs dedicated to Zarathustra interpretation” will be established; for the time being people still lack the proper “experiences.” Since Nietzsche can no longer teach his readers by referring to a reason common to all, whose commonness and universal validity he had questioned, he encourages them to discover the meaning of his writings based on their own experiences and on their own responsibility. He exposes them to an irritating double bind: “Anyone who thinks that they have understood me has made me into something after their own image, – often enough they make me into my opposite, an ‘idealist,’ for example; who has not understood me at all denies that I deserve any sort of consideration.” Simple conclusions transferred from Nietzsche’s life to his work are therefore especially forbidden. But at least, he writes, “exceptional intelligences,” “even real geniuses,” had already discovered him in Europe and New York (he likewise had helped them in letters with bold statements about his person). But what he hopes most of all, for the time being, are strong adversaries; he recommends himself as the “anti-jackass par excellence,” and above all – in German – he scares away the Germans (“mere Germans”) who are unable to do justice to his writings, not even “my so-called friends.” His “perfect reader” would have to be, like him, the author, “a monster of courage and curiosity,” as well as “supple, cunning, cautious, a born adventurer and discoverer,” and thus not expect any universal teachings. In all this, Nietzsche constantly returns to his Zarathustra, who he conceived of as an adventurous teacher. Finally, he recommends his “art of style” and his psychology and gives as a sample “an odd bit of psychology,” the theme of love and ‘woman’ (EH, Why I write such good books 1-6). He consistently renders himself a “question mark” (GS 382; EH, Za 2).



### III.

## Nietzsche's Cultural and Scientific Adoptions

No philosophy starts from scratch; each one adopts and continues earlier ones, be it voluntarily or involuntarily, knowingly or unknowingly. Philosophers are expected to know in what regards they want to innovate philosophy. They must therefore study the works of their predecessors. But it then depends on whether they find the right measure of this study. The more thoroughly they familiarize themselves with earlier philosophies and do justice to them, the easier it will be for them to lose sight of the new things they themselves could bring – and in the end, perhaps, not even consider them new at all and abandon them altogether. They then, according to Nietzsche, have become ‘scholars.’ Nietzsche writes in EH that he read little and at times even resisted books (cf. EH, Why I am so clever 3 and 8; EH, HH 4). This was first of all attributed to his poor eyesight. At the same time, he regarded it as a fortunate condition. For him, books were meant to be ‘recreational.’ In this way he did not show them contempt, but respect. For it was precisely stimulating books that prevented him from thinking for himself: “Scholars who spend basically all their time ‘poring over’ books – a modest estimate for a philologist would be 200 a day – ultimately become completely unable to think for themselves.” (EH, Why I am so clever 8) Nietzsche distinguished between scholars, i.e., “philosophical laborers,” and “*real philosophers*,” namely “*commanders and legislators*.” Scholars acquire historical knowledge in the field of philosophy for its own sake. Philosophical laborers systematize and work out categories, methods, and schemes according to which philosophical knowledge can be ordered, making it “clear, obvious, comprehensible, and manageable,” and thus create the conditions “to abbreviate everything long, even ‘time’ itself, and to *overwhelm* the entire past”; based on this, they can begin in a new way. Nietzsche’s examples are the “noble model of Kant and Hegel.” The real philosophers, on the other hand, who, as Nietzsche admits, perhaps do not yet exist, “reach for the future with a creative hand”; they help shape the future by providing to

the present concepts and values, which people will subsequently rely on and with which they can shape the future (BGE 211). If these new terms and values are plausible, they will become so self-evident that one will act according to them without question; they then become ‘dominant thoughts’ (Za I, *On the Way of the Creator*, etc.). In this sense philosophers become ‘commanders and legislators.’ A time that has discovered that even the philosophical concepts and values that have for so long been considered eternal have had their time is dependent on such ‘commanders and legislators,’ who can create for a new time a new orientation. This was the ‘task’ as Nietzsche saw it.

By now Nietzsche research has made it evident that Nietzsche in fact read a lot; he owned thousands of books, used libraries and reading rooms throughout his life, although he did not like them (“reading rooms make me sick”; EH, *Why I am so clever* 3); if his eye condition was too poor, he would have others read to him. Nevertheless, he did not acquire philosophical knowledge like a scholar, rarely read comprehensively or thoroughly, and never exhaustively. He stayed an autodidact. As an autodidact, he was quickly overwhelmed by Schopenhauer, who, for his part, had isolated himself from ‘university philosophy’ and whose thinking would completely dominate Nietzsche’s for many years to come, so much so that he wanted only friends who shared his enthusiasm for him. And yet he was, unlike his friends, insightful and strong enough to eventually also detach himself from Schopenhauer again. As an autodidact, he also made many arrogant and sharp judgements against other philosophers. And yet, as research has shown, he was surprisingly often right; even his most polemical judgments are quite ‘fitting’ and valuable. As an autodidact, he was eventually able, after his detachment from Schopenhauer, to conceive of philosophy in a much more impartial way. He then pursued his philosophizing in a way which included, as far as possible, the different academic disciplines: on the one hand, astronomy, physics, biology, chemistry and medicine, and on the other, history, legal studies and political science, linguistics, art history, mythology, religious studies and theology, and especially the then-new fields of sociology, psychology, ethnology, ethology, neurology, and psychiatry. He was not able, though he made plans again and again, to study these fields methodically and from the ground up; instead, he sought to quickly learn what he needed regarding the latest state of research, and, like many self-taught people, he did not shy away from using even second- and third-class literature. For he was less interested in the sciences themselves – in which he did not want to have any impact – but

rather in clues and footholds for his new philosophical thinking, which he did not find in the professional philosophy of his time, which was trapped first in Hegelianism, then Kantianism, and eventually more and more in positivism. He was all the more grateful to Friedrich Albert Lange's *History of Materialism and Critique of Its Present Importance*, which he studied again and again and which offered him what he was looking for: connections between a new kind of philosophy without metaphysics and the contemporary empirical sciences.

Mazzino Montinari, in addition to his project of a critical edition of Nietzsche's works, made it his life's task to explore all that Nietzsche read, but he was unable to finish this project. Montinari's work produced countless references in his commentary to the *Kritische Studienausgabe* in 15 vol.s (KSA, vol. 14) and in his *Nachberichte* (reports) to the *Kritische Gesamtausgabe der Werke* (KGW). After his early death, several groups in Italy, but also numerous researchers in Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, as well as in German-speaking and other countries have further developed the so-called research of sources (*Quellenforschung*), whose contributions appear on a regular basis in the *Nietzsche-Studien*. Their goal is to contextualize Nietzsche's thinking in his time, even if and precisely because he distinguished himself from it. The books in Nietzsche's possession, though he might not have read all of them, are listed in the comprehensive volume of Nietzsche's personal library, *Nietzsches persönliche Bibliothek* (BN); in addition, we must consider all the books that he read without possessing them, the so-called 'virtual library' of Nietzsche. Though most of it is known by now, it has so far not been systematically documented.

How Nietzsche worked with books can be studied partly by looking at what he marked and commented in them, and what he excerpted from them. In his published works, however, he hardly ever quotes what he brings in from his readings, and he rarely mentions his sources. This has earned him the accusation of plagiarism, especially considering that he made absolute truthfulness a fundamental virtue of his philosophizing. This, too, each reader must assess for him or herself. Here, one should take into account (a) that in Nietzsche's time, quotes in philosophy were treated far less faithfully and without indicating the source, as compared to today, because knowing the source was mostly taken for granted at that time; (b) that Nietzsche wrote primarily not for scholars ("I did not make it easy for those who only want to feel *scholarly* satisfaction, because in the end, I did not count on them at all. The citations are missing"; N Summer 1872 – Beginning of 1873, 19[55]); (c) that Nietzsche, nevertheless, may have

been ashamed of his limited knowledge of literature, which was insufficient for a solid scholarly debate; (d) that he made very free use of his readings: he adopted what he read mostly in a manner that would not have occurred to the authors and for which, therefore, he could not have referred to them, and interpreted what he discovered in his readings so pointedly that only he made them genuinely interesting. He had, according to Curt Paul Janz, “an unusual capacity for adaptation. He was able to adopt concepts, thoughts, and fundamental ideas without becoming a plagiarist, because he thought the adopted ideas further and, in a way, with consistency, and to the limit of their evidence, as they were at best in rudimentary form in the ‘original.’ It was only through him and his interpretation that all these ‘adoptions’ received their weight, shape, and meaning, with which they survived and become part of philosophy.” (CPJ 1.432, our translation) The majority of the books that Nietzsche used are remembered today only because *he* used them. As a student of philology, he noted down regarding Diogenes Laërtius and his “borrowed, or if you want stolen quotes”: “Writers” like Diogenes Laërtius are sometimes “dishonest, or they love not being controlled and therefore deliberately conceal the use of their sources in an airy veil.” But “we ask for the sources of an author only when we have the prospect of exchanging not a name for a name, but knowledge for knowledge: a book should become more comprehensible to us in its form, in its content of thought [...]: we want to see more than the finished book, namely the genesis of a book, the history of its conception and birth before our eyes.” This is also how today’s Nietzsche research of sources understands its work. Yet, there is “little chance of a precise answer, if that author is a head superior to his source writers, full of freedom over them, and controls everything he takes from them by pouring it into a new mold and stamping his individuality on it.” (N Spring 1868, 69[3] and [4]) This was not the case with Diogenes Laërtius, but with Nietzsche. Nietzsche *was* a ‘superior mind.’ Readings are not yet ‘influences’ in such minds, as even researchers of Nietzsche’s sources easily assume; what the metaphor ‘influence’ means here would need to be specifically examined. If the results from a ‘source’ have ‘flowed into’ certain writings of superior thinkers and their line of thoughts, do they then simply float in them, are they quickly washed to the margins, or do they give direction to the current? If they float in them, do they then amplify the current, make it more powerful, more sweeping, and give it force, or do they fully merge into it so that one cannot distinguish them anymore? When they are quickly washed to the margins, do

they then remain there, or do they form their own swirls that gain their own new strength and, mixed with the results of other sources, return to the stream with greater power? When they give direction to the stream, does this happen along the surface or in the depths? If in the depths, how can they be located there, how can their power be measured? And what does it say regarding the influence of a source if an author like Nietzsche admits or does not admit to using that source, or if he fights against or welcomes what he cites? We do not yet have any hermeneutics for the research of sources that could clarify or respond to such questions. The only thing that is certain is that one cannot reduce Nietzsche's thinking to that of the authors of his sources. He put the problem of 'influence' into the following image:

*"Greatness means giving direction. – No river is great and abundant of itself: it is the fact that it receives and bears onward so many tributaries that makes it so. Thus it is too with all great men of the spirit. All that matters is that one supplies the direction which many inflowing tributaries then have to follow, not whether one is poorly or richly gifted from the beginning."* (HH I, 521)

1. If one attempts to name the most important sources with clear influence on Nietzsche (a first overview of Nietzsche's "readings, sources, influences," differentiated into areas and time periods and written by proven experts, can be found in NHB 364-426), then *Christianity*, which strongly influenced him in his childhood and youth, is clearly most important. Nietzsche learned how to read and write based on the Luther Bible, was destined to become a pastor, and was throughout his life involved with the great theologians of Christianity, Paul, Augustine, and Luther, but most intensively with Christ himself, whose 'type' he eventually, in the middle of AC, brought very close to his own (see chap. XI.9). Schopenhauer, David Friedrich Strauss' *The Life of Jesus*, Ludwig Feuerbach's *The Essence of Christianity*, and eventually Franz Overbeck's *On the Christian Nature of Theology Today* reinforced his distance from dogmatic Christianity, which he already kept as a student. Later, for the history of Christianity and the figure of Christ, he especially drew on the work of the orientalist, religious scholar, and popular writer Ernest Renan and, for the history of Judaism, on that of Julius Wellhausen, an expert on the Old Testament and orientalism, both of whom had likewise distanced themselves from Christian dogma.

2. Nietzsche was likewise undoubtedly influenced by *ancient Greece*, which he had comprehensively been introduced to during his high school and university years. The kind of philology that he learned from Friedrich Ritschl had a great effect on his philosophizing too. It meant for him, above all, “to be able to read a text as text, without mixing one’s interpretation into it” (N Spring 1888, 15[90]), i.e., learning to see through one’s own euphemistic interpretations. But even here he had an impact on what influenced him: by breaking, as a young professor of classical philology in BT, with the beautiful appearance of ‘noble simplicity’ and the ‘quiet greatness’ that Winckelmann had spread across the image of ancient Greece, and uncovering instead abysmal horrors, tough competition, lust for cruelty, and Dionysian frenzy. He received impulses for this from Jacob Bernays’ *Grundzüge der verlorenen Abhandlung des Aristoteles über die Wirkung der Tragödie* (Outlines of Aristotle’s lost treatise on the effects of tragedy, 1857), an older master student of Friedrich Ritschl’s, who was unable to become a professor in then Germany because of his loyalty to Judaism, and from the landlord and private scholar Paul Graf Yorck von Wartenburg, who put Bernays’ analyses into a speculative-historical-theological horizon. Both Bernays and Yorck von Wartenburg, like Nietzsche, were clearly committed to Heraclitus. The works of the epic poets Homer and Hesiod, the tragedian poet Aeschylus and the historian Thucydides provided Nietzsche with additional footholds. Thucydides, Nietzsche writes, was “the final manifestation of that strong, severe, harsh objectivity that lay in the instincts of the more ancient Hellenes” (GD, What I owe the Ancients 2).

3. Thirdly, Nietzsche was, as mentioned, committed to *music* from childhood on; it moved him most strongly and helped him to live even in times of deep loneliness and despair. He experienced music in a very corporeal way (“Doesn’t my stomach protest, too? My heart? My circulation? My intestines? Do I not unnoticeably grow hoarse as I listen?”; GS 368). Music not only temporarily released him from his suffering, but also inspired him to philosophical ideas; music, he wrote on 15<sup>th</sup> January 1888 to Köselitz, “sets me free from myself; it disillusiones me from myself, as if I were looking, *feeling* over me from afar; it strengthens me, and each time after a night of music (– I have heard Carmen 4 times) comes a morning full of resolute insights and ideas. That is very strange. It is as if I had bathed in a *more natural* element. Life without music is simply a mistake, a strain, an exile.” (see also TI, Arrows and Epigrams 33) In his compositions, which he would later abandon, he mainly followed Schumann,

whom he in turn did not always judge favorably. But the undoubtedly strongest influence on him was, besides Wagner's personality, his music. What contributed to his detachment from Wagner were also the writings of the then most important music critic and musicologist, who became an opponent of Wagner's, Eduard Hanslick, who argued for an 'absolute' music detached from the word and ordered in clearly surveyable forms. Eventually Nietzsche found 'recreation' in Georges Bizet's *Carmen* (see WA 1).

4. In *philosophy*, Nietzsche verifiably studied only some of the great classics (see the comprehensive documentation by Thomas H. Brobjer, *Nietzsche's Philosophical Context: An Intellectual Biography*, Urbana/Chicago 2008): before university, probably the already-mentioned Feuerbach, Machiavelli's *The Prince*, Rousseau's *Emile*, Schiller's *Aesthetic Education of Man*, Emerson's *The Conduct of Life*, several dialogues by Plato and Cicero, and the critical writings of August Wilhelm Schlegel; as a university student, he read, besides Schopenhauer and, within his horizon, Kant's *Critique of Judgement*, Seneca's *Moral Letters*, Democritus and Lucretius, and some of Aristotle, especially his *Rhetoric*, *Poetics*, and *Politics*; as a young professor, he studied Montaigne, with enthusiasm the pre-Socratics, Lichtenberg, some of Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, Hamann's *Writings and Letters*, Spencer's *Study of Sociology*, La Rochefoucauld's *Moral Maxims and Reflections*, Pascal's *Pensées*, and Locke's *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*; after his departure from Basel, he read some of John Stuart Mill and Voltaire, Spencer's *Principles of Ethics*, Montesquieu's *Persian Letters*, and Mill's book on Auguste Comte; he reread some of these several times. Nietzsche learned about the great philosophers of the early modern period, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, largely via secondary sources, especially in surveys such as Friedrich Ueberweg's *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie von Thales bis auf die Gegenwart* (Outline of the History of Philosophy from Thales to the Present), and in detailed studies such as Kuno Fischer's multi-volume *History of Modern Philosophy*. In addition, he read numerous works that are less known today. On the whole, one may estimate this workload as comparable to a BA and MA in philosophy; but a systematic structure is lacking.

This list of confirmed philosophical readings certainly does not equal his actual knowledge. Above all, the old Greek philosophers remained authoritative for him, especially Heraclitus as well as Empedocles and Democritus ("For the world eternally needs truth, therefore it eternally needs Heraclitus: although he

does not need it.” PTAG 8). He engaged with the Platonic Socrates all of his life (“Socrates, to confess it frankly, is so close to me that I almost always fight a battle with him.” N Summer? 1875, 6[3]). Among the Hellenistic philosophers, Epicurus was especially close to Nietzsche. Philosophers of the Middle Ages, with the exception of Augustine, hardly played a role for him, versus those who brought about major changes to modern philosophy: Francis Bacon in the field of the philosophical method, René Descartes by proceeding from a self-directed thinking. Michel de Montaigne became for him a model of the free spirit. In Pascal, he encountered “Christianity’s most instructive victim, massacred slowly, first physically then psychologically”; of him he wrote that he “loved” him (EH, Why I am so wise 3). In Spinoza, he discovered, as mentioned, “a predecessor and what a predecessor!” The so-called French moralists, above all La Rochefoucauld, and the Enlightenment philosophers Voltaire and Diderot became for him an ever-new source for his moral criticism; on the other hand, he saw in Rousseau’s belief in an inherently good man a new amplification of moral fanaticism in Europe, which levelled out all differences among men. The late Nietzsche found the “real achievements of philosophical thinking that can be attributed to Germans” in: Leibniz (“consciousness [*Bewusstheit*] is only an *accidens* of the power of representation [*Vorstellung*]”), Kant (“colossal question mark that he placed on the concept of ‘causality’”), Hegel (“without Hegel there could be no Darwin”) and Schopenhauer’s “unconditional and honest atheism” (no longer his metaphysics of will; GS 357); in addition, he appreciated Lichtenberg and Jean Paul. For the rest, he dissociated himself here too from all those who not only *were* German, but also resolutely *wanted to be* such. He especially enjoyed rubbing up against the “Englishmen” and the stale utilitarianism he accused them of – primarily Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer; in their pragmatism, he considered them superficial (see BGE 252). Auguste Comte’s overcoming of theology and metaphysics through a scientific positivism interested him, even if it did not delve deep enough for him. Max Stirner and Pierre Joseph Proudhon likewise captivated his attention. Among his contemporaries he felt, to name only the most important ones, closely connected to Ralph Waldo Emerson and Jean-Marie Guyau; he worked directly with Paul Rée in Sorrento. He took up much from Otto Liebmann, Afrikan Spir and Gustav Teichmüller, who tried to further develop Kant’s philosophy under new conditions. To contemporaries, whose opinions could have been ‘mistaken’ with his own (“I do not want to be mistaken for



anyone else, – which also means that *I* should not mistake myself for anyone else either.” EH, Why I write such good books 1), he responded polemically: above all to David Friedrich Strauss and the Schopenhauer epigones Eugen Dühring, Eduard von Hartmann and Philipp Mainländer.

5. In *history*, among those who set standards for Nietzsche were, above all, “those amazing, incomprehensible, and unthinkable ones, those human riddles destined for victory and for seduction; Alcibiades and Caesar are the most exquisite expressions of this type (– and I will gladly set by their side that *first* European after my taste, the Hohenstaufen Frederick II), and among artists perhaps Leonardo da Vinci.” (BGE 200) In his century, Napoleon, Goethe and (at first) Wagner stood out for him. Goethe remained the ‘personality’ par excellence for him: “He made use of history, science, antiquity, and Spinoza too, but above all he made use of practical activity; he adapted himself to resolutely closed horizons; he did not remove himself from life, he put himself squarely in the middle of it; he did not lose heart, and he took as much as he could on himself, to himself, in himself. What he wanted, that was *totality*; he fought against the separation of reason, sensibility, feeling, will [...], he disciplined himself to wholeness, he *created* himself ...” (TI, Skirmishes of an Untimely Man 49). In historical scholarship, Jacob Burckhardt was for Nietzsche the greatest authority; he also thought highly of Hippolyte Taine and, to quite a lesser degree, Thomas Carlyle; all of them represented for him the great individual that makes history.

6. In *literature*, Nietzsche was impressed by Goethe and the “poor,” “glorious Hölderlin” (DS 2), Lord Byron (a man of “intellectual spasms,” who is “impatient and gloomily inclined towards” himself, D 549), Heinrich Heine (he gave him the “highest concept of the lyric poet”; EH, Why I am so wise 4), and Shakespeare (“how much suffering does it take for somebody to need to play the clown!”; EH, Why I am so wise 4). Among the French writers of his time, whom he could read in the original and with whom he felt most at home, he had a special fondness for Stendhal, the brothers Goncourt, Baudelaire and Bourget; among the Italian writers, he appreciated Leopardi; among the Russians, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy; among the English writers, Laurence Sterne. He particularly admired the perfection of form of the Persian Hafez and the Roman Horace; their “solemn frivolity” (HH I 109) became a model for his own art (“a minimal range and number of signs achieving a maximal semiotic

energy – all this is Roman and, if you are inclined to believe me, *nobility par excellence*”; TI, What I owe to the Ancients 1).

7. Nietzsche had only limited access to *paintings* and the *fine arts* because of his eye condition. Nevertheless, they too impressed him deeply, though more in their objects than in their artistic design. His understanding of art stayed surprisingly traditional. Greek sculpture, especially that of Phidias, represented classicism for him too, reaching new and more exciting peaks in the Renaissance with Leonardo, Michelangelo, and Raphael. Nevertheless, he had his own rank order: “It takes a very different kind of strength and mobility,” he noted in 1885, “in an unfinished system, with free unfinished prospects, to hold on – compared to a *dogmatic* world [like Dante’s or Plato’s]. Leonardo da Vinci stands higher than Michelangelo, Michelangelo higher than Rafael.” (N April – June 1885, 34[25]) In these three artists, he discovered stages to his philosophizing: Raphael, to whom he dedicated several picture descriptions, among others of his *Sistine Madonna*, had, despite all his ostentatious Christianity, just “outwitted his *believing* viewers in a very cunning fashion” (HH II, WS 73). Michelangelo “saw and felt the problem of being the legislator of new values: also the problem of the victorious-completed man, who first had the necessity to overcome even ‘the hero in himself’; the man elevated to the highest, who was also exalted above his compassion and mercilessly crushes and destroys that which is unrelated to him, – shining and in unclouded divinity”; but for Nietzsche, he already went too far into the over-dramatizing Baroque. Leonardo, however, who “saw too great a range of good and terrible things,” was characterized by “a truly over-Christian gaze” (N April – June 1885, 34[149], corr.). Of Dürer’s engravings, he was most fascinated by the two famous ones, *Melancholia* and *Knight, Death and Devil*; in the “armoured knight with the hard, steely gaze who, alone with just his horse and dog, knows how to take his path of horror, unperturbed by his dread companions and yet bereft of all hope,” (BT 20), he first recognized Schopenhauer, later himself. He was most deeply moved by “Claude Lorrain’s delights,” the magic stillness when looking beyond ancient idyllic scenes at seas that shimmer in infinite shades of color during dawn and dusk: “The heroic-idyllic is now the discovery of my soul” (N July – August 1879, 43[3]). But Nietzsche likewise admired the virtuosity of Delacroix, who fiercely excited his time with his “uncanny access to everything tempting, seductive, compelling, and subversive [...] longing for the foreign, the exotic, the monstrous, the crooked, the self-contradictory”

(BGE 256). In architecture, he was strongly influenced by Jacob Burckhardt and his preference for the Renaissance. Here, too, he desired an “*architecture for philosophers*” with “quiet and wide, expansive places for reflection – places with long, high-ceilinged arcades for bad or ill-too-sunny weather, where no shouts or noise from carriages can penetrate and where refined manners would prohibit even priests from praying aloud: a whole complex of buildings and sites that would give expression to the sublimity of contemplation and of stepping aside. [...] We want to have *us* translated into stone and plants; we want to take walks *in us* when we stroll through these hallways and gardens.” (GS 280) He called the Piazza di San Marco in Venice his “nicest study” (GM III 8), and considered Brunelleschi's Palazzo Pitti in Florence, already for Burckhardt the pinnacle of profane architecture, an example of “*great style*,” of “a way for power to achieve eloquence through form” (TI, Skirmishes 11).

8. Nietzsche, as mentioned, failed several times in his attempts to comprehensively study the *natural sciences* and *medicine*. Nevertheless, he upheld their strictly methodical research (“*Long live physics!*”; GS 335) on the one hand; on the other, he saw them relying on unexplained metaphysical premises (“*Let us beware*”; GS 109; see GS 344 and 373). From them, too, he sought confirmation for his philosophizing. He did find confirmations:

- in the polymath, diplomat, and poet Roger Joseph Boscovich, who published in Latin and French (a Croatian, who Nietzsche mistook to be Polish), in his doubt regarding final atoms and laws and in his concept of the resolution of forces among ever-newly constituted centers of force continually engaging with each other (what Nietzsche called ‘wills to power’);

- in Robert Mayer, who worked as a physician and struggled to gain scientific recognition for his law of the conservation of energy, on which Nietzsche based his so-called scientific attempts to prove his idea of eternal return; Mayer, too, advocated the idea of resolution;

- in Johann Gustav Vogt's *Die Kraft: Eine real-monistische Weltanschauung* (*Force: A Real-Monistic Worldview*), his rejection of an absolute balance of forces and his assumption that one must believe either in a circular process or in God;

- in the anatomist and founder of ‘developmental mechanics’ Wilhelm Roux and his approach of variable force relationships even in the smallest organisms, cells, which therefore only last as long as one force dominates the others.

However, Nietzsche's philosophizing was most deeply influenced by Charles Darwin's theory of evolution, which Lange likewise advocated for with great commitment. Even if Nietzsche did not fully understand Darwin's theory in all its details, he only fought against its narrowing interpretations and especially against the moral and social Darwinisms that followed it ("*Anti-Darwin*"; TI, Skirmishes 14). He drew the decisive philosophical conclusion from Darwin's theory of evolution: that it is no longer possible to proceed from universals that exist by themselves and eternally, but only from individuals, who, with other individuals, reproduce more individuals, or in short: that all life and all meaning of life is 'liquid.'

9. Nietzsche was increasingly captivated by (then) modern *psychology*, *neurology* and *psychiatry*. He studied current works such as *Responsibility in Mental Disease* by Henry Maudsley; *Die Psychologie des Verbrechens: Ein Beitrag zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde (The Psychology of Crime: A Contribution to Empirical Psychology)* by August Krauss; the *Nouveaux essais de psychologie contemporaine* by Paul Bourget, who provided character physiognomies of Stendhal, Renan, Taine, Baudelaire, Flaubert and others, and who wrote masterful psychological novels; Francis Galton's *Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development* and, eventually, Charles Féré's *Dégénérescence et criminalité: Essai physiologique*. All of them confirmed the close connection Nietzsche drew between psychology and physiology, which was most visible in pathological cases. In addition, hypnosis experiments, which were then being discussed especially in France, and which were based on James Braid's *Neurypnology; or the rationale of nervous sleep, considered in relation with animal magnetism*, likewise had a strong impact on Nietzsche's work (see GS 361 et al.).

## IV.

# Nietzsche's Forms of Philosophical Writing

In order to communicate his philosophizing, Nietzsche created ever-new textual forms which no longer fit the conventional concepts of genre, and he modified their characteristics in ever-new ways; no other great philosopher has made use of, newly coined or created as diverse forms of philosophical writing as Nietzsche did. In chronological order these are, after the still-conventional scientific treatise, in Nietzsche's case

- the particularly sober philological one, coming from the school of Friedrich Ritschl,

- the treatise (BT) that rises from the Wagner idyll in Tribschen to ecstatic heights;

- the essay (UM) that calls for the enhancement of culture, sharply criticizes the style, science and education of the time, and sets new 'great' standards;

- the book of aphorisms (HH, D, GS, later BGE), which includes a historical and systematic critique of all of European science, philosophy and culture and opens new perspectives for a cultural, philosophical and scientific orientation that is close to life and open to the future;

- poems and collections of poems that accompany his books of aphorisms along their flanks ("An Epilogue": "Among Friends" in HH I; "Jest, Cunning and Revenge" and "Songs of Prince Vogelfrei" were added to GS; the "Aftersong" "From High Mountains" in BGE);

- the epic-dramatic-lyrical didactic poem (Za);

- the sentence (*Sentenz*: single-sentence aphorisms) compressing surprising insights (interspersed in HH, collected as "epigrams and entr'actes" in BGE and as "Arrows and Epigrams" in TI);

- the preface written for books that are unwritten, previously published, or newly written (CV, Za, the new prefaces to BT, HH, D, and GS, and prefaces to BGE, GM, WA, TI, AC, EH);

- the book of aphorisms (Book Five of GS) that radiates liberating cheerfulness in great seriousness;
- the chain of treatises (GM), targeted at a ‘world-historical’ controversy, which brings European morality back to its non-moral roots;
- the indictment against a person of ‘world-historical’ magnitude (CW) which eases the burden of its author;
- the book of aphorisms (TI) that begins with sentences, clarifies the fundamental problems of European philosophy, and condenses its fog into a fable;
- the treatise that is aimed at a ‘curse,’ a religious condemnation of the religious character of Europe (AC);
- the genealogy of his own thinking (EH) and lastly
- the collection of dithyrambic songs in praise of the god Dionysus (DD).

In addition to these forms intended for the anonymous public of the book market, Nietzsche also wrote for himself (posthumous notations) and for individuals (letters); more and more of this content was eventually included in his works as well. His literary forms of writing are not external to his philosophical work. Nietzsche always took them into account: in different forms, one can express different things. Not only did he expect from the beginning that not everyone could and wanted to understand him, but he also deliberately used the “subtler laws of a style” in order to “select” his readers (GS 381). If he wanted to be understood at all, he had to present his revaluation of values and his rearrangement of perspectives in the conventional language, still dominated by the old values in the old perspectives, though from it he developed step by step a new language to be understood differently, with the conscious risk of being ‘heard’ by fewer and fewer with this language. Since he reckoned with the individuality of philosophical thought, he also created forms for the inter-individuality of philosophical communication. Instead of systematizing self-contained lines of thought, he aimed for 1. a *textual isolation* of philosophizing on the one hand and 2. its *contextualization* on the other (he primarily wrote aphorisms); he pursued 3. a *dramatization* of his philosophizing and 4. its *personalization* (he staged personal decision-making processes in philosophizing); and he went 5. from terminological definitions of terms to a *liquefaction* of his philosophizing in metaphors and 6. its *musical phrasings*. In his notes, which were not intended to be read by others, he 7. philosophized in emphatic *solitude*, which he 8. sometimes expressed in letters to certain individuals in

an inter-individual or personal communication of his philosophizing. Here we highlight three forms typical of Nietzsche's philosophical writing: the book of aphorisms, didactic poetry, and the song.

1) *Textual Isolation*: When Nietzsche detached from Schopenhauer's metaphysics and came to his own philosophizing, he decided, with HH, to primarily write aphorisms. At first, he wanted to merely add "supplements" "in aphorisms" to his UM (N 1876, 16[12]); he then planned his own book of aphorisms (N Summer 1878, 30[2]), but did not attach any importance to the term: "They are aphorisms! Are they aphorisms? – may those who make a reproach of them to me, think a little and then apologize to themselves – I need no word for myself" (N End of 1880, 7[192]). He was dependent on the brief form because he could only ever "steal" some "minutes and quarter hours" from his "suffering brain" and had difficulty bringing his notes, which he collected on long walks, into surveyable contexts; "head and eye compels" him to write in this "cursed telegram style" (Letters to Köselitz from Oct. 5, 1879, and Nov. 5, 1879). But soon he discovered a virtue in this necessity; the biographical coercion to write in aphorisms opens up their literary significance to him and their literary significance their philosophical one. Before him, the aphorism was a genre not yet fully established; what were aphorisms often had different names, and what was called an aphorism was oftentimes a different genre; it ranged from the aphorism to the essay and the treatise (as in the case of Schopenhauer's aphorisms on *The Wisdom of Life*). In the literal sense, 'aphorism' means 'demarcation, recess.' What distinguishes it is (firstly) its brevity, its conciseness, and its power to express many things with few words. In this way it leaves room for interpretation – that is the first condition for a deliberately inter-individual philosophizing. It also (secondly) intensifies what it says via punch lines, evoking surprise intellectual effects that take concepts out of their usual contexts and liberate them for other contexts. In this way, it purposefully dissolves the form of the system, in which metaphysics take root, and uncovers footholds for a new orientation. It is thus the perfect form for a revaluation of values – that is the first *effect* of inter-individual philosophizing. With his literary art Nietzsche draws us into a 'labyrinth' in which – without a given principle, without a preconceived method and thus also without the expectation of universally valid results, we must seek our own paths by ourselves, on which we will eventually get lost somewhere; he invites us to our own adventures in thinking, which are nowhere secure and always end in uncertainty.

“In books of aphorisms, like mine,” Nietzsche notes down for himself, “there are, between and behind short aphorisms, all kinds of forbidden big things and chains of thoughts; and some of it that may be questionable enough for Oedipus and his Sphinx.” (N June – July 1885, 37[5]) In short: The aphorism avoids doctrines; on the contrary, it makes what it speaks about questionable in a concise way, and it is thus the literary form of concise questionableness. But in this way, it corresponds to the “world” as we encounter it: provoking “*infinite interpretations*,” and it is thus probably the only realistic and honest form of philosophical writing – that is the first *result* of inter-individual philosophizing. If one “would want immediately to deify in the old manner *this* monster of an unknown world” (FW 374), then the aphoristic form prevents this as well: since (thirdly) the aphorisms are isolated from each other, they leave open far more than what they say. The aphorism isolates individual thoughts that are immediately illuminating – a model for this for Nietzsche was Pascal’s *Pensées* (see N 1885, May – July 1885, 35[31]); Pascal indeed wanted to reach God, but not via a metaphysical system. The aphorism and the sentence, i.e., the single-sentence aphorism, are, according to Nietzsche’s own definition, despite their brevity nevertheless “forms of ‘eternity’”: The aphorisms remain the same, but the interpretations they evoke change; with their conciseness they withdraw thoughts from temporality without pushing thinking back into metaphysics. Nietzsche knew that he “mastered” this, that he stood alone with his aphorisms: “My ambition is to say in ten sentences what other people say in a book, – what other people do *not* say in a book . . .” (TI, Skirmishes 51). Today, the concept of the aphorism is largely defined by Nietzsche’s aphorisms, and no other philosopher’s aphorisms are more gratefully quoted than his.

2. *Contextualization*: Nietzsche compiles his isolated aphorisms into carefully composed *books of aphorisms*, carefully creating contexts for them. Longer aphorisms, as he writes them more and more – they may eventually be even a few pages long – are so rich in perspectives that they open up views to other aphorisms, neighboring and more distant ones, in all directions, inviting readers to draw connections between them. They usually link several themes already in their own context; in networks of multiple aphorisms, thematic chains emerge, which Nietzsche artfully interweaves. This creates dense thematic networks, in which the aphorisms proffer themselves for mutual interpretation. These networks of thematic chains demonstrate the dependence of these themes on each other in a way that one can almost recognize with one’s eyes, and they



at the same time give the books their structure. The topics, however, extend beyond the individual book of aphorisms and interweave these books with each other, too, so that they each offer additional footholds for understanding. Today's readers attain further contexts in the documented preliminary stages of the aphorisms, the notes and letters that have been left behind, as well as the countless connections outside of Nietzsche's work. Each additional context can open up new perspectives for understanding the texts. And this again applies to orientation as such. Every clue, reference point, or foothold that one holds on to, from conspicuous geographical marks via communicative signs to the laws of nature, leaves room for interpretation and must leave it if one is supposed to 'make something' with them in changing situations. They become sufficiently clear for orientation not by closing their scope of interpretation and refraining from the situation, i.e., decontextualizing it, but by limiting their scope of interpretation as far as necessary in the respective situation, i.e., contextualizing it.

Nietzsche's isolation and contextualization of aphorisms in books thus adopts the well-established procedure of everyday orientation. One orients oneself to aphorisms as one does to clues and footholds (*Anhaltspunkten*): They stand alone, but one does not rely on them alone; they are never completely understandable, but in their references to one another they become sufficiently understandable; they do not teach anything universal, but orient everyone in his or her own way, depending on the connections he or she draws from his or her own point of view. The aphorisms do not determine the readers' understanding, nor do the readers fix the aphorism's meaning; in a new situation with new points of view, they can understand them in a different way again. Aphorisms thus remain open for the future. Nietzsche never explains the composition of his books of aphorisms (he certainly does not justify them), and in this way he leaves his readers free for their own contextualizations. He offers them orientations for their own orientation. This is how he fulfils his 'task' as a writer.

And he keeps these orientations in motion. In series of books of aphorisms, Nietzsche repeatedly takes up his thoughts again, puts them into new contexts and thereby develops them further. In his work, nothing is completed, nothing is final, and while he contemplated a final and definitive "major work" (CW 7) for years, he eventually gave it up. Alleged completeness and finality would be characteristics of a timeless system and thus a "lack of integrity" (TI, Arrows and Epigrams 26). If the individual aphorism is the literary form of 'eternity,'

then the book of interweaving aphorisms is the literary form of temporality. It keeps the processes of interpretation – of orientation – in motion.

Nietzsche's ways of contextualizing his writings are very diverse. In addition to thematic ways, there are artistic ones: poetic, musical, and pictorial ones. *Poetically*, Nietzsche varies and changes his themes and their weight (primary matters become secondary and vice versa); after long 'logical' transitions he suddenly skips intermediate steps; he sometimes leaves themes completely unconnected in hard stops; he suddenly addresses the reader or stages dialogues and soliloquies; his tone is sometimes strongly determined, sometimes emphatically questionable, here clear, there enigmatic, etc. *Musically*, he alternates between different tempi (e.g., "presto," "lento," "staccato," N Beginning of 1885 – Spring 1886, 3[18]) and tones (factual, serious, dramatic vs. ironic, cheerful, sober) and between homophonic-harmonic and polyphonic-contrapuntal compositions of themes. All this has so far hardly been explored. *Pictorially*, he proceeds like the Cubists in fine art, who were soon to reach worldwide fame. Like them, he dispenses with the illusion of the one-point perspective (*Zentralperspektive*) and shows his respective object in staggered, twisted and surprisingly new compositions, so that in each case an object becomes visible not as seemingly true, but rather in its richness of possible perspectives. The view rich in perspectives is the more complex one; it offers a more differentiated and expressive picture of reality than the systematic approach that is limited to one view, especially when it claims to be the only true one. One can of course simplify these perspectives again by making a system out of Nietzsche's philosophizing. But this is then the reader's system, not Nietzsche's.

3. *Dramatization*: In *Za*, Nietzsche dramatizes the communication of his philosophizing; he stages a narrative in which a mythical-historical founder of religion from the Far East, who stands high above all other figures, recites "doctrines," partly in dialogues, partly in monologues, with which he visibly fails. He knowingly has his Zarathustra fail by "going under," likewise out of an individual need. Zarathustra is *compelled* to teach because he can no longer contain the 'abundance' or 'overflow' (*Überfluss*) of wisdom that has accumulated in him during his ten years of solitude up in the mountains (*Za*, Preface 1). Like the sun, he wants to give away his wisdom and thereby create new life. This does not make him into a good teacher in the modern sense. He teaches with full authority – authority is given to those from whom you no longer demand justifications, and no one ever questions Zarathustra ("Why?"

said Zarathustra. ‘You ask why? I do not belong to those whose Why may be questioned.’” Za II, On Poets); he thus forgoes all argumentative justifications and systematic connections and instead presents his teachings with the high pathos of a religiously colored language. As such, they are less teachings than revelations. Zarathustra visibly ‘chooses’ his listeners through the ‘laws of his style,’ ‘goes under’ as a teacher and yet triumphs as a ‘recognizer’ (Za III, The Wanderer). He no longer presupposes the equality of human beings, according to which everyone could learn everything if it were only sufficiently explained to them, but addresses the different needs of individuals based on which they are receptive to certain teachings or not. He does this from a sublime but no longer otherworldly (transcendent or transcendental) standpoint; his listeners figure as ‘steps’ toward the height of *his* need of cognition, which they never reach: The people in the marketplace, whom he gifts his doctrine of the overman, can do no more than laugh about it (preface); his disciples who join him and with whom he shares the teachings of ‘life’ concerning the will to power misunderstand them (Za I and II); his animals, the only beings he keeps with him, make of his “most abysmal thought” of the eternal return (EH, Za 6) a “hurdy-gurdy song” (Za III, The Convalescent 2); his “higher men,” who themselves have acquired a high teaching authority, still remain dependent on a supreme authority and eventually worship a donkey (Za IV). Thus Zarathustra remains alone with his knowledge in every group. Through him, Nietzsche dramatically demonstrates the failure of seemingly universal doctrines given the (inter-)individuality of philosophizing.

4. *Personalization*: Nietzsche also personalizes his philosophizing in his books of aphorisms. In his “written style” he seeks to regain the “oral style,” to enrich it with “modes of expression only available to the speaker”: “gestures, emphases, tones of voice, glances” (HH II, WS 110). He largely does away with his own scientific terminology (“*Substitute words* in place of the philosophical terms: possibly in German and developed into a formula,” N Autumn 1887, 9[115]). Instead, he gives new weight to common words (e.g. ‘create,’ ‘give,’ ‘will to power,’ ‘superhuman’), uses plural formations that were still unusual at the time (‘desirabilities,’ ‘futures,’ ‘moralities,’ ‘cultures’), ironic modifications (e.g. ‘commonization,’ ‘fatherlandishness,’ ‘Schopenhauerism’), reevaluating compositions (e.g., ‘reason-bites,’ ‘necessity-truth’), etc.; here, too, the research is still in its infancy (see Richard M. Meyer, “Nietzsche’s Wortbildungen,” in: *Zeitschrift für deutsche Wortforschung* 15 [1914], 98-146, and Peter Pütz,

*Friedrich Nietzsche*, 1975, 41-46). In addition, there are intentional grammatical irregularities, seemingly random ideas, marginal notes, malicious outbursts, self-interruptions, etc., everything that characterizes everyday speech. In his books of aphorisms, Nietzsche reworked the “natural imperfection” of oral speech “into a perfect poetic musicality”; he “wanted to write books as if he did not write any.” (Heinz Schlaffer, *Das entfesselte Wort. Nietzsches Stil und seine Folgen*, München 2007, 83) Through riddles and parables, Nietzsche repeatedly makes his readers aware of the fact that they themselves must think, interpret, and guess. He also stages personal decision-making processes in philosophizing by linking universalizations to personal experiences, abbreviating thoughts with proper names, and above all by bringing himself into play, by ‘compromising’ himself so that his readers must compromise themselves as well, with *their* understanding of *his* texts, which inevitably remains insufficient. Given how inexhaustible and unfathomable Nietzsche’s texts are, his scholarly interpreters have mostly concerned themselves with finding a systematic interpretation that they themselves can hold on to. So far, they have all compromised themselves with their interpretations. Everyone becomes distinguishable by how he or she interprets Nietzsche. Compromising oneself in this way most strongly emphasizes the inter-individuality of philosophizing.

5. *Liquefaction of Philosophizing*: Contextualizations, dramatizations, and personalizations keep Nietzsche’s philosophizing in relentless motion. These methods even reach his use of concepts. Nietzsche generally does not define his terms (“all concepts in which an entire process is semiotically concentrated defy definition; only something which has no history can be defined.” GM II 13), and if he does, he redefines them again in new contexts. He treats apparently fixed terms as moving *metaphors* that can constantly shift their meanings. Nietzsche made this clear in his early unpublished writing TL; it became in many ways the core of his mature philosophy. There, he conceives of the “drive to form metaphors” as the “fundamental human drive” and “concepts” as “bony and eight-cornered as a dice and just as capable of being shifted around” as the “*residue of a metaphor*.” Concept formation, of which philosophy and science are so proud, is then, for him, the art of “sublimating the sensuous metaphors into a schema, in other words, to dissolve an image into a concept. This is because something becomes possible in the realm of these schemata which could never be achieved in the realm of those sensuous first impressions, namely the construction of a pyramidal order based on castes

and degrees, the creation of a new world of laws, privileges, subordinations, definitions of borders, which now confront the other, sensuously perceived world as something firmer, more general, more familiar, more human, and hence as something regulatory and imperative." While admiring humanity's capacity for "erecting the infinitely complicated cathedral of concepts," Nietzsche valorizes their "moving foundations" and shows how such erecting takes place "one might even say, on flowing water"; "in order to rest on such foundations, it has to be like a thing constructed from cobwebs, so delicate that it can be carried off on the waves and yet so firm as not to be blown apart by the wind." It must leave room for the concepts to move; the "form" must, as Nietzsche later formulated, remain "fluid" and the "meaning" (*Sinn*) even more so (GM II 12). Besides the metaphor of the river, Nietzsche also uses the metaphor of dancing for this: dance, as he understands it, is a movement according to music, the "music of life" (GS 372). He has his Zarathustra say: "one must still have chaos in oneself in order to give birth to a dancing star. I say to you: you still have chaos in you." (Za, Preface 5) A dancing star likewise follows a kind of order, but its movement subsists on its own momentum and gains a hold in it. However, it can also get out of step, become exhausted and collapse.

6. *Musical Phrasing of Philosophizing*: Nietzsche wished for his texts a "third ear" for their music, for the "art" that "is in every good sentence," the

Art that wants to be discerned to the extent that the sentence wants to be understood! A misunderstanding about its tempo, for instance, and the sentence itself is misunderstood! To have no doubts as to the rhythmically decisive syllables, to feel breaks in the most stringent of symmetries as deliberate and attractive, to extend a subtle and patient ear to every *staccato* and every *rubato*, guessing the meaning of the order of vowels and diphthongs and how tenderly and richly they can change color and change it again when put next to each other. (BGE 246)

The "meaning of every style," he writes eventually, is to "communicate a state, an inner tension of pathos, with signs, including the tempo of these signs," an "inner state" that cannot be communicated with words alone (EH, Why I write such good books 4). With his texts, he wants to make himself understood without using any fossilized concepts, in a way that is otherwise only possible in personal encounters, in which facial expressions, gestures, posture and the

voice with all its modulations allow people to guess the speaker's 'inner states,' and he summarizes all this in the metaphor of music. He wrote about Wagner that one could "be undecided which name to accord him, whether he should be called a poet or a sculptor or a musician, each word taken in an extraordinary wide sense, or whether a new word has to be created to describe him" (WB 9) and finally recognized in this a "semiotic" of himself (EH, UM 3). He wanted that "the whole of *Zarathustra*" be "considered music" (EH, Za 1): its literary ductus ("Sayings trembling with passion; eloquence become music; bold strokes of lightning hurled forwards into futures never before anticipated." EH, Za 6), its four parts as a four-movement symphony (Letter to Overbeck, Feb. 6, 1884; see also CPJ 2,211-221), and especially its *songs*. The less Nietzsche has Zarathustra be heard and understood, the more he has him 'sing': "But if you do not want to weep and weep out your purple melancholy, then you must *sing*, oh my soul!" (Za III, On Great Longing) The song redeems Zarathustra from his teachings. In songs, language is sufficient for itself and attains a self-contained form. You can sing songs by yourself, and when others hear them, they may or may not tune in or repeat them, without being convinced of or taught about anything. Songs permit leeways of freedom. As is well known, Kant disagreed; he regarded music as the most intrusive form of art (*Critique of Judgment*, B 221 f.). But it is only intrusive if you do not find resonance in the sounds and rhythms of your own life. Music may separate as well as connect people. Zarathustra sings by himself *and* with others; at the ass festival, at first, only he sings the song of midnight ("*Oh mankind, pray!*"), and then the 'higher men' join him (Za IV, The Sleepwalker Song). As his final work, Nietzsche, as mentioned, took the songs of Zarathustra out of the epic-dramatic plot in order to republish them in an edited version as DD.

7. *Personal Isolation of Philosophizing*: In the autumn of 1887, Nietzsche apparently drafted a new preface, including many edits, and wrote: "A book for thinking, nothing more: it belongs to those who *enjoy* thinking, nothing more ..." Then he turned against the "will to the system," including his own ("I distrust all systems and systematics and avoid them: perhaps one will discover behind this book the system which I have *avoided* ..."), and concluded: "I no longer respect the readers: how could I write for readers? ... But I take notes, for myself." (N 1887, 9[188], corr. according to KGW IX 6, W II 1, 1) He could tolerate writing for others only to a limited extent and from time to time withdrew to his notebooks. He certainly used the majority of his *notes* for his

works, but published almost nothing as he first noted it down; he intensively revised most of the texts, took them apart and put them together in new ways. He kept some things only in his notes, be it for a limited time, be it on principle, be it because they did not seem ready for publication, or be it because readers did not seem ready for them. These include the famous 'scientific' proofs of the eternal return, the connection of the eternal return with the will to power and nihilism, the different kinds of nihilism, elaborations on race and breeding, but also less conspicuous studies on affect, the phenomenology of thought, and the philosophy of sign and interpretation. Here, Nietzsche still mostly formulates without taking into account the communicative form of his philosophizing and thus in a way as one was used to in systems of metaphysics. It was then tempting to find a metaphysics here, especially a metaphysics of the will to power, and the edition of the *Nachlass* compiled by Heinrich Köselitz on behalf of Nietzsche's sister under the title "*The Will to Power*" further provided a systematic form that even Heidegger, who otherwise knew how to read carefully, was convinced of (see chap. V.5). But already a comparison of the apparent conclusion of this alleged metaphysics, §1067 of "*Der Wille zur Macht*" (N June – July 1885 38[12]), with the aphorism BGE 36, which was then actually published by Nietzsche, clearly shows how he very emphatically takes everything that seems dogmatic-metaphysical back into a critical-hypothetical language. His notes, as he recorded them for himself, must not be placed next to or even in front of his published works. The new edition of his *Nachlass* from 1885 in the new KGW IX section shows that these are not texts, nor fragments, but works in progress. Nietzsche's notations are not final and therefore cannot be taken as his final opinion. On the contrary, they show "only in special cases already a literary form" and thus a "degree of reflection" less than the published works (Claus Zittel, Art. *Nachlass* 1880- 1885, in: NHB, 138 f., our translation). The relationship between his notes and his publications as a whole is still a gap in the research.

8. *Personal Communication of Philosophizing*: A last form of Nietzsche's philosophical writings is his *letters*, which he wrote for certain individuals, mostly for friends, relatives and publishers, but eventually more and more also to 'communicators,' from whom he expected his philosophizing to spread according to its quality. Here, as one might expect, he connected his philosophizing most strongly with his life. And yet at the same time he said little about his thinking, because he soon saw how little he himself was understood by his friends. All

the more, he tried at least to give his publishers an ‘idea’ of himself, with which they were supposed to promote his writings. For this, he was received with long-lasting prejudices, which he of course must have anticipated. Like his Zarathustra, he failed in his own personal communication.



## V.

# Nietzsche's Expectations for Readers of "Both Sexes"

1. *Patience for Philological Surprises*: In two prominent aphorisms, Nietzsche made it clear how he wanted his texts to be read. The aphorisms are from the same time period, 1886/87. In the final aphorism of the new preface to D he demands that readers learn to read him patiently: he says "slowly" what he has to say and wants it to also be read "slowly." He wants to bring everyone who is "in a hurry" to despair. Only readers who can "take time," who can dedicate themselves to his writings in seclusion and patience, and who can engage in their "delicate, cautious work," are able to bear them. What is "delicate" in Nietzsche's sense are fine differences, distinctions of distinctions up to the finest "nuances," which can no longer be put into concepts, but are a matter of "taste." "Caution" means that one reckons with surprises; Nietzsche put his nuances in contrastive tension with a kind of "work" that is done with "haste," that "wants to 'get everything done' at once" and has no sense for surprises. Patient philology, on the other hand, from which he comes, "does not so easily get anything done," does not at all want to reach the finished, definitive, conclusive, but pursues "with reservations," keeps "doors left open" behind which something else, unexpected, can show itself. A philologist reads "with delicate eyes and fingers," perceives words even in their physical and sensual radiance, which again points to something new and surprising. Nietzsche wished for such "perfect readers and philologists"; in this way, one must "learn" to read him.

2. *Courage for Philosophical Surprises*: The aphorism No. 381 from Book Five of GS, "On the question of being understandable," written shortly after, can be read as a counterpart to the aphorism above. It deals with the "brevity" of Nietzsche's texts. This brevity is forced by the "matter" (*Sache*), the fact that some thoughts are "shy and ticklish," from which one shrinks back like from cold water, so that one can touch them only briefly: they are "truths," which "one must *surprise* or leave alone." Thus, readers of Nietzsche's writings need not only patience for philological surprises, but also courage for philosophical

ones. The courage to question one's own thinking is even less to be expected from "anybody" than patience. Philosophical surprises, as Nietzsche offers them to his readers, endanger habits of thinking that originate from "need" (*Noth*) and are more than necessary in a logical regard: they are necessary for living (GS 345); they pertain to one's self-preservation. Necessities of life are not true or false; they limit thinking before it can, at all, get involved in scientific or logical necessities; they determine the leeways of one's necessities of thinking. The narrower these leeways are, the less you are able to engage with Nietzsche's philosophy. And he, Nietzsche, in fact writes that he does not want to corrupt anyone's "innocence" either, but wants to even fill them with the enthusiasm for their philosophical innocence that they need for living. He does not want to be understood by "asses and old maids of both sexes." *That* they do not have to understand him – that is the goal of his "style" (see chap. IV). Whoever cannot bear his life-threatening truths that flash up only briefly should simply overhear them. Nietzsche therefore does not secure them according to the usual standards of science; he completely does away with any scientific footnotes or endnotes, any premises or conclusions, any coherent or hierarchically ordered arguments, references to sources (see chap. III) or to fields of research, any scholarly disputes with different research opinions (instead, he usually makes use of polemics), and even a fixed terminology (see chap. IV.4). Even (and perhaps especially) scientists may be "asses," may right away reject as "adventures" what is uncomfortable for their thinking habits. Nietzsche's dangerous truths are still perceived by most people, including Nietzsche experts, as adventurous, and they often reject them; the courage for his philosophical surprises is still rare and in turn surprising.

3. *Doing without Absolute Certainties*: If one takes the two aphorisms together, Nietzsche demands readers combine slowness in reading with speed and the "greatest possible suppleness" in thinking (GS 381), to lie in wait patiently in reading, as it were, in order to be able to grasp things quickly in thinking. With the courage for surprises, for adventures, for unexpected and dangerously new things in thinking, one renounces all secure grounds, all timeless things, even in one's own understanding and cognition, even something like an identifiable subject of cognition: "We are unknown to ourselves, we knowers: and with good reason" (GM, Pref. 1). The reason for this, according to Nietzsche, lies in our own cognition. 'Knowers,' in their search for knowledge, necessarily forget themselves, lose sight of themselves, become blind to themselves; they

must, in order to "bring" knowledge "home," suppress the "experiences" that tune them in, and thus have neither "seriousness" nor "time" for them. They remain "strange" to themselves "out of necessity" (ibid.). But if, like Nietzsche, they reflect upon this, they are also surprised by themselves, meet themselves as others. Nietzsche takes this seriously without reservations even for his own philosophizing when he questions his thoughts again and again. He understands every gain in temporal distance as a gain in self-distance, and this as a gain in self-criticism or self-overcoming, and thus as a gain in the leeways of philosophizing (see BGE 257). Self-criticism is "self-overcoming" insofar as everyone, even Nietzsche, needs, at least for some time, self-determinations in secure footholds – insofar as everyone is an 'ass.'

4. *Doing without Methodic Aprioris*: This is especially true for scientific readers. An interpretation that wants to do justice to Nietzsche's philosophizing has to do without either factual or methodical aprioris. Instead, it must respond to surprising discoveries with surprising methods, to the point that it must simply guess many things – and Nietzsche prefers to be guessed at (see chap. IX.3.2). Such an interpretation can always fail and, being completely 'innocent,' it may not even notice that it fails. Nietzsche says that he appreciates from his "heart" "the goodwill apparent in some subtlety of interpretation." To good friends, who are "always too lazy and think that they have a right to be lazy, just because they are friends," he grants "some leeway and playground for misunderstandings from the very start" – and at the same time he scares them with an insult: "and then you can even laugh; – or, alternatively, you can get rid of them altogether, these good friends, – and then laugh some more" (BGE 27). For "the good friends" – Nietzsche puts them in quotation marks – no longer expect surprises; they rely 'comfortably' on being old friends and, as readers of Nietzsche's, on their 'good' knowledge of his writings. It is precisely this knowledge that can endanger understanding, namely when you rely on established methods and routines of interpretation. You are able to read Nietzsche 'well' only with goodwill and based on the trust that 'good friends' have; at the same time, you cannot trust in the friendship to which he constantly invites you. Whoever believes he or she has understood Nietzsche runs the greatest risk of misunderstanding him. He or she then no longer expects surprises. Nietzsche has his Zarathustra say: "In one's friend one should have one's best enemy. You should be closest to him in heart when you resist him." (Za I, On the Friend)

5. *Doing without a System*: Nietzsche makes things obviously difficult for his interpreters, for people will only consider their interpretations plausible if these interpreters are reasonably convinced of them (this is true for this interpretation as well). Interpreters also have to ‘finish’ their work in a limited time, as far as they produce term papers, dissertations, essays, or books. It is their ‘need’ that forces them to commit themselves to their interpretations, at least tentatively. In this respect, they already resist Nietzsche’s declared intentions. This applies all the more to interpreters who fix his philosophy in ‘doctrines,’ which they then support or oppose, and above all to the internationally most influential of all Nietzsche interpreters, Martin Heidegger. Heidegger was especially impactful in that he reduced Nietzsche’s philosophy to a few basic doctrines, that of the death of God or nihilism, of the overman (*Übermensch*), of the will to power and of eternal return, all of which he isolated from their respective contexts while insisting on their consistency in *one* doctrine. He expected from Nietzsche’s philosophy a traditional system that could be analyzed according to traditional methods; he largely ignored the significant forms of Nietzsche’s philosophical writings and instead interpreted his philosophy as a metaphysics “blinded in itself.” But Nietzsche did not even have his Zarathustra systematically link these doctrines, apart from the fact that he had him fail in trying to teach them; he himself identified with the teachings of the overman and of the eternal return only very late, when he tried with all his means to be, if not understood, then at least finally heard. That the concept of the will to power was not a metaphysical principle in Nietzsche’s texts was shown especially by Wolfgang Müller-Lauter (*Nietzsche: His Philosophy of Contradictions and the Contradictions of His Philosophy*, 1999 [German original: 1971]).

6. *Doing without the Accusation of Ambiguity*: As far as Nietzsche’s philosophy does not fit the premises of one’s interpretation, one is tempted to accuse him of ambiguity; the accusation of ambiguity has become a dogma in Nietzsche research. But Nietzsche tolerated “ambiguity” neither in others nor in himself; he wanted to be avowedly ‘unambiguous’ in both his life and his writings; he accused Christianity and Richard Wagner of seductive ambiguity (GS 346; GM III 4). Only “*Dionysus*, that great ambiguity and tempter god,” was to be the exception (BGE 295, see chap. XI.10). Nietzsche’s writings become ambiguous when his concepts are detached from their respective contexts and generalized in an arbitrary way. Those who accuse Nietzsche of ambiguity thereby create leeways to reach final definitions of his philosophizing – which

Nietzsche, they argue, violated. They proceed like the "*worst readers*" according to Nietzsche: "The worst readers are those who behave like plundering troops: they take away a few things they can use, dirty and confound the remainder, and revile the whole." (HH II, AOM 137)



## VI.

### Nietzsche's Task and Guiding Distinctions

Already in his early writings, Nietzsche had discovered his 'task' as well as the most important themes and guiding distinctions of his philosophizing. In the approximately nineteen years that remained in his life, he refined, further developed, and re-evaluated them many times, but essentially stuck to them until the end; his philosophizing can only superficially be divided into phases or periods. He himself emphasized the deepest cut: his detachment from Schopenhauer and Wagner. As a philosopher, he was concerned with a crucial reorientation after what he considered to be the most serious disorientation in Western civilization, the fact that religion had become un-believable, metaphysical systems had deteriorated, and evolutionist thinking had gained acceptance – in short: the arrival of nihilism.

1. *The "Task"*: According to Nietzsche, the disorientation that dominated the 19<sup>th</sup> century could only be overcome by an *enhancement of culture*. "Culture," according to his famous definition, "is, above all, unity of artistic style in all expressions of the life of a people." (DS 1) 'Style' he understood as a characteristic way of communicating with others, of making oneself recognizable to others and oneself (cf. EH, *Why I write such good books* 4). A style develops when everyday routines, 'expressions of life' of various kinds, such as eating and drinking habits, the ways one interacts with others, moral attitudes and judgments, religious practices, artistic taste, etc., become in tune with each other, support each other, reach an overarching character or a common 'face,' and thus present themselves as a 'unity,' as a unit, which then does not follow revealed or imagined rules or principles, but gradually and for a long time grows quite unobtrusively out of 'life' itself. In this regard, every style is 'artistic,' aesthetic; and style in this sense can refer to individuals as well as to groups or entire peoples. Culture is that which in this way becomes self-evident through long practice, 'attains style' and is only noticeable when violated.

Nietzsche started with ‘culture’ and ‘style’ precisely because, for him, religion, metaphysics, and morality, which, until then, had seemingly provided a natural hold to everyday and philosophical orientations, had clearly become fragile. To enhance culture then meant, for him, first of all to reveal its illusions and to consciously reorientate it, to give the life from which it had grown a ‘goal,’ a ‘meaning’ without new illusions. Nietzsche therefore did not expect a reorientation, which was to overcome this disorientation, from philosophically conceived or politically propagated guiding ideas, such as the nationalism, liberalism, socialism, communism, or anarchism of his time, nor from what was initially only a political event: the founding of the new German Empire, which immediately gave rise to hopes for a new great culture in Germany. Instead, he relied on the historical example of a brilliant and successful culture that has since enjoyed the highest veneration in Europe: the culture of ancient Greece. His philology might have additionally suggested it to him. But here, too, the challenge was to yet discover what had constituted this culture – not Winckelmann’s ‘noble simplicity and quiet greatness’ (see chap. III.2), but rather, according to Nietzsche, something that had become foreign: the culture of competition and tragedy.

1.1. In *competition*, he discovered a blatant pleasure taken in the cruelty of victory. There was cruel competition between peoples, and it was also welcomed as a matter of course within city states. It brought about, in ancient Greece, not only a selection of the physically strongest, but also, and especially in war, of the cleverest and most prudent men; the Homeric epics provide clear evidence of the former in Achilles, of the latter in Odysseus. Here everything is set for competition, everything is acquired in competition, everything is sacrificed for competition, even one’s own life. The competition of the Greeks – this was Nietzsche’s guiding idea, which he never gave up – was the noble individual’s struggle to stand out before others; this was what made the Greeks superior to their rivals and lifted their culture to ‘greatness.’ But it also endangered them when the struggles within could no longer be controlled. The Athenians managed to shift this competition into a contest of words. In this way, they developed not only their aristocratic democracy, but also art, science and philosophy, whose brilliance is still luminous today. Finally, they opened their agonal thinking to everything foreign, as far as they could beneficially adopt it. Both the struggle for distinction and the willingness to adopt foreign things also characterize Nietzsche’s image of the ‘good European.’



1.2. Nietzsche – this was his *original insight* – combined the Greek sense for cruelty with that for art: The Greeks could look into the cruelest abysses of human existence because they were able to give this view an artistic form, the form of tragedy. For Nietzsche, the abysses of existence were most clearly expressed by the mythical Silenus, the exuberantly joyful companion of Dionysus, who was also the god of ecstatic destruction and rebirth: “The very best is utterly beyond your reach: not to have been born, not to be, to be nothing. However, the second best thing for you is: to die soon.” (BT 3) The formula appears in Sophocles’ *Oedipus at Colonus* (v. 1225-1229); Hölderlin used it as an epigraph for the second volume of his *Hyperion*. In honor of this Dionysus, the Athenians held, in annual festivals, dramatic competitions, which told the cruelest fates, through which the gods could burden mankind with blame. Three poets had to each perform a trilogy of tragedies on one day and conclude with a satyr play that made people laugh, turning the seriousness into a cheerfulness. Their art permitted Athenians to bear even the most abysmal realities in a way that they could face them without reservation. Nietzsche appreciated this as a model.

The Greeks, however, still considered art as a gift of the muses and therefore in the broadest sense as *music*. This music was part of the education of young men along with gymnastics, the art of physical exercise. The rhythmic, dithyrambic language of the tragedies was, according to Nietzsche, ‘born’ out of a music that is almost completely silent for us, as it was barely written down; Aeschylus and Sophocles, who took Greek tragedy to its peak, also created music for it. The young Nietzsche found this again in Schopenhauer’s metaphysics and Wagner’s plans for his musical drama. According to Schopenhauer, the abyss of existence, which deprives us of any value of life, i.e., the blind and senseless will to sheer existence, is temporarily forgotten in moments of the highest enjoyment of infinitely clear music; it calms our libidinal urge and redeems life, without requiring a knowledge of existence through ideas. According to Wagner, human existence was not only to be justified by his, Wagner’s, music, but also to be elevated to a new culture of the highest pleasure. With these two, the young Nietzsche concluded, Greek tragedy could be revived on German soil, and a new culture could be born from music. In his later “self-criticism,” he soberly called this an “artiste’s metaphysics,” “capricious, otiose, fantastical” (BT, An Attempt at Self-Criticism 2 and 5). But he continued to believe that while art does not metaphysically “justify” existence, it indeed

makes it “bearable”: Nietzsche changed his famous sentence from BT “only as an *aesthetic phenomenon* is existence and the world eternally *justified*” (BT 5) in GS 107 to “as an aesthetic phenomenon existence is still *bearable* to us.” He kept the notion of ‘aesthetic phenomenon’ but dropped the metaphysical justification.

1.3. *Philosophy*, too, became a significant cultural phenomenon in Athens. With Anaximander, Heraclitus and Empedocles, all of whom came from elsewhere, it was still oriented toward the tragic. For Nietzsche, its decline began with Socrates, who is regarded as its most important founding father, and this decline entailed that of Greek culture. Socrates remained, according to the tradition, rather distant from music and tragedy, and instead insisted on logical justification based on explicitly established and deliberately ordered universal terms; in philosophy, he distinguished between art and science in order to confine philosophy to the latter. To this end, he had to extract the concepts from their pragmatic use in changing situations and take a theoretical standpoint beyond everyday language. With the help of the personal fascination he exerted on young noble Athenians, he turned their gaze away from the horror of existence as shown by tragedy and toward a universal, timeless, theoretical combination of ‘pure’ concepts, bringing the “archetype of *theoretical man*” to prominence among the Greeks, who had previously been oriented toward war and competition (BT 15). For Nietzsche, philosophy in this way lost its insight into the depths of life for millennia, dealing only with life’s logical surface and finding its true value there. Philosophy was impoverished by its own illusions; the birth defect of Socratic philosophy, which wanted to provide enlightenment and declared itself an authority of truth, was its will to create its own illusions. The illusion of art, which permitted a view into life’s abysses, was changed by an illusion that protected people from this view.

2. *Guiding Distinctions*: From this, Nietzsche took up the task of philosophy in the present: to enlighten itself as an instance of truth, as Socrates had established, about its will to self-illusion and thereby make possible a new enhancement of culture. For Nietzsche, philosophy was to provide an orientation without illusions. In this respect, he distinguished (1.), in one’s attitude to reality, between pessimism and optimism (including the strength vs. weakness of one’s sense of truth); (2.) in reality itself, between chaos and cosmos (including becoming vs. being); (3.) in human reality, between individuals and society (including health vs. illness); and (4.) in the human arrangement of reality,

between metaphors and concepts (including types vs. caricatures). He wanted such distinctions to be understood as hypothetical or experimental, not as metaphysical opposites suggesting real entities (see BGE 2).

2.1 *The Distinction of Attitudes Concerning Reality – Pessimism/Optimism:* For Nietzsche (and Schopenhauer), 'pessimism' is not that what it is commonly understood as today, the notorious *expectation* of the *pessimum*, the worst; instead, it is, for him, the philosophical courage to see the worst that is always already *present*, the abysses of existence, and to face them without illusion. Pessimism, as Nietzsche understood it, does not weaken life; it makes it stronger. He contrasted, again following Schopenhauer, the art that makes this strong pessimism possible with the 'optimism' of the theoretical person, who relies on the surface of concepts and the (apparently universal) reason that forms and orders them, and who seeks his happiness in them. As a self-illuminated thinking created over thousands of years, this optimism is "a *truly infamous mode of thinking*" (DS 6). Schopenhauer wanted to do away with it through its enlightenment; Nietzsche included it in a new "*Dionysian pessimism*" (GS 370), through which this optimism could become bearable, and which was supposed to inspire the courage to enhance life rather than turn away from it.

2.2. *The Distinction Concerning Reality Itself – Chaos/Cosmos:* "The total character of the world is," Nietzsche wrote in GS 109, "for all eternity chaos, not in the sense of a lack of necessity, but of a lack of order, organization, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever else our aesthetic anthropomorphisms are called." These can be summarized in the term 'cosmos,' literally 'beautiful order.' With these concepts as illusions, people cover over the reality of chaos in order to cope with it; they need some kind of 'beautiful order' to be able to live at all. But illusions, as necessary for life as they may sometimes be, threaten it in the long run. It is therefore the task of philosophy to discover, underneath these concepts, the reality that is not beautifully ordered, the chaos that is changing relentlessly and irregularly. But since Socratic theoretical reason had merely maintained this optimistic illusion of reality, this very reason was the first to be dethroned: This reason in fact does not recognize an eternal 'being,' as metaphysics (as it was later called) had postulated since Parmenides and in contrast to which everything sensual became mere 'appearance,' but instead only creates appearances; it does not grasp reality, but only puts illusions over it. Nietzsche thus replaced the old Parmenidean and then also the Platonic and Aristotelian distinction of 'being' and 'appearance' with that of reality

and illusion, depth and surface or, in mythical symbols, the Dionysian and the Apollonian. The visible, tangible, well-ordered, calm and beautiful figures for which ancient Greece was celebrated, and whose highest symbols were the statues of the god Apollo, were only the calming surface of the chaotic-ecstatic becoming in the depths, which no reason can reach and which only music can symbolize. As far as language likewise belongs to this surface, all statements regarding that chaos remain problematic.

2.3. *The Distinction Concerning Human Reality – Individual/Society*: The reality of nature as well as that of humankind is above all – Nietzsche found confirmation of this in Darwin’s notion of selection as well as the Greek idea of competition – based on the concept of the individual. This reality is determined by the relentless confrontation of individuals – not according to laws, which are, according to Nietzsche, only presumed for the sake of a beautiful order. But ‘individuals,’ too, do not simply ‘exist’ as such. They constitute themselves by continuously engaging with each other – as ‘powers’ taking measure of each other: “every power,” Nietzsche writes in BGE 22, “draws its final consequence at every moment” (see chap. X.4). In this view, society and the ties and laws that permeate it are surface phenomena that philosophers must push through in order to reach the realities that determine them. People may well be dependent on society and political communities, but only out of necessity in order to survive, and it is from this necessity that one must understand all social bonds. Nietzsche therefore began his philosophy of human society with individuals who ‘stand alone’ and must also be able to ‘stand alone’ – a necessity which social ties easily conceal from them. They need the strength for loneliness, for “seven solitudes” (GS 285), in order to be able to orient themselves and be responsible for themselves. Philosophers too, and they especially, stood alone and competed before they established schools and camps, and as long as they stood alone, each of them could become a “*personality*” like Heraclitus, Empedocles, Socrates or Plato. Only the social success of philosophy forced philosophers to take on societal obligations – and this, according to Nietzsche, made them superficial. But people who are permanently deprived of the exercise of their strengths will become sick. The longer the strong individuals, on whom every society depends for its orientation under constantly changing living conditions, are subjected to constraints that level them with everyone else, including the weaker and weakest individuals, the more they will distrust their strength, internalize these

constraints as their own morals, and feel guilty about their strength – and thus, for Nietzsche, the weaker and sicker society as a whole will become.

2.4. *The Distinction Concerning Human Arrangements of Reality – Metaphors/Concepts*: The first requirement for people living together in a society is a common language, which helps them to rapidly communicate in times of need (see BGE 268, GS 354). A common language forms “conventions” (TL 1), which over time become a new “power,” which “embraces mankind with ghostly arms and impels it to where it does not really want to go” (WB 5). It creates common images of reality and thereby separates individuals from their own experience. It is, however, this personal experience of a chaotically changing reality that makes people speak – and speak differently each time. Thus language, too, must leave room for relentless change, must “still have chaos in itself” (Za, Preface 5); it must keep meaning “fluid” through metaphors and attractive images that permit multiple interpretations (GM II 12; see IV.5). At the same time, however, it must not deprive people of their “sense of security” (D 174, GS 355), must not, as Nietzsche feared from the historical scholarship of his time, pursue the “madly thoughtless shattering and dismantling of all foundations, their dissolution into a continual evolving and historicizing of all there has ever been” and thus deprive society in general and the education of youth of their ground (HL 9). Language must be able, Nietzsche noted, to “*pin down* concepts” (N May – July 1885, 35[84]) and “perhaps *pin down* the animal ‘man’ with it” (N Autumn 1885 – Autumn 1886, 2[13]), and thus, on the whole, guarantee a durable and yet flexible orientation by fixing concepts. This begins with the formation of *types*. A type is literally an imprint, an outline, a scheme that can be filled out in many ways – thus it is simultaneously durable and flexible. It is attached to individual things or persons and hypothetically taken as something general – until additional markers modify it. A type is a temporary concept, permitting generalizations even where they are not tenable in the long run – as are all living things in nature and history. In this sense, Nietzsche makes types out of figures of history such as Socrates and Jesus, Goethe and Napoleon; he also introduces his Zarathustra or the overman as a type. That he indeed *forms* types he makes clear through exaggeration. He wrote in an early note: “I show a caricature. Not in the opinion that everyone recognizes it as a caricature: Hope that in the end everyone will recognize it as a caricature.” (N Autumn 1869, 1[11]) And finally he saw that all living things that are held too long as a type and defined in fixed terms finally turn out to

be a caricature: “Man, locked up in an iron cage of errant people, has become a caricature of man” (N Spring 1888, 15[73]).

## VII.

# Nietzsche's Critique of Illusionary Orientations

Nietzsche's pessimistic conclusion is: regarding reality, we can only form illusions. Nevertheless, we can know this and deal with our illusions in such a way that they benefit life instead of harming it. Illusions benefit life as long as they give our orientation a necessary sense of security; they harm it if they make reorientations which are necessary under new conditions appear unnecessary. They threaten life if they confine our orientation to narrow and permanent systems; they enhance it when they help broaden and multiply the horizons and leeways of our orientation. If our orientations are to remain beneficial to life, we must be able to distinguish between what strengthens and what harms *them*. Philosophical critique can help, as the questioning of the conditions of the possibility of that which appears self-evident. In the history of philosophy, Nietzsche's critique has been the most radical so far. It engages above all with: 1. metaphysics and Christianity; 2. dominant morals; 3. play-acting in society; 4-6. science, knowledge, and logic; 7. consciousness; 8. language; 9. any kind of belief; and 10. the type of lifeform that is, for Nietzsche, oriented toward ascetic ideals.

1. *Metaphysics and Christianity*: According to Nietzsche's typology, Western civilization developed through a combination of metaphysics and Christianity. The Parmenidean tradition of philosophy, which is based on a truth that corresponds to being and that is logically defined in terms and therefore teachable, projects this true being as a uniform and eternal backdrop of phenomena which are accessible to human orientation only in limited perspectives and for a certain time. Since the disciples of Jesus were to go forth at his command and teach the gospel to people all over the world, they – and after them Paul and then Christian theology – had to put it into dogmas, using for this purpose the concepts of Greek metaphysics. Subsequently, metaphysics and Christianity mutually supported each other, and dogmatic Christianity (not the 'evangelical

practice' of Jesus, see chap. XI.9) became "Platonism for the 'people'" (BGE, Preface). Thus, in the 19<sup>th</sup> century both lost their credibility together.

2. *Dominant Morals*: Metaphysics and Christianity united in a morality that survived them after they became implausible. Critique of this morality is at the heart of Nietzsche's work, especially in D, BGE and GM. Morality refers as little as metaphysics and religion do, even if it may have "the oldest realism" as its advocate, to something real: "Moral actions are in fact 'something different,' – more we cannot say: and all actions are essentially unknown." (D 116) A morality is an interpretation that is subject to "*fashions*" (D 131). At the core of the present morality of a "*society engaged in trading*" (D 175), Nietzsche assumed "a social drive of timidity." It strives to take "*all the dangers* from life" and create a "social sense of security" (D 174). As the "danger of dangers" then appear the uncontrolled and overpowering individuals (D 173), those who "deviate from the usual path and who are so often the inventive and productive" ones (D 164). Morality therefore urges one "to make oneself equal, to fit oneself in an order, to diminish oneself" (D 26), to "thoroughly remould, weaken and abolish the *individual*" (D 132) – in the interest of the already adapted and weakened. The Greek morality of self-control on the one hand and the Christian commandment to love one's neighbor on the other are thereby reduced to a morality of mutual selflessness, as metaphysics assumes a free will as a means for people to place blame on each other and thus keep each other down using morality (see BGE 21). Modern 'Europeans' can only tolerate one another in this "moral disguise" (GS 352). This morality, which fights against power, thus becomes the dominant power itself, the power of the powerless over the powerful. It lives off the *ressentiment* of those who have 'come off badly,' who compensate for their weakness "by an imaginary revenge" (GM I 10; see chap. XI). Those priests and teachers who invented and disseminated this morality could have known this, but they attributed its origin to higher powers or orders, so that no one seemed responsible for it; when doing so, they may have been "*dishonestly mendacious*, mendacious right down to its very depths," or "innocently mendacious, true-heartedly mendacious, blue-eyed mendacious, virtuously mendacious" (GM II 19). But no one who lives in a society is free from the morality of mutual selflessness. Its critique is only possible "*out of morality!*" in favor of a higher morality (D, preface 4). Nietzsche took that path (cf. chap. VIII-XI).



3. *Society*: Nietzsche regarded *democracy and socialism* as heirs to the morality of “herd timidity” (BGE 201f.); he saw that, in his time, society was designed to be built on it. While the archaic Greeks were still capable of organizing precarious societies of autarkic individuals and the people of the Middle Ages of raising “those monsters of broad-based social towers,” of which the cathedrals bear witness, in the modern era “that Athenian faith,” which was enforced by growing democratization, had returned as “American faith” and eventually as “European faith”: that everyone must be able to fill in for everyone else and thus play-act every role. This, for Nietzsche, is a “faith of artists,” of “actors” (GS 356). In this faith, one’s role outweighs one’s character, art outweighs nature, and institutional reliance outweighs the ability to stand alone; the “art of adaptability” becomes the highest art (GS 361). A society of actors lives off illusions and therefore works constantly on its own self-illusion – no matter how dishonest, abysmal, faithless, or virtuous. Since the Jewish people and women – Nietzsche addresses both together in GS 361 – were forced to adapt the longest and hardest, and therefore learned to distinguish between playing roles in public and for themselves, they would one day prove to be the most powerful and most honest, but to everyone else they would appear as the most incomprehensible. For such diverse adaptations modern society had, according to Nietzsche, created the so-called “blessing of work” (D 173, see chap. XI.7.2).

4. *Science*: The different academic disciplines, the sciences as well as the humanities, are both the means and the objects of Nietzsche’s critique of illusionary orientations: They are means as far as they methodically dissolve a belief in illusions; they are objects as far as they too are “*still pious*” and still hold on to a belief, the belief in truth. Science and morality both require selflessness. They demand one refrain from one’s own advantages, personal feelings, and idiosyncratic judgments in favor of what is exclusively universal; in order to give this selflessness a positive foothold, transcendental philosophy postulates a ‘pure subject.’ In this way, however, the “*ground of morality*” is also the ground of science, and science, including traditional philosophy, is thus blind to its morals; it cannot distance itself from them, cannot make them into its object of investigation (GS 344). Thus, science was unable to question the value of the will to truth (“*Why not untruth instead? And uncertainty? Even ignorance?*” BGE 1), recognize “untruth as a condition of life” (BGE 4) or see that “physics too is only an interpretation and arrangement of the world [...] and

not an explanation of the world” (BGE 14). Nevertheless, in Western science, “Christian morality itself, the concept of truthfulness that was taken ever more rigorously, the father confessor’s refinement of the Christian conscience” has been “translated and sublimated into a scientific conscience, into intellectual cleanliness at any price.” (GS 357 / GM III 27) With this truthfulness, morality would, Nietzsche argues, also question its faith in truth and thus be capable of becoming the highest and final instance of critique – as a ‘gay’ science (cf. chap. VIII.7).

5. *Knowledge*: If truth no longer consists of a correspondence between scientific statements and their objects, because objects are not at all comprehensible without these statements, then truth becomes a “dogma” (GS 347, GM I 13). Such “erroneous articles of faith” – for example, “that there are enduring things; that there are equal things, that there are things, kinds of material, bodies; that a thing is what it appears to be; that our will is free; that what is good for me is also good in and for itself,” that there are subjects – have been “passed on by inheritance further and further, and finally almost became part of the basic endowment of the species” and now function like instincts that definitely orientate us. This is precisely where “the *strength* of knowledge” lies, “not in its degree of truth, but in its age, its incorporatedness, its character as a condition of life.” (GS 110) Confronting this arouses fear. According to Nietzsche’s hypothesis, cognition as a whole, in everyday life as well as in science and philosophy, is driven by an “*instinct of fear*”: it always tries to trace something unfamiliar or unsettling “back to something *familiar*,” and thus “the rejoicing of the person who attains knowledge” is only “the rejoicing from a regained sense of security.” For this, it is sufficient to simply find “our logic or our willing and desiring” in the unfamiliar. The philosophical alternative to this kind of ‘cognition’ would be to fearlessly view even the familiar “as a problem” and see it “as strange, as distant, as ‘outside us’...” (GS 355, see chap. VIII.6)

6. *Logic*: “Even behind all logic and its apparently autocratic posturings stand validations or, stated more clearly, physiological requirements for the preservation of a particular type of life.” (BGE 3) Logic is, as Nietzsche stated (only) in his notes, a “tremendous capacity of abbreviation,” a “sign apparatus,” whose superiority lies precisely in the fact that “it distances itself as far as possible from the individual fact”; the “reduction of experiences to signs, and the ever-greater quantity of things, which thus can be grasped: is its *highest* power” for life (N April – June 1885, 34 [131], corr.). Logic simplifies reality,

which is “unspeakably differently complex” (“*unsäglich anders complicirt*”), through extreme measures and thereby makes it surveyable. Its “simplification apparatus” is in this regard the “model of a complete *fiction*” – without which we cannot live. Its “*sign writing*” enables the “*communicability and memorability* of the logical processes”; logic creates signs that can be recorded in writing independently of any individual conditions of experience and in a way that it can be taught universally; it is thus the pattern of a “*regulative fiction*” (ibid., 34[249]). As long as one does not assume a metaphysical being behind logic, but regards it as an “art of making schemata and abbreviations [...] for the purpose of understanding,” applicable only to what is “*most superficial*” (N Summer 1886 – Autumn 87, 5[16]), it is a highly useful “art of making *unambiguous determinations*” (N End of 1886 – Spring 1887, 7[34]). But as far as one believes in having at one’s disposal “a criterion of reality in the forms of reason, while having it in order to become master of reality, in order to *misunderstand* reality in a clever way,” it is “the greatest error that has been committed, the actual doom of error on earth” (N Spring 1888, 14[153]). Philosophy and the sciences can only try “to somehow describe Heraclitan becoming and abbreviate it into signs (to *translate* and mummify it, as it were, into a kind of an illusionary being)” (N June – July 1885, 36[27]), and for this they need “the greatest artists of abstraction” (N Summer 1886 – Spring 1887, 6[11]) in order to “invent signs for entire genres of signs” (N Autumn 1885 – Spring 1886, 1[28]). As such, they can certainly advance to the highest levels of universalization, but only ever experimentally, provisionally, and semiotically.

7. *Consciousness*: Descartes, who had turned from being as such to the consciousness of being, conceived of consciousness again as a being as such, to which one can again attribute immortality. Since then, consciousness has been considered “the *kernel* of man, what is abiding, eternal, ultimate, most original in him!” (GS 11) For Nietzsche, however, consciousness is a yet incomplete experiment in the evolution of humans that may still either threaten or strengthen “*the still undetermined animals*” (BGE 62). From a phenomenological point of view, consciousness expresses itself as an occasional state of ‘awareness’ (*Bewusstheit*), when “the preserving alliance of the instincts” is no longer sufficient and, under increased attention, new and more complex orientations are tested (GS 11). This kind of awareness is especially necessary for “communication” via signs. For in the “need” of people to “understand each other swiftly and subtly,” there is always leeway for misunderstanding

the communicative signs; communication requires constant awareness and, *in this sense*, persistent consciousness. In a “possibly extravagant conjecture,” Nietzsche therefore attributes “the subtlety and strength of consciousness” to “a person’s (or animal’s) *ability to communicate*” and consciousness in general to the “*pressure of the need to communicate*.” According to this, consciousness is an effect of communication, “really just a net connecting one person with another.” Therefore it ‘contains’ only that which can be communicated in signs that have become conventional: consciousness “actually belongs not to a man’s existence as an individual but rather to what is the community- and herd-aspect of his nature” (GS 354).

8. *Language*: The illusory orientations of religion, metaphysics, morals, science, and logic all manifest themselves in language, finding their “constant advocate” in it (TI, ‘Reason’ in Philosophy 5). Language involuntarily orients us in its ways of sense-making. The Indo-European languages may, with their subject-predicate grammar, have supported the basic metaphysical distinctions of permanent substances, which function as subjects of sentences, from changing properties, which are attributed to these subjects (BGE 20). Even the assumption of God as the origin of everything else could be an effect of grammar: “I am afraid that we cannot get rid of God because we still have faith in grammar . . .” (TI, ‘Reason’ in Philosophy 5). But even if we realize that this “*rational thinking*” is “*an interpretation according to a schema*” or to a “linguistic coercion,” we still cannot, Nietzsche notes, “*discard it*” (N Summer 1886 – Autumn 1887, 5[22]): “It is not at our discretion to change our means of expression: it is possible to understand to what extent it is mere semiotics.” (N Spring 1888, 14[122])

9. *Beliefs*: Nietzsche summarizes these illusionary orientations in his concept of ‘belief’ – which refers not in the least to only religious belief. The less one can recognize reality, the more one is in “*need of faith, a foothold, backbone, support*” in order to be able to live and act. The question then concerns “the extent to which one needs a *faith* in order to flourish” and “how much that is ‘firm’ and that one does not want shaken because one *clings* to it.” The less someone needs it, the more open he or she will be toward reality. This ability may again change under changing circumstances. It is therefore “a measure of the degree of one’s strength (or, to speak more clearly, one’s weakness)” (GS 347), the extent to which one can “renounce” “endless trust,” “ultimate wisdom, goodness, or power,” hope for a “final corrector,” “reason” or “love” in what happens, some kind of “ultimate peace” (GS 285). The opposite of belief is not

knowledge – even the assumptions of “bodies, lines, planes, causes and effects, motion and rest, form and content” are “articles of faith” (GS 121) – but rather a will to create one’s own hold by relying on one’s own strength and decide each time for oneself what one wants to hold on to: “will, as the affect of command, is the decisive mark of sovereignty and strength.” (GS 347) If someone is in need of permanent beliefs, whatever they may be, Nietzsche calls him or her a bound spirit, in contrast to a free spirit (HH I 225-229), and he considers it his own ‘task’ in philosophy to help people liberate their spirit again and again.

10. *Ascetic Ideals*: In the third treatise of GM, Nietzsche introduces for the metaphysical-Christian morality of Western civilization, which permeates its philosophical terminology and even its science, the concept of the ascetic ideal. In this term, he succinctly summarizes, echoing the monastic virtues of poverty, humility and chastity, the illusionary orientations of Europeans (wherever they had spread). ‘Asceticism’ refers to rigorous training and strict discipline. An ascetic ideal demands untiring effort throughout one’s life, and yet, as an ideal, one can never fulfill it; it creates a conscience all the worse the more one strives after it; it demands constant self-violation. But there is meaning in it: the meaning of giving meaning to meaningless suffering in a meaningless world: “The meaninglessness of suffering, *not* the suffering, was the curse that has so far blanketed mankind, – and *the ascetic ideal offered man a meaning!* Up to now it was the only meaning, but any meaning at all is better than no meaning at all.” But this meaning is empty; the ascetic ideal “means, let us dare to grasp it, a *will to nothingness*, an aversion to life, a rebellion against the most fundamental prerequisites of life” (GM III 28).



## VIII.

### Nietzsche's Footholds and Standards for a Self-Critical Orientation

A self-critical orientation, which renounces illusions of any hold outside itself, beyond its own viewpoints, horizons, and perspectives, must and can find its own hold within itself. This is, according to Nietzsche, since we cannot rely on any final grounds, a matter of the will, of decision-making that is based only on one's own strength (see chap. X.4). Given the uncertainty of every orientation, it would be a "paralysis of the will" to simply be skeptical, to make oneself comfortable in doubt (BGE 208; see also N Autumn 1881, 15[2]). Nietzsche found the power to orientate oneself, to decide oneself, and to act on one's own responsibility entirely in everyday life, and he thereby created new horizons for philosophy.

1. *Naturalness*: Nietzsche also understood his "task" as a "de-anthropomorphization of nature" on the one hand, i.e., the reduction of its millennia-old anthropomorphizations, and, on the other, as a "naturalization of mankind," i.e., an orientation toward an understanding of nature that is not (or less) humanized (N Spring – Autumn 1881, 11 [211]). Human beings should, according to him, understand themselves from nature as it really is, as neither deified nor devilized, neither demonized nor belittled. Nietzsche distinguished between the natural, which grows over time out of needs and hardships, and the artificial, which is only imagined and played. One must first get to know "*the things closest*" to us better, know "what is beneficial to us and what is harmful in the institution of our mode of life, in the division of the day, in how long and with whom we enjoy social intercourse, in profession and leisure, commanding and obeying, feeling for nature and art, eating, sleeping, and reflecting" – in short: the human, all too human; "the requirements of the individual, his great and small needs within the twenty-four hours of the day" may, for philosophy, no longer be regarded as something "contemptible or a matter of indifference" (HH II; WS 5f.).

2. *Corporeality*: Naturalness begins with our own body. Nietzsche zestfully removed for philosophy the taboos that had been put on our affects, drives, instincts, feelings, and passions (or what is left of them in modern civilization) and especially our sexuality: “The degree and type of a person’s sexuality reaches up into the further-most peaks of their spirit” (BGE 75). He urged us to newly explore the human being in all its complexity, led by the “guideline of corporeality” (N Summer – Autumn 1884, 26 [374], and others). In doing so, he relied on the distinction of male vs. female. He proceeded as a man, because everyone is bound to a sex and its ways of thinking (even if he or she would change it – we would call it gender today), and he addressed, as a man, in ever-new ways, the “riddle” of the “woman” – for him, the “truth” was a woman (GS, Preface 4). On the other hand, he distinguished all philosophizing as healthy or ill. Everyone is bound as an individual to his or her corporeal and mental ‘healths.’ Especially through the illnesses to which these healths are exposed, he or she can learn a lot from them for philosophy, which Nietzsche himself was the best example of. A critical philosophy must therefore also always be a “*health teaching*” (HH II, Preface 2, see II).

3. *Reasonableness*: Nietzsche dethroned the metaphysical “reason,” but he all the more insisted on pragmatic ‘reasonableness’ (“Vernünftigkeit”), which one ought to appreciate and to perform according to “expedience” and “utility” (BGE 191). Clarity, overview, and planning capacity belong to it, each in the leeways of one’s living conditions. Reasonableness must have originated from “irrationality,” i.e., from the corporeal drives and needs, in an “irrational way” (HH I 1, D 123), and it remains bound to it. Nevertheless, it is indispensable as “the non-arbitrary in judgment” and as a potential “universal” obligation in our discourse with others (GS 76). “Being rational” in this sense helps the individual to control every extravagance and practice self-discipline (TI, The Problem of Socrates 10). But sometimes this and that may appear reasonable; “reason” can turn out to be “unreason” again (GS 307); you reach some “freedom of mind” only as a “wanderer,” by going in and out of different forms of reasonableness (HH I 638). In this sense, pragmatic reason likewise becomes a self-critical “reason on behalf of reason” (HH II, WS 189), a reason for dealing with reason. Nietzsche, as he noted down in retrospect, understood his entire philosophizing as an “attempt on my part to comprehend the *absolute reasonableness* of societal judgment and valuation: of course free of the will to deduct moral results.” (N Autumn 1887, 9[140])



4. *Spirituality*: Nietzsche transformed not only Kant's concept of reason but also Hegel's concept of spirit in a pragmatic way. Like Hegel, he elevated reason to spirit (*Geist*) and reasonableness to spirituality (*Geistigkeit*). 'Spirit,' in which Hegel's thinking culminated, was also Nietzsche's concept for the freedom that bound thinking attains when it has consistently thought through all its guiding distinctions and can then sovereignly decide on them, can, in Nietzsche's words, "unhinge and hinge his pro and contra" (HH I, Pref. 6, GM III 12). The 'free spirits' of the Enlightenment, whose "acquired *good* conscience in their hostility toward familiar, traditional, hallowed things" (GS 297) already made them believe that their thinking was free from all ties, while they nevertheless still clung to the old "prejudices of philosophers" (BGE 1ff.) regarding a universal and equal reason, which was to find in everyone the good through the true – these so-called free spirits did not yet, for Hegel and Nietzsche, attain the freedom of mind. According to Nietzsche, a spirit will be free only when it has abandoned the "martyrdom" for eternal truths in favor of greater truthfulness "in every little question-mark" concerning its own "favorite doctrines" (BGE 25), when it "takes leave" of "every wish for certainty" (GS 347) and at the same time has realized that its leeways for mobility in thinking are limited. For a free spirit will always reckon with the will to self-deception as "the fundamental will of the spirit," which most of all proves as a spirit when it is cruel, "cruelty turned against itself" (BGE 229f.). For this it must be gifted "with front and back souls," whose "ultimate intentions nobody can see, with their fore- and backgrounds that no foot can fully traverse" (JGB 44). It was Socrates, Nietzsche noted down for himself, the 'inventor' of 'theoretical reason,' who had these multiple hidden souls at his disposal (see N April – June 1885, 34[66]).

Based on these anthropological footholds, Nietzsche set his epistemological-ethical (non-theoretical) standards. For him, the first condition of a self-critical orientation was

5. *Honesty*: 'Honesty' or 'truthfulness' or 'conscientiousness' is what remained after millennia-old discourses of justification, truths, and certainties were lost; it remained as a residual need and will for them. Conscience becomes an "intellectual conscience" (GS 2), through which individuals must decide for themselves what they consider to be religion, morality, and reason. However, one never simply 'possesses' this honesty, but one must "work on it with all the malice and love at our disposal" so that it never comes to rest (BGE 227);

one must never believe in one's honesty, but must persistently question with "extravagant honesty" the drives that are pushing one toward it while not losing sight of the "terrible basic text of *homo natura*" (BGE 230).

6. *Fearlessness*: "And if our honesty nevertheless gets tired one day and sighs and stretches its limbs and finds us too harsh and would rather things were better, easier, gentler [...] we will help it out with whatever devilishness we have – [...] our adventurer's courage, our sly and discriminating curiosity" (BGE 227). Honesty requires, as a constant incentive, the will to fearless experiments – Nietzsche entitled the fifth book of GS in its entirety "We Fearless Ones." Despite our "herd timidity," certain "strong and dangerous drives such as enterprise, daring, vindictiveness, cunning, rapacity, and a domineering spirit" have also been "nurtured and cultivated" in society – because they are needed for new orientations (BGE 201). It could be the task of philosophers to make their life an "experiment" (GS 324), to push their orientation to its limits in such a way that it turns into desperate disorientation. In doing so, they may test the limits of human orientation as such, become "experimental stations of humanity," as Nietzsche notes (N Beginning of 1880, 1[38] f.; see D 453). The extent to which they are able to do this depends on their power to "incorporate" unusual and unheard-of orientations, i.e., make them routine and thus bearable for themselves (HL 1; HH I 224; GS 11; N Spring – Autumn 1881, 11[141]).

7. *Gaiety, Cheerfulness*: "*Life as a means to knowledge*" – with this principle in one's heart one can not only live bravely but also *live gaily and laugh gaily!* And who would know how to laugh and live well, who did not first have a good understanding of war and victory?" (GS 324) Gaiety is, for Nietzsche, the sign of a spirit that has become free in its naturalness, corporeality, and reasonableness after long struggles, a spirit that is unbound, at times boisterous, and which dominates its own bindings (cf. GS, Preface 1). Being 'gay' in this sense, you can more freely face realities and deal with surprises. Such gaiety can perhaps be learned, but never taught. Whoever does not know it cannot estimate it either: "that genuinely philosophical togetherness (*Beieinander*) of a bold and exuberant spirituality that runs along at a *presto* and a dialectical rigor and necessity that does not take a single false step – this is an experience most thinkers and scholars find unfamiliar and, if someone were to mention it, unbelievable." (BGE 213) When the exuberant gaiety matures, it becomes the serene cheerfulness that Nietzsche had found early on in ancient Greece. He wanted to have his Zarathustra die cheerfully, out "*of happiness*" (N Autumn

1883, 21[3]), and he hoped the GS would be, if the preceding books were not yet, proof of his own cheerfulness (see GS 343). The “new happiness” which it brought to him, the “attraction of everything problematic, the delight in the X,” strikes again and again, he writes, in “highly spiritual, spiritualized people,” flaring up like “bright embers” “over all the distress of the problematic, over all the danger of uncertainty” (GS, preface 3). Not the supposed truth, but rather such a happiness indicates, according to Nietzsche, the plausibility of one’s philosophizing.

8. *Responsibility*: The criticism of illusory orientations results in the “bitterest” insight into the complete irresponsibility, the “complete unaccountability of man for his actions and his nature”: “Everything is necessity – thus says the new knowledge; and this knowledge itself is necessity. Everything is innocence: and knowledge is the path to insight into this innocence.” (HH I 107) But the less responsibility there is as such and for everyone, the more responsibility falls to individuals, depending on the extent to which they are, in an emergency, the ‘next available’ person, who has the power to judge, decide, and act in order to remedy the emergency. Thus the “founder of Christianity” came to the “antithetical doctrine that everyone is wholly accountable and culpable” (HH II, WS 81). While for him God was still the entity to which everyone had to answer, it could, for Nietzsche, only be the individual him or herself who is responsible. As far as things depend on each individual, what is decisive is then his or her “high, independent spiritedness, a will to stand alone, even an excellent faculty of reason” and a “high and hard nobility” and self-responsibility (“Selbst-Verantwortlichkeit”) (BGE 201). With such responsibility the individual may “promise”; with their judgement and their mere existence they can give credit to the future (GM II 1). Insofar as such individuals must have overcome the “morality of custom,” whose “long history” has cultivated such responsibility, Nietzsche calls them an “autonomous supra-ethical” or “*sovereign individual*.” They do not consider “the consciousness of their rare freedom and power over themselves and their destiny,” which has “penetrated their lowest depths” and has become their “dominant instinct,” as a merit, but rather as an “extraordinary privilege,” to which they must do justice (GM II 2). Nietzsche drew from this autonomous, supra-conventional personal responsibility, which is the precondition for everything ethical transcending conventional morals, the most extreme consequences, which today are hardly bearable: A philosopher, who becomes the experimental station of human orientation and broadens its

horizons, is then also the person “of the most comprehensive responsibility.” He – Nietzsche here only thought of men – has “the conscience which is responsible for the overall development of humanity” and will for this also use religions and “the prevailing political and economic conditions” for that “breeding and educational work” (BGE 61). Nevertheless, such philosophers have nothing but their philosophy, and these philosophies are still in competition with each other.

## IX.

### Nietzsche's Ways of Revaluating

Values, not only moral, but also religious, political, economic, scientific, and aesthetic, stabilize our orientation; by distinguishing between positive vs. negative, they define the leeways concerning what is welcome or unwelcome, beneficial or detrimental, useful or harmful, delightful or threatening. One can choose among them, bind oneself more or less firmly to them, put them in a hierarchy – and reevaluate them: Values allow for a change of values. Values change if they become untrustworthy, which usually happens inconspicuously. Nietzsche exposed the change of values in the 19<sup>th</sup> century in a spectacular way; he discovered in it a fundamental shift after millennia and demanded that mankind consciously shape it. He regarded it as his “*age's good fortune*” that “for the first time in history, the tremendous far-flung prospect of human-ecumenical goals embracing the entire inhabited earth” has opened up to us, and that we feel at the same time “conscious of possessing the strength” to “take this new task in hand ourselves without requiring supernatural assistance; indeed our undertaking eventuate as it may, even if we have overestimated our strength, there is in any case no one to whom we owe a reckoning except ourselves: henceforth mankind can do with itself whatever it wishes” (HH II, AOM 179). It is no longer a matter of a god, but of the people themselves, and ultimately of each individual human being, to revalue the values. Nietzsche saw no other criterion for this than “life” and its challenging unknown future. In the “horizon” of “life and culture” (HH I 234), he oriented himself toward the possibilities allowing enhancement. Giving justifications here is possible only to a limited extent, because even, and especially, the premises for such justifications are questionable. Nietzsche therefore sought and discovered different ways of revaluing, 1. the negative way: by means of refuting; 2. the hypothetical way: by perspectivizing; 3. the debunking way: by exposing; and 4. the humorous way: by means of parody.

1. *Refuting*: Nietzsche, following his critique of logic, considered any *logical refutations* in philosophy to be undermined. They presuppose the unconditional validity of the logical; in a reality that is ‘unspeakably differently complex,’ however, the refuting person could be just as wrong as the refuted. After centuries of critique, it is unlikely that the terminological opposites, which logical refutations work with, correspond to anything in reality. Nietzsche drives them, by means of critical self-reference, into paradoxes: reason originates, according to a self-critical reason, from the irrational; morality, according to a self-critical morality, from the non-moral. He instead supposes “levels of appearance” (BGE 34). By undermining improper terminological opposites, entire complexes of problems disappear, which such terms have generated, including notoriously unsolved questions such as the relationship between being and becoming, being and appearance, being and consciousness, body and soul, brain and mind, knowledge and object. Logical refutations regarding morality may be morally inappropriate: According to Nietzsche, it is best to simply accept “accusations” someone makes “against us without refuting them even when they do injustice to us; for our accuser could consider it even a greater injustice if we contradicted him, let alone refuted him.” (HH I 340) If it appears that someone needs a certain morality for living, it is best to let him or her have it, however inappropriate it may be, and patiently wait until it settles itself, *historically*, on its own accord: “Therefore: do not deride and befoul that which you want to do away with for good but respectfully *lay it on ice*; and, in as much as ideas are very tenacious of life, do so again and again.” (HH II, WS 211) “Conditions of existence,” Nietzsche notes down for Lou, “cannot be refuted: one can only – *not have them!*” (N July – August 1882, 1[2]) Since moral prescriptions often have lost the purposes they had a long time ago, logical refutations can easily grasp at nothing (see D 24). Then, *aesthetic refutation* comes into play, the “change in common taste”: “Opinions along with their proofs, refutations, and the whole intellectual masquerade are only symptoms of the changed taste, and certainly *not* what they are so often taken to be, its causes.” (GS 39; see N Spring – Autumn 1881, 11[109]) Thus the victory that Socrates achieved with his logical justifications becomes even more astonishing. For “we know, we can still see how ugly he was. But ugliness, an objection in itself, was almost a refutation for the Greeks.” (TI, The Problem of Socrates 3) However, the most plausible refutations are, for Nietzsche, the “*physiological*”

ones, the “ways of thinking” that can make persons ill (N Summer – Autumn 1884, 26[316], see above).

2. *Perspectivizing*: Nietzsche renounces even more ontological reductions, the reduction of everything conditional to an apparently unconditional existence (“Nonsense of all metaphysics as a derivation of the conditional from the unconditional,” N Summer 1883, 8[25]). Instead, he concedes different approaches from different points of view; he respects the perspectivity of orientation and is the first in the history of Western philosophy to do so to the fullest extent. In doing so, he pragmatically proceeds from the action of the individual, in which he also includes all cognition and philosophizing: “Our actions are incomparably and utterly personal, unique, and boundlessly individual, there is no doubt; but as soon as we translate them into consciousness, *they no longer seem to be...* This is what I consider to be true phenomenism and perspectivism: that due to the nature of *animal consciousness*, the world of which we can become conscious is merely a surface- and sign-world” (GS 354). It is precisely the apparently non-perspectival, the universal, that is perspectival, and in addition, it is a mere surface phenomenon. Believing in it, even in the form of the Kantian synthetic judgments a priori, may be “*necessary*,” “as a foreground belief and piece of visual evidence belonging to the perspectival optics of life” (BGE 11); but to regard this “*perspectivism*,” “the fundamental condition of all life,” in the sense of old Platonism, as something in itself (which Kant and even Plato did not do) means “putting truth on its head” (JGB, Preface). This phenomenism and perspectivism can be claimed only paradoxically (likewise you can only orient yourself about orientation under its own conditions); Nietzsche *shows* how it justifies and refutes itself at the same time. It justifies itself by the fact that “an existence without interpretation, without ‘sense,’” becomes “‘non-sense’”; for “all existence” is “essentially an *interpreting* existence.” But, since we “cannot look around our corner,” cannot take any perspective other than our own, and thus cannot positively state that other perspectives really exist, this claim is refuted as well. Consequently, perspectivism can only be a hypothesis and, as a hypothesis, it cannot be a positive claim, but only a negative concession. We cannot, Nietzsche formulates as cautiously as he does precisely, “reject the possibility” that the “world” (or what we call such) “*contains infinite interpretations.*” (GS 374) Interpretations are insights within perspectives; they are infinite as long as they never end but leave open the possibility of ever-more interpretations in ever-more perspectives. This, too, is a self-referential and paradoxical statement:

“Granted, this is only an interpretation too – and you will be eager enough to make this objection? – well then, so much the better.” (BGE 22)

In the same way, perspectivism, without itself being a positive doctrine, always boils down to reminding us of possible alternatives to positive doctrines, or preserving the unspeakably complex reality. Nietzsche’s unusual pluralizations (see chap. IV.4) likewise serve this purpose, especially that of ‘morality’ to ‘moralities’ (“several diverse kinds of moralities (*Moralen*)”; D 9, etc.). In GM, which is entirely devoted to the “*revaluation of all values*” (I 8, III 27), he perspectivizes morality in three ways: In its own perspective, ‘morality’ permits only itself to be regarded as good and excludes any opposition to it as evil. In the broader perspective of life, however, the question arises to what extent such morality makes people healthy or sick, i.e., whether it is physiologically good or bad – not equally for everyone, but for individuals or groups, depending on how strong or weak they are. According to Nietzsche, they are weak when they are dependent on a dominant morality in order to assert themselves before themselves and others; they are strong or, in (reflected) moral language, “noble” when they are capable of self-responsibility, when, in (aggressive) political language, they are masters, and not slaves, of a morality. In the perspective of the mind (*Geist*, see chap. VIII.4), he goes beyond these distinctions once again. For, if one wants to be honest, one will have to grant to everyone, under their own conditions, his or her right to his or her own morality, and in another paradoxical way, one will have to be just even toward injustice, be it that of others or one’s own.

3. *Exposing*: Nietzsche pursued the path of exposure as a means of revaluation in four different ways: the placing of question marks; the heuristics of needs; psychology as he understood it; and genealogy as he understood it.

3.1. *Placing Question Marks*: As a critical philosopher, he placed at the beginning “the great question mark over the value of existence” (BT, Preface 1). The “name of Dionysus” is “yet another question mark” (ibid., 3), “the question-mark of a more and more perilous curiosity” (HH I, Preface 3). Nietzsche’s entire philosophy wants to be a single “*question mark*” (GS 346). For this it must be suspicious (“The more mistrust, the more philosophy,” ibid.), but it must also place a question mark over this mistrust. Because in order to live, one needs both trust and mistrust; unconditional trust can be life-threatening; unconditional mistrust can make life impossible. Their value for life is not decided: “How so? Is it really less harmful, dangerous, disastrous not to want to let oneself be deceived? What do you know in advance about the character



of existence to be able to decide whether the greater advantage is on the side of the unconditionally distrustful or the unconditionally trusting?" (GS 344) A final authority for this decision does not exist here either; if it existed, one would have to trust it again. We thus oscillate in our everyday orientation between trust and mistrust. As a philosopher, one will develop a fundamental "suspicion" (*Argwohn*), a "relentless, fundamental, deepest suspicion concerning ourselves that is steadily gaining more and worse control over us Europeans" and in the meantime has placed us before "nihilism" – if one is willing to look into its abyss (GS 346, cf. chap. XI.1). Being suspicious, one 'suspects' evil everywhere, without having any particular reason for it, and can thereby become embittered. One remains cheerful if one only keeps to a "suspicion" for a given occasion. Nietzsche appreciated the fact that some called his philosophy a "schooling in suspicion" (HH I, Preface 1). But it, in turn, can also become an "abyss": It is, according to Nietzsche, the philosopher's "*duty* to be suspicious these days, to squint as maliciously as possible out of every abyss of mistrust." (BGE 34)

3.2. *The Heuristics of Needs*: Suspicion toward a philosophy becomes abysmal if behind it something very different is hidden – a need, a drive, a distress, which is only masked by that philosophy. In his exposures, Nietzsche followed a heuristic of needs and made it his agenda to study the "states of mankind's needs" "up to their last consequences" (N Summer 1880, 5[46]; N Autumn 1881, 15[9]) and up to their philosophical interpretations: whoever "looks at people's basic drives, to see how far they may have played their little game right here as *inspiring* geniuses (or daemons and spirits –), will find that they all practiced philosophy" (BGE 6). However, needs can only be generalized to a very limited extent; "many diverse individuals" will also have their "diverse" sets of needs (GS 149). Thus, one must look at each religion, morality, philosophy, and science individually. But since one only ever has the 'surface,' i.e., the testimonies of the religions, etc., and the testimonies from the lives of their founders, which are likewise 'superficially' prepared, one must "guess" the needs behind them. The heuristics of need is an art for "groping after the solutions of riddles" ("tastende Rätselrater") (D 113). Such 'guessing' precedes all theories in matters of life. Here, vague symptoms and symbols must be understood as clues to hypotheses, which can then perhaps be developed into scientific theories that provide explanations. Thus, Nietzsche writes about the first philosopher, Thales: "A brilliant presentiment shows him provable certainties, it guesses from afar that they are there at this point." (PTAG 3)

Here, Oedipus, the guesser who opened his own abyss, remained the model for Nietzsche. The guesswork reaches into the most elementary perceptions. Human beings only ever see the surface of each other and can therefore only ever guess at each other; “fear wants to guess who the other is, what he can do, what he wants: to deceive oneself in this would be disadvantageous and dangerous.” (D 309) For this there remains only ever a “minute of knowledge and guessing” (D 314), and therefore one’s orientation remains restless: “Restless discovering and guessing has such an attraction for us, and has grown as indispensable to us as is to the lover his unrequited love” (M 429). When we see, we guess based on a few clues; when we hear, we do so based on a few sounds; when we read, we guess what the text is about based on a few keywords perceived as images and we fully invent the rest (cf. N Spring – Autumn 1881, 11[13] and 11[18]). “But it is music which reveals to us most clearly what masters we are in the rapid and subtle guessing of feelings and in empathising” (D 142). In this, one drive stimulates the other, “each fantasizes and wants to enforce its own kind of error: but each of these errors immediately becomes again the handle for another drive (e.g., contradiction, analysis, etc.)” (N Spring – Autumn 1881, 11[119]; cf. JGB 192). Nietzsche has his Zarathustra rave about the “riddle-drunk, the twilight-happy whose souls are lured by flutes to every maelstrom / – because you do not want to probe along a thread with cowardly hands; and because where you can *guess*, there you hate to *deduce*” (Za III, On the Vision and the Riddle 1). He also classifies the “*historical sense*” here, as “the ability quickly to guess the rank order of valuations that a people, a society, an individual has lived” (BGE 224), and finally also “a Dionysian human being,” for whom it is impossible not “to understand any suggestion”: “he will not miss any affective signal, he has the most highly developed instinct for understanding and guessing, just as he possesses the art of communication to the highest degree.” (TI, Skirmishes 10)

3.3 *Psychology*: With respect to people, Nietzsche called his heuristics of needs ‘psychology.’ He wanted to push his explorations “into the depths” below the resistant moral surfaces in order to recognize in “what has been written so far as a symptom of what has not been said until now” and develop psychology as the “path to the fundamental problems” (BGE 23). Its “hunting grounds” are, for Nietzsche, the “human soul and its limits, the scope of human inner experience to date, the heights, depths, and range of these experiences, the entire history of the soul *so far* and its still unexhausted possibilities” (BGE 45). He

continued to use the soul hypothesis in “new versions and sophistications” – he regarded the “soul as a society constructed out of drives and affects” (BGE 12).

But the view of this psychology had to be directed also, and especially, at the psychologist himself. In order to achieve the necessary “subtlety,” a psychologist had to be “himself as deep, as wounded, and as monstrous as Pascal’s intellectual conscience” (BGE 45). Only “self-questioning” and “self-temptation” helps one to achieve “a subtler eye”: one is then better at “guessing the involuntary detours, alleyways, resting places, and *sunning* places of thought to which suffering thinkers are led and misled on account of their suffering; one now knows where the sick *body* and its need unconsciously urge, push, and lure the mind – towards sun, stillness, mildness, patience, medicine, balm in some sense.” (GS, Preface 2) One will then perhaps guess how “under the holy fable and disguise of the life of Jesus” lies hidden one of the “most painful cases of the martyrdom of *knowledge about love*” (BGE 269) and realize that religious founders themselves must have been great guessers: “The significance, the originality of the religion-founder usually lies in his *seeing* and *selecting* this way of life” – a new assessment of life – “in his *guessing* for the first time what it can be used for and how it can be interpreted.” (GS 353) Nietzsche conceived his entire GM as an art of such guessing.

3.4. *Genealogy*: He used the term ‘genealogy’ specifically for the study of morals. In GM he performed in a concise and consistent way his heuristics of needs regarding Western morals. When non-moral origins of moral values are exposed, the unquestionable validity on which they depend is undermined. Nietzsche began his genealogy already in TL with the distinction of truth and lie (in the ‘extra-moral’ or ‘non-moral’ sense), then continued it as ‘critical history’ in HL, as “history of moral sensations” (HH I, Second Part) and a “natural history of morals” (BGE, Fifth Part). In GM, he showed how assumed origins get more and more lost in uncertain pasts, just as all ancestry research – from which Nietzsche borrowed the term ‘genealogy’ – must inevitably end in uncertainties; it becomes more and more hypothetical and the morals less and less self-evident. The strongest foothold for his genealogical interpretation of morals in GM was the insight that cruelty was tamed and cultivated into morality. In EH he concludes this thought with the fatefulness of his “*uncovering* of Christian morality,” which made him, the ‘discoverer,’ into a destiny: “Anyone who knows about this is a *force majeure*, a destiny, – he splits the history of humanity into two parts.” (EH, Why I am a Destiny 8)

4. *Parody*: The humorous mode of reevaluating values only seems to be the easiest. It is actually the most difficult to understand. It was also for Nietzsche the most challenging; at any rate, he did not clearly pursue it to its end. He simply wanted to strip morality of its seriousness – by parodying this seriousness. Toward the end of the fifth book of GS, he places what he calls “another ideal,” “the ideal of a human, superhuman well-being and benevolence that will often enough appear *inhuman* [...], when it places itself next to all earthly seriousness heretofore, all forms of solemnity in gesture, word, tone, look, morality, and task as if it were their most incarnate and involuntary parody” (GS 382). If parody is placed next to seriousness, the seriousness cools off; its intense pathos crumbles. Nietzsche seems to have intended something similar already in Za: “Zarathustra,” he notes down, is “constantly parodying all earlier values, out of abundance.” (N End of 1886 – Spring 1887, 7[54]) He has him celebrate the ‘the ass festival’ with the ‘higher men,’ then surrounds him with cooing doves and a laughing lion; but Zarathustra remains silent and weeps, falling into a strange stupor, when the lion roars again at the approaching higher men; he then laughs angrily, sinks once more into himself and cries out in pity for the higher men, only to call up a new, ‘great’ noon like a morning sun (Za IV, The Sign). Something similar and less pictorial happens at the end of the fifth book of GS (from 1887). Its last aphorism, GS 382, concludes with a reference to Za: “– and in spite of all this, it is perhaps only with it that the *great seriousness* really emerges; that the real question mark is posed for the first time; that the destiny of the soul changes; the hand of the clock moves forward; the tragedy begins.” At the end of the fourth book of GS (1882), Nietzsche introduces Za with the same “*Incipit tragoedia*” (GS 342). Is GS as a whole, as a ‘gay science,’ a parody of Za, just as the preludes and postludes are parodies of GS? And is Za then supposed to newly begin as tragedy – now as a tragic parody of the cheerful parody? The new preface to GS (from 1886/87) seems to confirm this: “*Incipit tragoedia*, we read at the end of this suspiciously innocent book. Beware! Something utterly wicked and mischievous is being announced here: *incipit parodia*, no doubt.” (GS, Preface 1) What part, then, is seriousness, what part parody? In the case of a parody of seriousness, we cannot say, because this parody could also be serious itself. One cannot and probably is not meant to be certain here. In what Nietzsche calls ‘great seriousness,’ parody could include tragedy and tragedy could include parody; it could thus be another name for the Dionysian. If it remains an enigma, it would still correspond to Nietzsche’s

concept of the “philosophers of the future” (whoever they may be): “since it is typical of them to *want* to remain riddles in some respect” (BGE 42).



## X.

### **Nietzsche's Doctrines and Anti-Doctrines in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra***

In *Za*, his epic-dramatic-lyrical-didactic poem, Nietzsche presents many themes that he also addresses in his books of aphorisms. But in *Za* this happens via doctrines taught by a teacher of highest authority. Moreover, he has his Zarathustra, with whom he did not want to be mistaken, teach the doctrines of the overman and the eternal return of the same, which have become Nietzsche's most famous. However, they are not characteristic of Nietzsche, but of Zarathustra, a figure whom he invented as a teacher and whom he had fail as a teacher (see chap. IV.3). Nietzsche uses the titles of the speeches to indicate Zarathustra's step by step withdrawal from teaching. Sections with teachings are always entitled "On ..." ("On the three transformations," "On the chairs of virtue," etc.). In the first part of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, all sections are teachings like that; in the second part, they make up two thirds; in the third part, about half; in the fourth part, one tenth. Instead of teachings, there are stories and songs ("The Child with the Mirror," "On the Blessed Isles," "The Night Song," "The Dance Song," etc.); at the end, there is "The Sign." Nietzsche leads the entire poem to a sign reserved for Zarathustra (the laughing lion). Zarathustra, for his part, can with his teachings do nothing but convey or 'give' signs, to the people in the market, to his disciples, his animals, the 'higher men,' who all may misunderstand and not even recognize them as signs. Zarathustra himself, in turn, is Nietzsche's 'semiotics': a sign that his readers may understand or misunderstand and may not even recognize as a sign. We must therefore be especially careful when speaking of Zarathustra's doctrines, in particular the doctrines of the overman and the eternal return of the same, which initially only belonged to Zarathustra.

1. *The Gift (Giving and Creating)*: According to the epic structure of Nietzsche's didactic poem, teachings are introduced via stories. The prelude emphasizes the gift-giving virtue that Zarathustra, before teaching it, learns from the sun (at the end he will leave "his cave, glowing and strong, like a morning

sun that emerges from dark mountains”; only then will he have learned his lesson; Za IV, The Sign). From the sun, which gives light, warmth and life, he wants to learn how to give, i.e., to give away his abundance; this abundance encourages him to ‘go under’ among people; it makes him become a teacher, and we must understand the following doctrines as coming from this abundance. He *must* fail in teaching. A teaching or doctrine, that which can be taught is Gr. *máthæsis*, and in the strict sense only mathematics, which soberly deals with rules of connecting signs and not with life situations, can be ‘taught.’ Only mathematics can, according to Kant, “on account on its evidence” “as it were, be preserved as a *certain and lasting doctrine*,” and natural science is “*genuine science*” only “as far as there is mathematics” (Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, The Jäsche logic, Introduction, AA IX.26; *Metaphysical Foundations of the Natural Sciences*, Pref., AA IV.470). Its strict universal validity is constructed. For all other doctrines, Nietzsche shows with Za the limits of this construction regarding an overcomplex reality. Since individual orientations are separate in their respective standpoints and perspectives, signs are in each case understood differently in their respective leeways; this ‘understanding-differently’ can be noticed and limited, but never completely avoided (except in mathematics). “To each soul,” Nietzsche’s Zarathustra says, “belongs a different world; for each soul every other soul is a hinterworld.” (Za III, The Convalescent 2) In others’ orientations, however, signs do something – though one is never able to universally determine what that is and how it is done; this would again presuppose a standpoint beyond all orientations, a purely theoretical standpoint. In Zarathustra’s language, this unpredictable affecting is a ‘giving’ and ‘creating’: a giving that does not expect an equivalent ‘taking,’ a giving without wanting reciprocity, and a creating, which brings a different orientation forward in its own way. It resembles the giving of the sun, which gives and creates – but does not teach. However, most people *want* sameness, reciprocity, predictability, and the universal rules of behavior that would make them possible. Especially those who are too weak to follow their own ethical orientations desire a dominant universal morality (see chap. VII.2). Givers and creators seem threatening to them (“Can you give yourself your own evil and good and hang your will above yourself like a law?”; Za I, On the Way of the Creator). They want teachings which they can follow, but they instead receive gifts from which they themselves must draw their own conclusions. Thus, Zarathustra tries something paradoxical when he teaches giving, the giving of gifts, and creating.



2. *Overman*: All teachings of Zarathustra and especially those of the overman and of the eternal return of the same are gifts in this sense. Nietzsche, in a note that he reserved for himself, spoke eventually of 'counter-concepts,' which he was in 'need of': "I need these strong counter-concepts and the *luminosity* of these counter-concepts in order to illuminate the abyss of carelessness and lie, which has been called morality" (N October 1888, 23[3]3). The doctrines of the overman and of the eternal return of the same have shown tremendous luminosity; they have, however, been quickly outshone by new metaphysical interpretations, especially Heidegger's. As paradoxical doctrines, they are anti-doctrines, doctrines that question their own teachability. Zarathustra directs the doctrine of the overman against the "last human being" (*letzter Mensch*, Za, Preface 5). The last human being is the one who considers himself the 'last' and 'ultimate' in the sense that beyond him humanity cannot be improved any further, and thus he or she has the last, final, and universal concept of mankind, whose image he or she finds in him or herself. Zarathustra later calls the last human being who needs everywhere sameness, reciprocity, and calculability, as well as universal rules of behavior, the 'little' human being, because he or she is not great enough to go beyond him or herself. The last or little human being considers him or herself ontologically and morally the norm for everyone. Zarathustra, on the other hand, is concerned with the transgression of apparently universal ontological and moral norms for the sake of new possibilities of people's orientation and life. He therefore does not give a universal concept of the overman, but rather gives signs with diverse meanings, including constantly changing images and metaphors, especially of water – a lake, a river, a stream, and the sea – but also other, consciously contrary metaphors, such as lightning, stairs, a bridge, clouds, gods, and devils. He never allows the sign of the overman to become 'fixed' in this web of metaphors, but rather creates with them impulses for ever-new discoveries as to how people can get beyond their present, seemingly final humanity. The idea or sign of the overman can thus not be taught, and only because people expect doctrines does he first offer it to them as a doctrine. Once they have freed themselves from a fixed concept of the human being (such as that of the 'reasonable' living being or of the 'good,' morally correct human being), they will be able to understand not only themselves but also everything else 'more freely,' gaining new leeway for their orientation. But if 'overman' is again reduced to a generic term, under which species and individuals can be subsumed, it again refers to

a ‘last human being,’ who is superior merely to the present one and violently overpowers others according to the standards of the present ruling morality. Nietzsche himself, perhaps consciously, has repeatedly tempted such readings by bringing historical examples like Alexander, Caesar, or Napoleon into play. But if they were the norm, the overman would already have passed away and would not still *come* like the ‘sign’ that calls Zarathustra out of his cave. The overman, which surpasses the present man, can only ever be in the future.

3. *Eternal Return*: The last or little human being is that with which Zarathustra feels most disgusted when thinking of the eternal return (“Oh, disgust! disgust! disgust!”). This disgust (*Ekel*) is the only thing that Nietzsche has Zarathustra himself say about the thought of the eternal return – everything else that is said (“the wheel of being rolls eternally,” “*you are the teacher of the eternal recurrence*,” “you teach that there is a great year of becoming”) is the “hurdy-gurdy song” into which the animals turn this thought (Za III, The Convalescent 2). It is precisely because of his thought of the overman that Zarathustra shudders at the thought of an eternal return; for him it becomes an “abysmal thought” (Za III, On the Vision and the Riddle 2; see also Za III, On Unwilling Bliss). Zarathustra directs the counter-concept or the anti-doctrine of the eternal return not only against a fixed, timeless concept of man, but also against fixed, timeless and thus metaphysical concepts in general. Yet Zarathustra seems to create a new metaphysics with this thought. For ‘eternal’ and ‘the same’ are unquestionably core metaphysical concepts, as is ‘all,’ which is to return eternally and equally; ‘all’ can, already according to Kant, never be grasped in any experience and is thus transcendent. But as in the concept of the human being, Nietzsche then has his Zarathustra inscribe time into these concepts of metaphysics; with the eternal *return*, the eternal is no longer a being, but time, in which, even if everything remains the same, everything always becomes different. Time as such, as Parmenides, the founder of metaphysics, already saw and Aristotle explained in detail, is something paradoxical, and it makes everything that becomes its subject paradoxical. Nietzsche makes metaphysics, which tried to resolutely exclude time, paradoxical by reintroducing time into it. The eternal return of the same is paradoxical on the one hand because it cannot be thought without contradiction; on the other hand, it cannot be recognized at all. For in order to recognize that everything returns in the same way, one would have to be able to distinguish an earlier from a later return, and for this purpose they would have to differ in something, even if only in the number of

returns. But then it is *not really the same* that returns. If, however, in order to be able to recognize the return, one places oneself outside of the returns on a purely theoretical or divine standpoint, which metaphysics has always assumed, *not everything* would return, but that standpoint would remain. With its paradoxical effect, even the idea of the eternal return of the same cannot be a doctrine, making it all the more a gift. For with it, all apparently timeless concepts that one thought one could 'hold on' to are at the same time exposed as paradoxical metaphysical illusions, even and precisely the concept that one makes of oneself in order to be able to take up an apparently unconditional observer's standpoint on which one can stand unharmed by life. The idea of eternal return thus puts you before the abysses of your reality: because it demands that everything, even that which you do not want to see recur in yourself and in your life at any price, be thought of as eternally recurring. This makes the idea unbearable; and this is also how Nietzsche described it in GS 341, prior to Za: "If this thought gained power over you, it would transform you as you are and possibly crush you; the question in each and every thing, 'Do you want this again and innumerable times again?' would lie on your actions as the heaviest weight! Or how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life *to long for nothing more fervently* than for this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?" After Za, in BGE 56, too, without naming it, Nietzsche seems to take up once more the thought of eternal return as "*circulus vitiosus deus*," literally as 'defective circle of God.' Here, he speaks of a "performance" (*Schauspiel*) after which even the "most high-spirited, vital, world-affirming individual" still longs, which he or she "fundamentally," in its unrecognized and unrecognizable depths, still "needs" and "makes it necessary: because again and again he needs himself – and makes himself necessary": that is, the illusionary concepts, which one needs in order to speak of oneself at all, and which one nevertheless knows are unfounded white lies. It is a 'flawed' circle when one wants, in order to hide the origins of the illusions necessary for life, to prove them as logically necessary; the circle is God when one tries to prove Him as the highest and most comprehensive illusion; and it is an additional 'circulus vitiosus,' when one assumes that His omnipotence makes this proof possible. The idea of the eternal return of the same is reproducing the *circulus vitiosus* – without God. But when Nietzsche then, at the end of TI, comes back to the fact that he "was the first one to take seriously that wonderful phenomenon that bears the name of 'Dionysus,'" he sees that Dionysus and the cult that the Greeks dedicated to him already included

the thought of eternal return, “*eternal* life, the eternal return of life; the future promised by the past and the past consecrated to the future; the triumphal yes to life over and above all death and change; the *true* life as the overall continuation of life through procreation, through the mysteries of sexuality.” Here Nietzsche also identifies himself as the “teacher” of the eternal return: “– I, the last disciple of the philosopher Dionysus, – I, the teacher of eternal return...” (TI, What I owe to the Ancients 4-5). But by placing omission points at the end, he also makes this terminological self-determination questionable again. When he soon thereafter repeats in EH his reference to his new discovery of the Dionysian, he assigns the thought – hypothetically – to Heraclitus: “The doctrine of the ‘eternal return,’ which is to say the unconditional and infinitely repeated cycle of all things – this is Zarathustra’s doctrine, but ultimately it is nothing Heraclitus couldn’t have said too.” (EH, BT 2-3) And, in the end, it is again Zarathustra who thought the “most abysmal thought,” that, if everything returns eternally, the little human beings too return eternally; but he “can nonetheless see it *not* as an objection to existence, not even to its eternal return,” and by doing so he resembles Dionysus (“*But this is the concept of Dionysus himself,*” EH, Za 6).

4. *Will to Power*: A strong counter-concept and anti-doctrine is finally also his ‘doctrine’ of the will to power, which Nietzsche likewise introduces in Za. Here it is “life itself” that conveys this doctrine to Zarathustra as the “secret” of life (Za II, On Self-Overcoming); Nietzsche thus doesn’t present it as one of Zarathustra’s doctrines, and he keeps it under his own name. Nietzsche has Zarathustra expressly reject a metaphysical interpretation of the will to power as an optimistic alternative to Schopenhauer’s pessimistic will to existence (“Indeed, the one who shot at truth with the words ‘will to existence’ did not hit it: this will – does not exist! / For, what is not can not will; but what is in existence, how could this still will to exist!” *ibid.*). The anti-doctrine of the will to power, deeper still than the anti-doctrines of the overman and the eternal return of the same, is already directed against the *formation* of apparently timeless concepts. With it, Nietzsche tries to conceive of reality beyond all metaphysical illusions. If the metaphysical illusion of universal, timeless concepts is abandoned altogether, what remains are wills to power (in the plural). Then, everything is directly exposed to everything else, everything reacts to everything else, connects with and separates from everything else, is absorbed by it or rejected from it, masters it or is mastered by it. The “‘development’ of a thing, a tradition, an organ is therefore certainly not its *progressus* towards a

goal, still less is it a logical *progressus*, taking the shortest route with the least expenditure of energy and cost, – instead it is a succession of more or less profound, more or less mutually independent processes of subjugation exacted on the thing, added to this the resistances encountered every time, the attempted transformations for the purpose of defence and reaction, and the results, too, of successful countermeasures. The form is fluid, the ‘meaning’ [*Sinn*] even more so...” (GM II 12) In itself, will does not exist either, as Nietzsche noted for himself: “1 - everything is will against will / 2 There is no will at all” (N Summer 1886 – Autumn 1887, 5[9]). One speaks of ‘will’ when it is no longer a matter of giving reasons for something to which others can consent, but when asserting something to which others refuse consent; then there is, as it were, ‘will against will.’ With the talk of will, then, Nietzsche – and Schopenhauer preceded him in this regard – goes behind the concept of reason with its ‘good reasons’ for everyone. The will to assert oneself inevitably leads to strife, and thus to decisions based on power, the overpowering of one will by another. Will is therefore always already will *to power*, and, since power is always at risk in altercations, it must always be *will* to power. In life, according to Nietzsche, nothing withdraws from the will to power, not even reason, which former philosophies put in opposition to it: from his point of view, reason is merely the will to replace power struggles by the presentation of good reasons. After Za, in BGE 13, Nietzsche therefore recommends one consider the will to power for methodological reasons. First, he advises physiologists to “watch out for *superfluous* teleological principles”: for the sake of the “economy of principles,” it is better to speak of “will to power” instead of “the drive of self-preservation,” because “a living thing wants to *discharge* its strength.” The “conformity of nature to law,” which physicists speak of, perhaps still succumbing to a moral prejudice (“Everywhere, equality before the law, – in this respect, nature is no different and no better off than we are”), likewise still needs to be critically questioned: the most economical, least presuppositional hypothesis is here that the world has indeed “a ‘necessary’ and ‘calculable’ course, although *not* because laws are dominant in it, but rather because laws are totally *absent*, and every power draws its final consequence at every moment.” And this hypothesis itself may be included in this – it is likewise a will, namely a will to an interpretation (BGE 22). In BGE 36, with its famous concluding phrase “‘will to power’ and nothing else,” Nietzsche goes ‘all in,’ but not – as his prior note for this text makes it appear, which the editors of the supposed main work *The Will to Power*

set as Nietzsche's final metaphysical keystone and which many interpreters followed – with metaphysical dogma (“*This world is the will to power – and nothing else!*” N June – July 1885, 38[12]), but instead with a hypothesis carefully placed in the subjunctive and in quotation marks (it “would be [*wäre*] just this ‘will to power’ and nothing else. –”). In GM, he puts it even more sharply as being the “major point of historical method” and mere “theory” (“that a *power-will* is acted out in all that happens,” GM II 12). Since it is always a matter of will against will, the will-to-power hypothesis is also a formula for Nietzsche's pluralism; since interpretation, too, proceed from wills to power (“The will to power *interprets*”; “in truth, *interpretation is a means itself to become master of something*,” he notes down; N Autumn 1885 – Autumn 1886, 2[148]), the will to power is also a formula for his philosophy of interpretation; and, since the world “*includes infinite interpretations*” (GS 374), it is also a formula for his philosophy of multi-perspectivity. The concept ‘wills to power’ could thus become the guiding formula of his philosophy as a whole. The will to power is the sign of the temporalization of concepts par excellence, the sign of that which is unrecognizable and logically comprehensible only in paradoxes, and that from which all recognition and conceptual comprehension emerges.

# XI.

## Nietzsche's Affirmations

Nietzsche advances his radical disillusionment of our orientation all the way up to an embracing affirmation. A revaluation or a reorientation only becomes plausible if, in the end, it is an affirmation, if it offers new values and horizons. The “*redemption*” of “reality” from the “spirit of heaviness,” from the illusionary and hostile morality that burdens life, had to be, in a philosophical way, a “deeper immersion into reality” (*Vertiefung in die Wirklichkeit*, GM II 24), to show it in a new “*innocence* of becoming” (TI, The Four Great Errors 7f.), as kids display when playing games. Nietzsche’s affirmations do not diminish his criticism, nor do they contradict it, but they embrace it; he conceived of his “strong counter-concepts” – overman, eternal return, and will to power – as affirmative ones. Even more controversial than these concepts are his political ideas for Europe and the world, which for him result from his critique, some of which are still fascinating today, while others are increasingly provocative. They are, in an irritating way, part of the epistemological and ethical horizon of his “*amor fati*,” the love of fate, and it is from this concept that they are to be understood.

Nietzsche characterized his “type” as one that “deals only indirectly, only involuntarily with contradiction and criticism,” as one that it is “*affirmative*” (TI, What the Germans lack 6). He wanted to say yes to life, as it is, without reservation. But every affirmation necessarily denies – namely the negations that oppose the affirmation. Looking back in EH on his life and work, Nietzsche writes that with Za, after he had placed there a new type with new values, “the yes-saying part of my task had been done.” With BGE, “it was time for the no-saying, *no-doing* half: the revaluation of values so far, the great war, – summoning a day of decision” (EH, BGE 1) – the decision of who would be capable of affirming the innocence of life. The decision *for* affirmation is a decision *against* negation, the negation of the liveliness of life by means of theory and morality. But saying-no to this kind of saying-no is not simply a

logical opposition, in which the double negation simply becomes positive; it is also an existential one: “I contradict as nobody has ever contradicted before, and yet in spite of this I am the opposite of a nay-saying spirit.” (EH, Why I am a Destiny 1) A ‘nay-saying spirit’ habitually says no, cannot avoid saying no to his living conditions, and cannot want them to return eternally. In GM, Nietzsche (following Eugen Dühring) turned this nay-saying into the formula of the “spirit of *ressentiment*” (GM II 11): *Ressentiment* is a defensive attitude against life, which has arisen from persistent feelings of revenge against ‘having come off badly’ and which, according to Nietzsche, found its strongest support in metaphysics and Christianity. Saying no *to ressentiment* differs from the nay-saying *of ressentiment*. It no longer needs theory or morality for living, no longer needs to say anything at all or be told anything, no longer needs to speak of any contradiction. It is the expression of a ‘sovereign’ life that has *no need* for *ressentiment* and that, when others bring it up, lets their *ressentiments* bounce off. Then, according to Nietzsche, one “*does No*” (BGE 208). The affirmative “doing no” (EH, Why I am a Destiny 2) cannot be formulated in values or norms of a universal morality; it shows itself and makes such formulations superfluous. You then “do not want anything to be different” (EH, Why I am so clever 10).

1. *Nihilism*: Nietzsche’s initial affirmation is that of nihilism. With the dying of religion and the breakthrough of the theory of evolution – which in philosophical terms had to be followed by a temporalization of all values – the metaphysically supported values of Christianity were not only devalued; it at the same time became obvious that they had in turn devalued the values of life for thousands of years. Nihilism means for Nietzsche – the formula had been used in various ways since the eighteenth century – that the “highest values” “devalue themselves” (AC 5; N Autumn 1887, 9[35]). Thus, it became evident that these values were always already worthless, ‘nothing’ (*nihil*), that they were not the highest values. Nietzsche spoke of this more in his notes than in his published works. He expected that the process of devaluation would be accelerated by its unreserved uncovering, indeed that it would virtually explode (“I am dynamite,” EH, Why I am a Destiny 1). Nihilism originated from the search for a final foothold, a final certainty. In BGE 10, Nietzsche introduces it as the “will to truth,” as the “metaphysician’s ambition to hold on to a lost cause,” “that, in the end, will still prefer a handful of ‘certainty’ to an entire wagonload of pretty possibilities. There might even be puritanical fanatics of conscience who would rather lie dying on an assured nothing than an uncertain



something.” Nihilism is thus “symptomatic of a desperate soul in a state of deadly exhaustion,” which has lost the strength for its own orientation and the courage to bear its inevitable uncertainties. In a psychological view, this is the opportunity for the spread of moralities, to which such weakened people willingly submit; in a historical view, this favored a metaphysically designed Christianity, which was “the most excessive, most elaborate figuration of the moral theme that humanity has ever had to listen to.” (BT, Preface 5) As the morality of the weak who have come off badly in life (and only for them), Christianity was “from the very outset, essentially and pervasively the feeling of disgust and weariness which life felt for life, a feeling which merely disguised, hid and decked itself out in its belief in ‘another’ or ‘better’ life. Hatred of the ‘world,’ a curse on the passions, fear of beauty and sensuality, a Beyond, invented in order better to defame the Here-and-Now, fundamentally a desire for nothingness, for the end, for rest, for the ‘Sabbath of Sabbaths’ – all this together with the determination of Christianity to sanction *only* moral values, seemed to me the most dangerous and uncanny of all possible forms of a ‘will to decline,’ at the very least a sign of the most profound sickness, tiredness, distemper, exhaustion, impoverishment of life” (ibid.). Christianity, Nietzsche notes in his well-known draft “*European Nihilism*,” was meant to be “the great *antidote* to practical and theoretical *nihilism*,” but it deepened it even more. Nihilism penetrated the entire European culture, imbued it with a need for “moral interpretation,” which one can no longer get rid of, even if one has genealogically uncovered its reasons and abysses: “Nihilism appears now, *not* because the unwillingness to exist is greater than before, but because one has become suspicious of a ‘meaning’ in evil, even in existence. *One* interpretation collapsed; but, because it was regarded as the only interpretation, it now appears as if there were no meaning at all in existence, as if everything were *in vain*.” Recognizing this, you receive it as “the *most paralyzing* thought, namely if you realize that you are hoaxed but you are powerless to prevent yourself from being hoaxed.” As such, you can only cope with nihilism by affirming it. An “*active nihilism*” becomes easier when the hardships, as happened in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century, diminish; one may then be able to face the thought and life experiment of the eternal return. But perhaps this would no longer be necessary. For one can, Nietzsche concludes his note, count the idea of eternal return, which is likewise metaphysically conceived, among the “extreme doctrines of faith.” Thus “the *strongest*” could be precisely those who

have no need for such doctrines, but are able to “not *only* concede but love a good amount of chance and nonsense, those who can think of the human being with a significant reduction of value without thereby becoming small and weak: the richest in health who can cope with the most misfortunes and therefore hardly fear them – human beings who *are sure of their power* and who represent with conscious pride the *achievement* of human strength.” (N Summer 1886 – Autumn 1887, 5[71]) People with a sovereign orientation – Nietzsche’s type for this was, as mentioned, Goethe – will be able to affirm existence even without first confronting the idea of the eternal return.

2. *Décadence*: Nietzsche called the manifestation of nihilism in the culture of his time, especially in the writings of 1888, *décadence*, a term he was encouraged to use by Paul Bourget’s *Essais de psychologie contemporaine* of 1883, but also by historical and medical literature; he translated it as “declining life” (CW, Epilogue, etc.). *Décadence* was attractive and seductive in contemporary art, especially in French and Russian literature and – for Nietzsche – in Wagner’s music; the journal *Le Décadent*, which appeared from 1886 to 1889, was engaged in disintegrating the bourgeois morality through intoxication, perversion, exoticism, and the pleasure of decay. The diagnosis of nihilism thus seemed confirmed in the immediate present. Nietzsche was more concerned with the moral and aesthetic sense of decadence than with the physiological one: “Such a complete aberration of humanity from its most basic instincts, such a complete *décadence* of the value judgment, is the question mark par excellence, the true riddle that the animal ‘human being’ poses to the philosopher” (N November 1887 – March 1888, 11[227]). He interpreted it in such a way that the instincts – the long-established regulations of life that have become involuntary – had disintegrated in such a way that one, trying to cope with them, had to seek one’s happiness in morality (see TI, The Problem of Socrates 11). *Décadence*, he notes down, is not to be condemned in itself, but is “a necessary consequence of life, of the growth of life,” which, if it rises, must also decline (N Spring 1888, 14[75]). Nietzsche thus also affirms it for himself, as a challenge for his philosophizing. While he notes for himself in 1887/88, I am “the first complete nihilist in Europe, who, however, has already lived nihilism to its end in himself – who has it behind him, below him, outside of himself...” (N November 1887 – March 1888, 11[411]3), he later writes in his *Nietzsche Contra Wagner*: “I am just as much a child of my age as Wagner, which is to say a *décadent*: it is just that I have understood this, I have resisted it. The philosopher in me has

resisted it.” (CW, Preface) And in *Ecce homo*: “Granted that I am a *décadent*, I am the opposite as well. My proof for this, among other things, is that I have always instinctively chosen the *correct* remedy for bad states; while complete *décadents* always choose the means that hurt themselves.” (EH, Why I am so wise 2) He understood himself as a *décadent* *and* as its existential antithesis.

3. *The Abundance of Life: Décadence*, which copes with itself, as in the case of Nietzsche, requires, as he understands it, an expanded concept of life. Life, Nietzsche emphasized more and more emphatically, can be ‘poor’ or ‘rich,’ ‘impoverished’ or ‘abundant’ in possibilities and perspectives of knowledge and action. It becomes the more impoverished the less it can unfold its plurality, the more it needs to limit itself to the average, the uniform, the universal. According to Nietzsche, this also includes “self-preservation” in the “struggle for survival.” It is, for him, “only an *exception*” in emergency situations; the rule is “abundance, squandering – even to the point of absurdity” (GS 349). It is thanks to an impoverished life that Europe’s “art and insight” has produced metaphysics and morals that are largely hostile to life. This could require as much a “desire for fixing, for immortalizing, for *being*” as a “desire for destruction, for change, for novelty, for future, for *becoming*”: In one case, one cannot endure change and ever-new novelty; in the other, one cannot bear that altogether everything remains as it is; in both cases one takes “revenge on all things” by “forcing, imprinting, branding one’s own image on them, the image of one’s own torture” and in so doing seeking “redemption from oneself.” However, one can suffer not only from an “*impoverishment of life*,” but also from a “*superabundance of life*”: if one cannot live out one’s abundance of creative possibilities and cannot give them away, if one finds no one with whom one can share them or at least to whom one can communicate them – Zarathustra was Nietzsche’s type for this. But only such abundance will be capable of the “tragic outlook and insight into life,” of the hard and cold view of the realities of life which has no need to transfigure them – and it is this free gaze on which it depends whether in new times new possibilities of life and survival will be discovered for everyone. If the longing for ‘being’ comes from such a superabundance of life, prompted “by gratitude and love” for it, the result will hardly be philosophy, but it will, according to Nietzsche, “always be an art of apotheosis, dithyrambic perhaps as with Rubens; blissfully mocking like Hafez; bright and gracious as with Goethe, spreading a Homeric light and splendor over all things.” This kind of art had already existed. But what, for Nietzsche, had not yet existed is a manifestation

of the desire for ‘becoming’ out of an abundance of life. He reserved it for a philosophizing that was yet to come, the “*Dionysian pessimism*” (GS 370). It would be a kind of philosophizing that is able to affirm being *and* becoming, immortalization *and* destruction, timelessness *and* temporality, because they result from very different desires and needs, a kind of philosophizing that does not have to commit itself to something once and for all, but that can understand life in changing ways regarding the changing needs of life. Such a philosophizing would then also be capable of the most uncanny and abysmal insight, and would be able to affirm it: that with the moral good, evil must grow as well, that mankind, whenever it is ‘improved,’ is also made more evil – because the power to do good, which comes from a rich and abundant life, inevitably transcends the prevailing morality and thus becomes for it a power of evil. Good and evil have, if one does not succumb to moral prejudice, “grown up out of the same roots”; “between good and evil actions there is no difference of kind, but at the most one of degree. Good actions are sublimated evil ones; evil actions are coarsened, brutalized good ones.” (HH I 107; see also Za I, On the Tree on the Mountain) Indeed, at least the Europeans and especially the German people, as far as they have increasingly been ‘improved’ in the past centuries by philosophical-pedagogical agendas, have also become capable of more and more evil, even of a coldly organized genocide of millions. Nietzsche shuddered that “those who have come off badly,” once disappointed in the morality according to which they have been ‘improved,’ “also *want power* for themselves, *forcing* the powerful to be their executioners. This is [...] the *doing-no* after all existence has lost its ‘meaning,’” in times of nihilism (N Summer 1886 – Autumn 1887, 5[71]). But Nietzsche did not say this publicly: “Even the bravest among us only rarely has courage for what he really *knows*...” (TI, Arrows and Epigrams 2)

4. *Rank Order*: Nietzsche measures the richness and abundance of life by the degree of one’s ‘spirituality’ (*Geistigkeit*), i.e., one’s competence in orientation, judgment, and leadership. From this, a rank order results. Such a rank order was still perfectly ‘natural’ in aristocratic societies, such as the ancient Greek or Roman, but became unpopular the more at first Christianity and then modern morality insisted on the equality of human beings. Christianity has prevented people from seeing “the abysmally different rank order and chasm between human beings. People like this, with their ‘equality before God’ have prevailed over the fate of Europe so far, until a stunted, almost ridiculous type,

a herd animal, something well-meaning, sickly, and mediocre has finally been bred: the European of today ...” (BGE 62) At the same time, however, in the course of the functional differentiation of society, modernity has placed more and more emphasis on the abilities and skills of individuals and on competition among them, and has therefore increasingly created wider leeways for them to act. Thus, individuals are now supposed to be unequal and equal at the same time, unequal in their abilities and skills, equal (and still more equal) in their moral judgements. Nietzsche wanted to draw attention, against the moral ideology of equality, to the still-existing, inevitable, and indispensable order of rank among human beings; he addressed the moral contempt of rank orders as *his* problem: “– I am forced, in the age of suffrage universel, i.e. when everyone may sit in judgment on everyone and anything, to restore the *rank order*” (N Summer – Autumn 1884, 26[9]). He affirmed an order of rank, not individualism: “My philosophy is directed toward rank order: not toward an individualistic morality.” (N End of 1886 – Spring 1887, 7[6])

He proceeds from exploring rank orders already present in physiological matters. He starts with the “difference between *lower* and *higher* functions: the rank orders of organs and drives, represented by commanding and obeying ones.” The “task of ethics” is therefore, for him, not to deny rank orders, but to analyze “the differences in value as *physiological* rank order of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ (‘more important, essential, indispensable, irreplaceable,’ etc.),” to see how far they inevitably enter ethics (N Spring 1884, 25[411]). For morality is nothing but “an evaluation and ranking of human drives and actions”; as a rule, it is “the expression of the needs of a community and herd: that which benefits *it* the most – and second most, and third most – is also the highest standard of value for all individuals.” Nevertheless, “there have been very different moralities; and in view of essential changes in future herds and communities, states and societies, one can prophesy that there will be very divergent moralities.” (GS 116) Moral philosophers must then – for the sake of morality itself, so that it may form itself in a new way in new times – look beyond “the *present* dominant rank order”; but for this, most of these philosophers lack, “on the one hand, historical sense, and on the other, they themselves are dominated by morals, which teach the present as eternally valid.” (N May – July 1885, 35[5], corr.) As such, for Nietzsche, everything boiled down to the problem of rank order. To see this problem at all despite the millennia-old moral pressure makes a philosopher a philosopher; one can therefore measure *his or her* rank

according to whether and how he or she is able to see it and connect it with all other problems. For this, however, rich and deep personal experiences of life are necessary, people who “had to experience the most manifold and contradictory states of joy and distress in soul and body,” in order to be able to say at last, to be allowed to say: “Here a long ladder upon whose rungs we ourselves have sat and climbed – which we ourselves have at some time *been!* Here a higher, a deeper, a beneath-us, a tremendous long ordering, an order of rank, which we *see*: here – *our* problem!” (HH I, Preface 7) “Of course,” Nietzsche noted down, these rank orders stand “apart from all existing social orders.” (N Summer 1886 – Autumn 1887, 5[71]14) They lie far deeper, in a “rank order of psychic states which correspond to the rank order of problems; and the highest problems will ruthlessly repel anyone who dares to get close without being predestined by sheer stature and power of spirituality to reach a solution.” In this, the virtues manifesting themselves “must have been individually acquired, cared for, passed down, and incorporated”; in the case of a philosopher these are “not only the bright, light, gentle gait and course of his thoughts, but above all the eagerness for great responsibilities, the highness of his ruling gazes and downward gazes, the feeling of separation from the crowd with its duties and virtues, the genial protection and defense of anything misunderstood and slandered, whether it is god or devil, the pleasure and practice in great justice, the art of command, the expanse of the will, the slow eye that hardly ever admires, hardly ever looks up, hardly ever loves...” (BGE 213). A rank order “between people” is then also already a rank order “between moralities” (BGE 228): “What group of sensations in a soul will be the first to wake up, start speaking, and make demands is decisive for the whole rank order of its values, and will ultimately determine its table of values.” (BGE 268) The “*first question* concerning rank order” is here, Nietzsche adds in his notes, “how *solitary* or how *herd-like* someone is / (in the latter case his value lies in the qualities that secure the existence of his herd, his type, in the former case in those qualities that set him apart, isolate, defend, and *make him solitarily possible*.” But they are “both necessary; likewise their antagonism is necessary” (N Autumn 1887, 10[59]). Both types cannot and should not be measured against each other, be ‘estimated’ against each other. For they inevitably follow different perspectives: Rank orders must look different from every rank in them; there can be no universal understanding of them, no universal concept – and Nietzsche too can only have *his* understanding of them.

5. *Pathos of Distance*: Nietzsche's affirmative term for the fact that there can be no universal concept for the rank order among humans and morals is that of the "*pathos of distance*" (BGE 257). 'Pathos,' Gr. for 'sensation, experience, suffering, passion,' is the negation of the concept as such; 'distance,' Lat. for 'standing-apart, distance, difference,' is a difference without a concept. Nietzsche also uses the notion of 'nuance,' which is the deviation from a concept for which there is no concept anymore ("I am a nuance," EH, CW 4). The pathos of distance is never fixed; it is, according to Nietzsche, experienced in "new expansions of distance within the soul itself," as "the development of increasingly high, rare, distant, tautly drawn, and comprehensive states," which permit conceiving of different moralities and, with them, "the enhancement of the type 'human being,' the constant 'self-overcoming of human being'" (BGE 257; see also Za II, On Self-Overcoming). 'Pathos of distance' is also a term for nobility, which means: being aware of one's value, without vanity, and according to one's own standards (BGE 261). This entails having an "*instinct for rank*" and a "pleasure in the nuances of respect" (BGE 263); "never thinking about debasing our duties into duties for everyone; not wanting to relinquish; not wanting to share your own responsibility; considering privileges and the exercise of these privileges as a *duty*" (BGE 272), but also a "distinctive and superior *graciousness* toward his fellow creatures" who are not on the same level (BGE 273). A philosopher, however, will doubt whether he or she can "*have* 'final and actual' opinions, whether every cave in him or her does not have, *must* not have, an even deeper cave behind it – a more extensive, stranger, richer world above the surface, an abyss behind every ground, under every 'groundwork'" (BGE 289).

6. *Greatness*: Rank orders permit greatness. Nietzsche, like most in his time, affirmed greatness without worshipping it; the veneration of 'great men' seemed to him small and vulgar. He used the predicate 'great' thousands of times in his work, mostly in the usual senses: first *quantitatively* as 'more than usual'; 'outstanding' in terms of people's physical shape or luck, if it was more or less improbable; and *qualitatively*, namely emphatically evaluating as 'more impressive,' 'more effective,' 'more significant than usual' in cases of 'great,' 'greater,' 'greatest' events, destinies, or human beings. The early Nietzsche supposed that mankind's sole task is to "produce single great men" (SE 6). They are measures for their time and times to come, but also products of manifold conditions that are often quite coincidental and reaching far back in time.

In his later works, Nietzsche added a third, *dialectical* sense to the meaning of ‘great’: Here, something ‘great’ can include the opposition that negates it, making it fruitful for itself and thereby enhancing itself. This sense becomes conspicuous in unusual phrases of Nietzsche’s, such as ‘great reason’ or ‘great politics.’ Here, Nietzsche makes the ‘small’ a means for the ‘great,’ and the ‘small’ is the familiar aspect. In the case of reason this is the (apparently) ‘pure reason,’ which in the European philosophical tradition became the measure of everything else and which believed itself to be above all corporeality. Instead, Nietzsche understands this reason as a mere “work- and plaything” of the “great reason” of the body, which is complex in such a degree that it remains for ‘small’ reason “an unknown wise man” (Za I, On the Despisers of the Body). In the same way, the “great pain” frees – “as the teacher of *great suspicion*” – the spirit, instead of paralyzing it (GS, Preface 3). “Life on the largest scale” (“grosse Form des Lebens”) does not despair, but grows when confronted with morality’s questionability (GS 344); the “*great health*” does not become weaker but stronger through illnesses (GS 382; EH, Za 2); the “*great seriousness*” includes the ‘cheerfulness’ that science has so far excluded, thus opening up new horizons (GS 382); the “great decision” even requires making a decision on the criteria for deciding, which it seems to be subject to, “making the will free again” (GM II 24); the “*great life*” does not have to “give up war,” but can grow by means of it (TI, Morality as anti-Nature 3); the “great tolerance” (“grosse Toleranz”) can tolerate even intolerance with “*generous self-restraint*” (AC 38); the “*great style*” can unite highest pathos with sobriety and cheerfulness (EH, Why I write such good books, 4). And the “great problems,” which are so vast that they have not even been recognized as problems, “demand *great love*,” which would blind us if it did not first incorporate the “great contempt,” which can see what it loves without illusions (GS 345; Za III, On Virtue that Makes Small 3; GM II 24).

7. *Great Politics*: “Great politics” thus likewise includes, for Nietzsche, “petty politics,” but also goes beyond it: petty politics refers to the power politics of the dynasties and nation-states of his time, which, like that of Bismarck, with its traditional wars, falsely considered itself to already be engaged in ‘great politics’ (BGE 241 and others). “Great war” is, for Nietzsche, “the revaluation of values”; it also unites its usual opposites: morality, religion, science, and philosophy. The revaluation, he believed, would not be possible without military wars, and he thus affirmed them as well: “*great politics*” would be a “war of spirits,” a war concerning the assertion of ideas and ideologies, which would be



more cruel and shattering than history had seen up until the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (EH, *Why I am a Destiny* 1). Nietzsche did not want military war; he himself encountered it sufficiently as a young man; he feared its “costs” (HH I 481), but soberly reckoned with his time’s enthusiasm for war (see D 189). Nietzsche did not appreciate politics either, but he nevertheless confronted it: “All the great ages of culture have been ages of political decline: anything great in the cultural sense is apolitical, even *anti-political*” (TI, *What the Germans lack* 4).

7.1. *Europe, Global Government, and the Jewish People*: The object of Nietzsche’s great politics was a vision of Europe as the spiritual head of the Western world. It was unusual and forward-looking in a time of sharply escalating nationalism, and, in a time of aggressive anti-Semitism, Nietzsche included the Jewish people in his vision. This was possible only at a distance from the prevailing European morals. Nietzsche understood ‘Europe’ less as a territorial, economic, or political unit, but rather as the heiress to Greek-Jewish-Christian morals (see HH II, WS 215), as the “sum of commanding value judgments that have become part of our flesh and blood” (GS 380). With its Enlightenment, its democratic revolutions, its advanced capitalist economy and industrialization and the socialist movements that followed, and finally its nihilism, ‘Europe’ had indeed ventured the utmost modernization worldwide and experimented with itself on a grand scale. It was precisely these ventures, however, that it now threatened to gamble away with rampant nationalism and anti-Semitism, and thus also lose the task that was now visibly at hand: “to create better conditions for the propagation of men and for their nutrition, education and instruction, manage the earth as a whole economically, balance and employ the powers of men in general” (HH I 24). Great politics in Nietzsche’s concept of Europe is politics for coping with globalization. And this would require less a “conscious universal rule” than a “*knowledge of the preconditions of culture* as a scientific standard for ecumenical goals.” “A future survey of the requirements of mankind” may show that it “is absolutely not desirable that all men should act in the same way, but rather that, in the interest of ecumenical goals, whole tracts of mankind ought to have special, perhaps under certain circumstances even evil tasks imposed upon them” (HH I 25). Already there is taking place “a selecting out among the forms and customs of higher morality, whose objective can only be the elimination of the lower moralities” (HH I 23), which leads to a competition among moralities. In the future there may no longer be any

need to “lean on metaphysics and the errors of religions,” no more “severity and violence,” which have been “the strongest cement binding man to man and nation to nation” (HH I 245). To find the yardsticks for this is “the tremendous task facing the great spirits of the coming century” (HH I 25). They are most likely to be created by the “genius of Europe,” which is accustomed to “creating spirit and form” (*geist- und formerfindenden Genius Europa’s*) (HH II, WS 215). The great music, art, literature, science, and philosophy, which for Nietzsche could be only great when it reached a European dimension, also gives sufficient hints “that *Europe wants to be one*,” contrary to the “nationality lunacy” of the then incumbent European politicians (BGE 256). Thanks to “Europe’s longest and most courageous self-overcoming” (GS 357), it can perhaps already look beyond itself and thus become capable of “the direction and supervision of the total culture of the earth” (which is not world domination in a world state created by war) (HH II, WS 87). Those Europeans who are capable of this Nietzsche called “good Europeans” (GS 357 and others). He thus had a moral concept of the future Europe, which could place itself at the disposal of other moralities (see GS 380). Nevertheless, he remained skeptical. He saw that Europe would probably only unite under strong political pressure, and he expected this pressure from Russia on the one side and the United States on the other. But then it would be a matter of the “struggle for the domination of the earth”: “the *compulsion*” to great – and then military politics. (BGE 208).

The “control over present-day Europe” could, according to Nietzsche, already now be held by “the Jews,” “if they wanted (or if they were forced, as the anti-Semites seem to want)”: “A thinker who has Europe’s future on his conscience will, in every sketch he draws of this future, consider the Jews, like the Russians, to be the most certain and probable factor at present in the great play and struggle of forces.” “The Jews,” Nietzsche wrote, are “without a doubt the strongest, purest, most tenacious race living in Europe today. They know how to thrive in even the worst conditions (and actually do better than in favorable ones) due to some virtues that people today would like to see labeled as vices – above all, thanks to a resolute faith that does not need to feel ashamed in the face of ‘modern ideas’” (BGE 251). They could, as far as their ‘race’ was concerned – in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, races were still spoken of in a largely unbiased and non-moral manner –, do Europe good with its “absurdly sudden experiment in the radical mixing of classes and *consequently* of races” (BGE 208). They could consolidate the mixture of races, which is far more

beneficial than racial purity; Nietzsche expressly rejected any “mendacious racial self-admiration and obscenity” (GS 377). The Jewish people had once before, when they paved the way for Christianity, proved their strength for a “radical revaluation” of values; after they had failed in their military uprisings against the hated rule of the Romans, they knew how “to gain satisfaction” through “an act of *the most spiritual revenge*”; this was, according to Nietzsche, “truly *great politics*” (GM I 7 f.). Now, as Christian Europe despaired of itself, the Jewish people could again bring forth a new and better Europe: “compare peoples with similar talents, such as the Chinese or the Germans, with the Jews, and you will realize who are first rate and who are fifth” (GM I 16). In the same way, Nietzsche said about his Zarathustra, the non-European teacher of Europe: “Zarathustra *created* this fateful error of morality: this means that he will be the first to *recognize* it.” (EH, Why I am Destiny 3) Nietzsche had no sympathy for “the Jews” (“I have yet to meet a German who was well disposed towards Jews,” BGE 251), but he did have the highest respect for them (cf. HH I 475; D 205; BGE 250f., 361).

7.2. *The Breeding of a Ruling Caste and the Necessity of a New Slavery:* Nietzsche was very “*serious*” regarding the “European problem.” He understood it as “the breeding of a new caste to rule Europe” (BGE 251) and connected this with the “necessity [...] for a new slavery” (GS 377). This makes us shudder today. But if one takes Nietzsche seriously, then one must also try to take this seriously. For him, ‘breeding’ (*Züchtung*) did not mean selection as organized by the state, but rather, as was commonly understood at the time, as ‘natural selection’ (*natürliche Zuchtwahl*), but also ‘education’ (*Erziehung*). Living beings, including human beings, always seek to ‘raise’ the best offspring in their sense; Nietzsche admired how aristocratic societies, through careful marriage politics, had succeeded via many generations in producing a type that was not only ‘noble’ in status, but also in personality, and for whom ‘rank orders,’ in Nietzsche’s sense, and therefore also ‘commanding and obeying’ were self-evident. For Nietzsche, this was supposed to and had to be successful, even under the conditions of more and more democratically constituted societies, if ‘Europe’ was to set the standards for the globalization approaching. It would then need, independently of the then outdated classes or estates, personalities with extraordinary skills of orientation, judgement, and leadership, who in turn would have to learn from each other over generations and improve their skills in competition with each other. When Nietzsche spoke of ‘castes’ (and

lastly, in AC 57, he referred to the Indian “*caste-order*”), he did not distinguish them as hardened social classes. Instead, individuals were to change castes according to the degree of their ‘spirituality’ (*Geistigkeit*) and the dimension of their ‘task’ (see HH I 439). One then does not attain positions of power simply by birth, but through proven skills of orientation, judgment, and leadership. Power is, contrary to what Jacob Burckhardt had asserted, not evil in itself, but springs from such superior abilities, and is welcomed and wanted precisely by those who are inferior in them; the person who has difficulties orienting him or herself is grateful if someone is able to show him or her the way, but is then also in that person’s power.

‘Commanding and obeying’ in this sense is deeply ingrained in everyone (see HH II, WS 6, and VIII.1). One also “commands” oneself when one seeks to ‘control’ and ‘get a grip on’ oneself, in order to ‘freely’ ‘want’ something: “Freedom of the will’ – that is the word for the multi-faceted state of pleasure of one who commands and, at the same time, identifies himself with the accomplished act of willing. As such, he enjoys the triumph over resistances, but thinks to himself that it was his will alone that truly overcame the resistance.” In the face of the unstoppable processes of democratization and socialization – and this meant for Nietzsche: the levelling of Western societies – he wanted, with the help of strong counter-concepts, to make people remember that “the phenomenon of ‘life’” arises under “power relations,” which are still asserting themselves even in the moralities that fight them, and that all wanting is a matter of commanding and obeying in a “society constructed out of many ‘souls,’” which constitute each person, and which are also present in every political social structure (BGE 19). Only then is power ‘evil,’ only then can it be abused, when it is institutionalized, becoming the authority of a fixed ‘position’ of whatever kind, no longer having to prove itself by superior achievements in orientation, but only serving its own interests; the powerful, then, are autocrats. The most blatant example of this for Nietzsche was “the notorious manufacturer’s vulgarity with ruddy, plump hands,” which, in the rapid growth of ruthless capitalism, characterized if not the type, then at least the cliché of the industrial entrepreneur. In an “industrial culture,” it is much harder to obey the orders of others than it is for a soldier to do so in the military: “Here is simply the law of need operating: one wants to live and has to sell oneself, but one despises those who exploit this need and *buy* the worker. It is strange that submission to powerful, frightening, yes, terrifying persons, to tyrants and generals, is

experienced to be not nearly as distressing as this submission to unknown and uninteresting persons, which is what all the greats of industry are: the worker usually sees in the employer only a cunning, bloodsucking dog of a man who speculates on all distress and whose name, figure, manner, and reputation are completely indifferent to him.” (GS 40)

As far as one cannot help but follow a superior will, one is, Nietzsche formulates pointedly, a ‘slave.’ When ever-more complex living conditions also demand ever-improved skills of orientation, judgement, and leadership, then there will inevitably be new ‘slavery’ – not in the legal sense, in which many would again become the serfs of a few, who could then arbitrarily dispose of their lives, but in much more subtle ways. Nietzsche counted every ‘labor’ as slavery if it followed preset standards, not just ‘mechanical’ and manual labor: “If one does not dispose of two-thirds of one’s day, one is a slave, whatever one may be: statesman, businessman, official, scholar” (HH I 283). Academics are slaves too in so far as they work through scientific agendas and do not set the goals for them (“The objective human being is a tool, a precious measuring instrument and piece of mirror art that is easily injured and spoiled and should be honored and protected, but not a goal” (BGE 207). Even philosophers of “the noble model of Kant and Hegel” are “laborers” if they have taken up the task “to prove and formulate some large class of given values, that is to say: values that were once *posited* and created but have come to dominate and have been called ‘truths’ for some time” (BGE 211). What was once shunned and despised is now praised, according to Nietzsche, as “the blessings of work”; but he has the “ugliest misgivings” about “these beautiful words” (GS 359 and 377): “that hard industriousness from early till late” disciplines people and keeps them from “reflection, brooding, dreaming, worrying, loving, hating; it sets a small goal always in sight and guarantees easy and regular satisfaction. Thus, a society in which there is continual hard work will have more security: and security is now worshiped as the supreme divinity.” And so it becomes “*dangerous*” when the “worker” lifts his gaze and becomes an independently thinking and acting “individual” (D 173). But the danger is small: the ‘blessing of work’ is willingly accepted by most people, it is a sign of “a deep weakening, of weariness, of old age, of declining energies” in modern societies altogether (GS 377). For people in ancient times, “a creature who is not at its own disposal and who lacks leisure” was “something despicable,” and the philosopher felt himself to be the freest man. But now, according to Nietzsche, “perhaps each

of us possesses too much of such slavishness in accordance with the conditions of our social order and activity, which are utterly different from those of the ancients,” and thus “not even metaphorically does the word ‘slave’ possess for us its full force” (GS 18). We have become more enslaved than we dare to think.

Nietzsche tried to affirm this as well. He did so through his consideration for the enhancement of culture: inasmuch as great cultural achievements require the broadest possible preliminary work over generations, authoritative cultures, in antiquity as in modernity, would only be possible through ‘slave labor,’ and inasmuch as the labor “must be done” by someone, it would make more sense, he noted down for himself, to create satisfaction for those who are not capable of more than such work, instead of stirring up their “feelings of indignation” against that labor. Otherwise, one would be forced to “import barbaric peoples from Asia and Africa on a massive scale, so that the civilized world would continually make the uncivilized world subservient to itself” (N Autumn 1877, 25[1]), that means: continue the slave economy that had reached into his time (which Nietzsche never considered a viable option). Yet, in the meantime, the “‘improvers’ of mankind” have prevented a “modest and self-sufficient type of human being, a Chinese type,” from developing “into its own class”; instead, in the “most irresponsible negligence,” these ‘improvers’ have made “the worker today feel their existence to be desperate (expressed morally – to be an *injustice*)” (TI, Skirmishes 40). Nietzsche did not advocate keeping workers (of any kind) in misery, but was against making them morally dissatisfied with their existence, even and especially when it improved. Whoever had the strength to do so, he suggested, should emigrate from the old Europe that had driven them into slavery, to establish a new existence outside it, “and through this deed of freedom (*Freizügigkeit*) in the grand manner to protest against the machine, against capital, and against the choice now threatening them of being *compelled* to become either the slave of the state or the slave of a party of disruption.” (D 206)

In this way, Nietzsche’s distinction of “*master morality* and *slave morality*” becomes less aggressive. He set them likewise not as belonging to specific classes, but as “basic types” of morality. They might have arisen “within either a dominating type that, with a feeling of well-being, was conscious of the difference between themselves and those dominated – or alternately, among the dominated people, the slaves and dependents of every rank.” But the distinction now also manifests itself “within a single soul” inasmuch as, from case to

case, one sets standards for oneself or subjects oneself to those of others – in which case one degrades oneself (BGE 260). Since “obedience” has so far been cultivated and bred in humanity in the best and most long-standing way, and since therefore the “average person has an innate need to obey,” and thus the “herd instinct of obedience is inherited the best and at the cost of the art of commanding” – for these reasons do those “with independence or ability to command” (“*Befehlshaber und Unabhängige*”), those who must wield power, “suffer inwardly from bad consciences.” They need to

fool themselves into thinking that they too are only obeying before they are able to command. This is in fact the situation in Europe today; I call it the moral hypocrisy of the commanders. They do not know how to protect themselves from their bad consciences except by acting like executors of older or higher commands (from their ancestors, constitution, justice system, laws, or God himself) or even by borrowing herd maxims from the herd mentality, such as the ‘first servants of the people,’ or the ‘instruments of the common good.’ [...] But in those cases where people think they cannot do without a leader and bellwether, they keep trying to replace the commander with an agglomeration of clever herd men: this is the origin of all representative constitutions, for example. (BGE 199)

This could still be an alarmingly precise description of the plight of democracy today.

8. *Amor Fati*: “All in all and on the whole,” Nietzsche wrote already in 1882, before his *Za*: “some day I want only to be a Yes-sayer!” And he called this yes-saying ‘amor fati’: “*Amor fati*: let that be my love from now on! I do not want to wage war against ugliness. I do not want to accuse; I do not even want to accuse the accusers. Let *looking away* be my only negation!” (GS 276) The concept of *amor fati*, the ‘love of destiny,’ completes and unifies his thinking. It too is visibly paradoxical, and it is one of his most difficult ideas. The paradox of not exempting the accusers in this not-wanting-to-accuse forces us to look away. Nietzsche then has Zarathustra speak in a similarly paradoxical manner about justice: “I do not like your cold justice; and from the eyes of your judges gazes always the executioner and his cold steel. [...] Then invent me the kind of justice that pardons everyone, except the one who judges!” Here, however, in this not-wanting-to-judge, he exempts the judge, and this now permits him to

look at and into the paradox; thus, a justice becomes possible that is “love with seeing eyes” (Za I, On the Adder’s Bite). Not to accuse, but to acquit everyone, means to let everything happen as it happens, and at the same time try to do justice to it in all clarity and without any reservation. ‘To accuse,’ from Gr. *katēgoreîn*, that is, ‘to categorize’ and ‘to judge’ are closely related; love renounces both. Eventually, Nietzsche wanted *amor fati* “without reduction, exception, and selection” (N Spring – Summer 1888, 16[32]). But this brought forth the entire paradox of wanting-to-not-want. For wanting is always wanting something to be different than how it is. Spinoza, whom Nietzsche had discovered as his great ‘predecessor,’ already wanted this paradoxical non-wanting. He had concluded his thinking with the concept of *amor Dei intellectualis*. According to Spinoza’s *deus sive natura*, God is not distinguishable from nature, his creation, but nature is likewise not distinguishable from Him. Everything is thus to be understood by proceeding from nature, and yet, like God, nature is ultimately incomprehensible. One can only try as far as possible to understand its connections in their own necessity, but only by being a limited part of it, limited not only in cognition, but also, and above all, by the concern for one’s self-preservation, which lets everyone affectively ward off everything that seems detrimental. One will therefore want many things to be different than how they are, and one will therefore accuse and judge. But the more one sees through the connections of one’s own defense, the sooner will one be able to dismantle them and love everything as it is, and, since one will love it as a part of God-nature, God (*Deus*) in this seeing love (*amor intellectualis*) ultimately loves Himself. For one century, Spinoza was considered an atheist, until Goethe and others understood him as the very opposite, as *‘theissimum, yes christianissimum.’* The paradoxical union of God with nature permits both, and thus even after the ‘death of God,’ Spinoza’s *amor Dei intellectualis* is still conceivable as *amor hominis fati*, as man’s love of fate. According to Nietzsche’s dialectical concept of greatness, it is ‘great love,’ which includes its opposite, the ‘great contempt,’ that makes one ‘see,’ and which no longer accuses and judges. He eventually brings this idea to the concept of wanting-nothing-to-be-different: “My formula for human greatness is *amor fati*: that you do not want anything to be different, not forwards, not backwards, not for all eternity. Not just tolerate necessity, still less to conceal it – all idealism is hypocrisy towards necessity –, but to *love* it...” (EH, Why I am so clever 10) Nietzsche thus had achieved what Spinoza wanted: “To ‘will’ anything, to ‘strive’ after anything, to have a ‘goal,’ a ‘wish’



in mind – I have never experienced this. Right now I am still looking out over my future – an immense future! – as if it were a calm sea: there is not a ripple of longing. I do not have the slightest wish for anything to be different from how it is; I do not want to become anything other than what I am.” (ibid., 9; see also Spinoza, Ethics I, Appendix) Thus Nietzsche finally, for himself, in the concept of *amor fati*, even suspended the idea of the will to power. But he added: “*amor fati* is my innermost nature. But this does not prevent me from loving irony, even world-historical irony.” (EH, CW 4) Irony creates distance, the distance of the Socratic knowledge of non-knowledge. One can never know, can never be sure, whether one is in a state of *amor fati*; one can only ever try to live it, Nietzsche notes for himself, as an experiment; one can ‘want’ it only paradoxically:

Such an experimental philosophy as I live it, tries to anticipate even the possibilities of the most fundamental nihilism: without saying that it stops at a No, at a negation, at a will to No. Rather, it wants to go right through to the reverse – to a *Dionysian saying-yes* to the world as it is, without reduction, exception, and selection – it wants the eternal cycle, – the same things, the same logic, and illogic of knots. Highest state that a philosopher can reach: to stand in a Dionysian way to existence –: my formula for this is *amor fati*... (N Spring – Summer 1888, 16[32], corr.)

9. “*A Being Awash in Symbols and Incomprehensibilities*”: In the case of Nietzsche’s ‘type’ of Jesus, the “no-saying, no-doing” part (AC 40) was likewise missing. And so, in the middle of his “*Curse on Christianity*,” he was fascinated by the “psychological type of the redeemer” (AC 29), his

*instinct of hatred for reality*: the consequence of an extreme oversensitivity and capacity for suffering that does not want to be ‘touched’ at all because it feels every contact too acutely.

*The instinctive exclusion of all aversion, all hostility, all boundaries and distances in feelings*: the consequence of an extreme oversensitivity and capacity for suffering that perceives every reluctance, every needing-to-be-reluctant as itself an unbearable *pain* (which is to say *harmful, proscribed* by the instinct of self-preservation) and only experiences bliss (pleasure), when it stops resisting everyone

and anything, including evil, – love as the only, the *final* possibility for life ... (AC 30)

Here Nietzsche unmistakably speaks of his own “*chronic vulnerability*,” in which he suffers from everything he encounters: “I can no longer come to terms with any kind of reality. If I can’t manage to forget it, it kills me.” (Letters to Köselitz, Feb. 1 and Jan. 15, 1888) For him, in the ‘type of the redeemer,’ there was no “hard-won faith”: “The concept, the experience of ‘life’ as only he knew it, repelled from him every type of word, formula, law, faith, or dogma.” That type had no need for refutations, reasons, proofs, or dialectics; he had “no idea how even to form the thought of an opposing judgment” (AC 32). His reality had been quite different, “a being awash in symbols and incomprehensibilities” (AC 31), “the whole of reality, the whole of nature, language itself, has value only as a sign, a parable, for him.” (AC 32) According to Nietzsche, he acted differently, had lived “a new *practice*,” “the genuinely evangelical practice” (AC 33). Nietzsche understood it as ‘practice’ without theory and thus also without the distinction of theory and practice. Such a practice, which has ‘become flesh and blood,’ can be more definite and unambiguous than the most fixed concepts, because no counter-concepts can call it into question. It even withstands paradoxes.

10. *Dionysus Versus the Crucified*: Nietzsche’s last word in EH was: “Have I been understood? – *Dionysus versus the crucified*...” (EH, Why I am Destiny 8) It was the final formula of his struggle to uncover the non-moral origins of Christianity. The ‘crucified’ is the Christ of Christianity, who had to justify his shameful death and dogmatically exaggerated it. For Nietzsche, death on the cross was a fate, nothing more, but a fate of a type that had lived “the freedom, the superiority *over* every feeling of *ressentiment*”: “As it were, Jesus could not have wanted anything more from his death than to publicly give his doctrine its strongest test, to *prove* it...” (AC 40) ‘*Dionysus versus the crucified*’ thus also means ‘*Dionysus for the type of Jesus*,’ as Nietzsche understood it, and an ‘*Antichrist*’ is one who lets Jesus be seen as a mere human being again: ‘*Ecce homo*.’ “I am,” Nietzsche wrote, “in Greek, and not just in Greek, the *Anti-Christ*...” (EH, Why I write such good books 2). For the Greek ‘*anti*’ has a fourfold meaning: it indeed means (a) opposition, but also (b) comparison, and, by comparison, (c) ‘making equal,’ substitution, and finally (d) surpassing (as one can say ‘joy over joy’). Nietzsche recognized in the “logic” of his life

at last a surpassing of the “logic” of Jesus’ life: “the Antichrist,” he wrote in a preliminary draft of EH, “is himself the necessary logic in the development of a true Christian; in me, Christianity overcomes itself.” (N October – November 1888, 24[1]6) In this sense, he was “a *bearer of glad tidings* as no one ever was before” (EH, Why I am a Destiny 1) – inasmuch as he liberated the good news again from the ‘spirit of *ressentiment*’ that had laid over it for millennia.

Nevertheless, the ‘anti’ also retains its sense of opposition – not only to Christianity, but to the type of Jesus as well: ‘Antichrist’ also means ‘Antijesus.’ Nietzsche calls Antichristian all those who want something specific, i.e., who want to have something different and also want to enforce it: soldiers, judges, statesmen, philologists, physicians (see AC 38, 47) – as well as philosophers as ‘commanders and legislators.’ Nietzsche ascribed this ‘anti-Christianity’ in the full sense initially to his type Zarathustra and eventually to his type Dionysus. Zarathustra “defines,” Nietzsche quotes him in EH, “the *highest type of everything that exists*,” as the “deepest,” “most comprehensive,” “most necessary,” and “wisest” soul, the “being” soul, “the one that loves itself the most” – and, at the same time, the opposite of all these determinations: it can likewise assume the most superficial masks, “drift and wander,” “plunge joyfully into chance,” “will itself into wanting and longing,” “flee from itself,” and let “idiocy speak to itself most sweetly” (Za III, On Old and New Tablets 19; EH, Za 6). Nietzsche did not sublimate the opposites, but consciously let them stand side by side. Dionysus, too, is a god, insofar as everything else is to be understood from him, without him being understood himself. But against *every* concept, by which something is understood, other concepts can be asserted, allowing it to be understood differently. Nietzsche’s ‘Dionysus,’ like his ‘type of Jesus,’ is different from every concept by which one tries to understand it, and one concept is the ‘nuance’ of the other. Eventually, Nietzsche no longer spoke of Dionysus, but he ‘sang’ of him, in his DD.



## XII.

### Nietzsche's Future?

“Whoever understands *what* has been destroyed here,  
may see if there is anything left in their hands.”

(EH, Why I am Destiny 8)

Nietzsche called himself a “posthumous” person who only came to life after his death (GS 365): “I will possess the times non until the day after tomorrow” (AC, Preface, see EH, Why I write such good books 1). His fame began soon after he had fallen into madness, and it grew immensely and far beyond the field of philosophy. Whoever sought intellectual stimulation and debate with intellectual curiosity – artists, intellectuals, politicians, journalists, entrepreneurs, scientists of all disciplines, founders of religion, and of course philosophers – read him and let themselves be either fascinated or repelled by him (academic philosophers understandably had reservations and still have them today). But also for simpler minds, to whom art, science, and philosophy otherwise remained alien, Nietzsche’s work, above all *Za*, became a source of catchwords. In terms of a history of reception, he thus had a tremendous impact, probably more than anyone else in a comparable period. But does Nietzsche therefore ‘possess’ the today, the ‘day after tomorrow,’ since his time? Has his thinking taken possession of our time? A vast number of significant research contributions from many scientific disciplines have been dedicated to his work, and thus, today, we understand the inner and outer contexts of his thinking much better than in Nietzsche’s own time, when he remained almost completely without resonance. But has it also been thought further, and do we understand it in such a way that we can think it further for our time? This certainly applies to many subjects of his philosophizing, including: human sexual life (Freud); anthropology (Scheler, Plessner, Gehlen); nihilism (Heidegger, Jünger, Löwith) and existence in nihilism (Jaspers); it applies to the philosophy of language and grammar (Wittgenstein) and the philosophy of science (Quine, Putnam, Goodman, Davidson); to

philosophical disillusionment (Ryle, Rorty, Feyerabend), the critique of the metaphysical tradition (Derrida, Deleuze), and the discourse of (post)modernity (Vattimo, Habermas, Sloterdijk); to the genealogical exploration of morals and cultures (Foucault), metaphorology (Kofman, Blumenberg), perspectivism (Kaulbach), moral criticism (Luhmann), and the ethics of nobility (Levinas); to the philosophy of signs (Simon) and the philosophy of interpretation (Lenk, Abel), and finally to the God-is-dead theology (Sölle) – to name only the most striking ones. But all these were developed not so much in connection to Nietzsche's philosophy, but rather at a greater or lesser distance to it, often even in more or less deliberate ignorance of his writings. There has been no philosophically productive 'Nietzscheanism' – with the exception, perhaps, of Jewish Nietzscheanism – as there were dynamic traditions of Cartesianism, Kantianism, and Hegelianism, or even Platonism and Aristotelianism and, above all, Socratism – with whose authors Nietzsche had measured himself. The art of his language and the forms of his philosophical writings, his 'joyful science,' his project of a revaluation of all values and the new justification of rank orders have not yet been reached again, let alone developed further. Above all, however, the famous teachings he put into the mouth of his Zarathustra were not followed up philosophically; chairs for the interpretation of his *Za* were not established (at least up to now). It is not clear whether and how we cope with nihilism and what footholds this might be based on. Western morality has clearly lost some of its self-evidence and self-righteousness, but at the same time the demands for moral correctness have grown considerably. Nevertheless, the philosophical horizon and our philosophical orientation as a whole have changed considerably: more recent philosophies come across as less sublime but increasingly cheerful; we hardly expect any final truths and reckon all the more with irrevocable uncertainties. But we have only begun to understand how Nietzsche's unreserved disillusionment of our orientation can be combined with the power of his affirmations. The extreme tension under which Nietzsche placed philosophizing is likely to unleash many exciting thoughts in the coming generations.

## Postscript:

### How to Study Nietzsche Today?

This *Orientation to the Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche* was first published in German in 2011 as *Friedrich Nietzsche zur Einführung*. It is an introduction to his philosophy as I believe we can best understand it today in its overall context. Yet, in the past decade, another perspective of Nietzsche research has opened up, beyond the study of Nietzsche's *philosophy* in its thematic context: the study of his process of thinking and working, that is, his *philosophizing*, in which he developed what we now consider his philosophy. Through this, one can understand his philosophy in new ways; in new contexts, which are to be explored with new methods, new philosophical subjects become visible. For this purpose, one has to neatly distinguish Nietzsche's *Nachlass*, i.e., all that he wrote in notebooks and workbooks and on loose sheets, from the works he prepared for printing. The former is what Nietzsche noted down for himself, the latter what he presented to an audience. One thinks differently when one considers one's thoughts for oneself than when one communicates them to others, and one communicates them again differently to personal acquaintances and friends than to an anonymous audience. Nietzsche explicitly kept many of his thoughts to himself, either because the thoughts themselves did not seem ripe to him or the audience to understand them, or he himself to think them, because he did not have the courage for them yet. Certainly, Nietzsche used to write down his thoughts in order to publish them later; but until publication, a great deal could happen to these thoughts. For the most part, he reworked his manuscripts again and again, combined their themes with other themes, worked on the most concise literary and often musical expression of what he wanted to say, mostly without having definitive plans for it: if he made plans, he used to revise them as well. His thinking was far less systematic than evolutionary: it moved forward in incessant variations and selections, and Nietzsche himself seems to have been surprised at times at what emerged. Even what he published was never final: he often took it up again in new manuscripts and developed it anew, with new

surprises. With Nietzsche, we find a unique and great *philosophical orientation process*, which was stimulated to ever-new developments.

Today, we can trace this process of orientation to a certain extent – in Nietzsche’s bequeathed manuscripts, which, as far as we can ascertain, have survived for the most part because he himself, together with his sister, carefully preserved them. Some of his smaller notebooks, in which he often wrote down his first ideas during walks, his bigger workbooks, in which he worked out these ideas, and folders with loose sheets, where he often made new transcriptions of what he had already worked out, but also drafted overviews and plans, he took with him on his frequent travels. From the further developments of his thoughts in further manuscripts and the ongoing revisions of these manuscripts – deletions, insertions, new deletions, new insertions – one can recognize Nietzsche’s *philosophical orientation decisions*, which did not lead to a definite system: What he planned for a long time after the completion of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, something like a systematic *opus magnum* (*Hauptwerk*) with the title “The Will to Power” or later “Revaluation of all Values,” he eventually gave up at the end of 1888 and instead found new literary forms again, in *Twilight of Idols*, *The Antichrist*, *Ecce Homo* and the *Dionysian-Dithyrambs*. Since Nietzsche in his manuscripts often initially formulated his thoughts like theses, one believed for a long time and many still believe today that they contain his true opinions, his teachings, or something like his dogmas. But they are only first drafts, which he strongly transformed first in his philosophical orientation process and then in the process of preparing publications. Often, the transformations were so strong that nothing of their allegedly thetic or dogmatic character remained. His thoughts themselves then took on a different form; they were not simply covered with a fine literary dress, as many assume.

Tracing Nietzsche’s philosophical orientation process became possible through a fundamentally new edition of his *Nachlass* from the period between 1885 and 1889, the time between *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and Nietzsche’s mental collapse. When he was no longer able to work, first his sister Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche and his friend Heinrich Köselitz, whom he called Peter Gast and who often had helped him to get his difficult-to-read manuscripts into print, edited a collection from the *Nachlass* in 1901 and a bigger one in 1906 that had an enormous impact and that led to Nietzsche being recognized as a philosopher of the first rank. Förster-Nietzsche and Köselitz compiled the collection or compilation according to one of many plans Nietzsche



had drafted for the 'Hauptwerk' and gave it the title *The Will to Power*. The compilation was largely arbitrary; the chronological sequence in the notebooks and workbooks was ignored and Nietzsche's notes were partly torn apart, shortened and supplemented. In the Nietzsche Archive in Weimar, which was directed by Förster-Nietzsche, it was called the 'prose opus magnum,' in order to distinguish it from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and the aphorism books, which Nietzsche himself had promoted for printing. *The Will to Power* should offer Nietzsche's 'true' opinions and convictions, not obscured by the literary art of his 'gay science.' Nietzsche scholars, including such eminent philosophers as Martin Heidegger and Karl Löwith, stuck to this edition until the 1960s, despite knowing better; in Germany, it is still printed today, and in English-language Nietzsche scholarship, it is still used in the translation by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale.

Finally in the 1970s, this philologically irresponsible edition was replaced with a correct one by the Italians Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. They published Nietzsche's works, including his posthumous notes, for the first time in an edition faithful to the text reproducing the *Nachlass* chronologically according to the sequence of Nietzsche's notebooks and workbooks. In this way, the *Nachlass*, since it was no longer arranged thematically, became confusing for the reader; one could no longer read it like a coherent book, as Förster-Nietzsche and Köselitz had presented *The Will to Power*. One had to find one's own way through it, as far as Nietzsche's topics, texts and thoughts were concerned, and thus one had to orientate oneself about his philosophy. One could now be largely sure to have the texts in front of one as Nietzsche had last left them. As such, one read them like final texts, referred to them and quoted them like the works that Nietzsche himself had promoted for printing.

Yet, one was mistaken once again: Nietzsche did not leave behind finished texts in his posthumous notes; neither are they 'fragments' (*Fragmente*) or mere 'preliminary stages' (*Vorstufen*), as Colli and Montinari called them. Nietzsche wrote them while dependent on ever-difficult living conditions as well as on his changing writing tools – pencil, ink, typewriter, dictation – and, above all, on the present progress of his philosophical orientation process. Thus, new editors decided to reedit the manuscripts of the late *Nachlass* once again, in the so-called IXth section of "Works of Nietzsche. Critical Complete Edition" (*Nietzsche, Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe*). The new edition was called this way because it was intended to follow and complement the VIII sections of

Colli's and Montinari's edition, in appreciation of their work. The "KGW IX," containing 13 volumes, is planned to be completed in 2022. The Colli/Montinari edition of the late *Nachlass* is thus outdated. This edition still helps for quickly reading over the alleged 'texts,' being mostly unfinished notes or jottings, in the way Montinari elaborated them as the final form of Nietzsche's revisions – not less, not more. It can no longer be the basis of Nietzsche research.

The same is true for the edition of *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*, published by Stanford University Press, which has appeared since 1995 in 19 volumes reediting Colli's and Montinari's edition, and even more so for the selection from Colli's and Montinari's edition in two volumes published in 2003, resp. 2009 by Cambridge University Press, which collects notes taken from the early and the late *Nachlass* in different translations, being again a selection according to the editors' own philosophical ideas (*Friedrich Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks*, ed. by Rüdiger Bittner, transl. by Kate Sturge, Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2003; *Friedrich Nietzsche: Writings from the Early Notebooks*, ed. by Raymond Geuss and Alexander Nehamas, trans. by Ladislaus Löb, Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2009). To be sure, the translations are largely convincing. However, the editions are no longer sufficient to study Nietzsche without constraint and prejudice.

The new KGW IX edition offers Nietzsche's bequeathed manuscripts as he had written them down in his notebooks, his workbooks and on loose sheets. It was elaborated under the direction first of Marie-Luise Haase, a former assistant of Mazzino Montinari, and Michael Kohlenbach by two groups of researchers in Weimar and Basel, who newly deciphered the material with great care. The edition makes all of Nietzsche's revisions visible: by 'diplomatically transcribing' the manuscripts exactly as Nietzsche had written them, i.e., by only transforming the difficult to read handwritten notes into easily readable printed letters. This was done in such a way that Nietzsche's entries on the pages of his notebooks, workbooks, and sheets can be distinguished 'chronologically.' At the same time, they are arranged 'topologically.' That means: you can recognize where Nietzsche added which remark and in which relative sequence. Since he used different pens and inks, experts can often even find out when Nietzsche wrote an entry. Martin Endres and Axel Pichler have already presented the new edition and its philosophical outcome in an English publication ("warum ich diesen mißrathenen Satz schuf": Ways of Reading Nietzsche in the Light of KGW IX, in: *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 44:1, 2013, pp. 90-109).

The KGW IX shifts the focus from the ‘systematic’ interpretation, to which the English selection from the *Nachlass* is particularly committed, to the so-called ‘contextual’ and ‘genetic’ interpretation: One can now better understand Nietzsche’s writings from the chronological and topological contexts in which they were written and to which they also belong, just as Nietzsche’s published aphorisms must always be understood within their contexts in the books of aphorisms, which Nietzsche carefully arranged, as can be recognized in the *Nachlass* as well. Especially interesting are the ways Nietzsche transformed his thoughts from first ideas through numerous revisions up to the publication of one of his works – his thoughts do not remain the same, and that is why they resist any systematization, even for Nietzsche himself, as he explicitly wrote in *Twilight of the Idols*, after he had given up on the plan of an *opus magnum*: “I distrust all systematists and go out of their way. The will to a system (*Wille zum System*) is a lack of righteousness.” (TI, Proverbs and Arrows 26) This sentence, too, has a most revealing background, from which one can see how Nietzsche step by step transformed ‘content’ into ‘form,’ so that one can only understand it adequately from this ‘form.’ I present it here as an example.

Nietzsche inserted the maxim in *Twilight of the Idols*’ first chapter at the end of 1888. At the beginning, there was probably a note in notebook W II 2, which Nietzsche used mainly in the autumn of 1887, but in which he later also added revisions. There, he made remarks on the “points of view for my values” (*Gesichtspunkte für meine Werthe*), among them the “sublimation of cruelty” (*Sublimierung der Grausamkeit*), the “love of the sexes” (*Geschlechtsliebe*), whether one thinks and acts “out of abundance or out of desire” (*aus der Fülle oder aus dem Verlangen*), whether one can survey only a few things or many, whether one is “genuine or only an actor” (*ächt oder nur Schauspieler*), whether, when one “goes ahead” (*vorangeht*), “dignity is needed or ‘the buffoon’” (*Würde nöthig – oder ‘der Hanswurst’*), etc. Nietzsche had either already addressed all these themes in preceding works or would do so in the works of 1888. He supplements and corrects the note many times. Not corrected at all, however, the following lines stand out:

[S 1] NB. To go further at this point I leave to another kind of spirits than mine. I am not narrow-minded (*bornirt*) enough for a system – and not even to my system... (N Autumn 1887, 10[146], KGW IX 6, W II 2, 44)

Nietzsche does not want to systematize all the points of view he has compiled and for his part declares systematists outrightly narrow-minded. His own mind is too free to get involved in the limitations and restrictions that a system demands. He adds that “necessities of thought are moral necessities” and refers to Herbert Spencer’s naiveté (which he emphasizes again and again). While the latter, like Socrates, thought that necessities of thinking lead to necessities of morality, Nietzsche reverses the sentence: necessities of thinking come from necessities of morality; morality constricts thinking.

This note was probably followed by a longer note in booklet W II 1 from mid/late February 1888 (9[188], KGW IX 6, W II 1, 1/2). The note was written down explicitly in view of a forthcoming book and was apparently intended as part of a preface to it (which, however, then looked quite different). Its context is different from the former one. In the first draft, it begins thus:

[S 2a] These books for thinking, – they belong to those who have nothing better to do than think.

Nietzsche is obviously not yet satisfied with these lines, as he overwrites and supplements them several times, keeping in mind especially the Germans of his time, who like to, according to him, confuse “thinking” with “some German imperial aspirations.” This leads him to “victims of national waste of power” or, in short, to “stupidization” and to the general “problem of civilization.” It is in this context where the increasingly corrected remark appears (striketroughs are indicated as striketroughs, underlinings as underlinings, subsequent insertions by curly brackets { ... }, insertions into insertions by curly brackets within curly brackets {... {...} ...}):

[S 2b] I distrust all {systems and} systematists {and go out of their way}: perhaps one {still} discovers behind these thoughts {book still} the system I have avoided ... and me, the systematist ...

On the same page, a new transcript follows with additional edits:

[S 2c] Systematists: {The will to system:} a finer form of dishonesty {with a philosopher {morally expressed,} his a finer form of depravity, a {character-}disease, {im}morally expressed; {but immorally expressed} his will to make {display} himself more stupid than one is, immorally expressed – More stupid, that means: {namely}

stronger, more imperial {simpler; {and} more commanding}  
tyrannical ...

Nietzsche completes the notes without corrections:

[S 2d] I no longer respect readers how could I write for readers?  
... But I note myself, for myself.

And below that another note appears obliquely, in neat letters written with a different writing tool and again without additional corrections:

[S 2e] I read Zarathustra: but how could I cast my pearls before swine in such a way!

The basic issue of the note is “thinking,” which, as Nietzsche adds to the first section, “gives pleasure to people,” apart from contemporary Germans and “systematists.” If “the readers” do not appreciate this, Nietzsche will write down his thoughts just for himself. He would rather publish nothing at all than commit to a system.

The numerous corrections, however, show that Nietzsche is not comfortable with this predicament. He now explicitly makes a question of morality out of it, accusing systematists in general first of dishonesty, then of finer corruption, and eventually of character disease. Then he takes the moral characterization back into a question of will, first the will to act, then to command (he does not say “will to power”) and summarizes both as will to self-stupefaction. But self-stupefaction consists in purposeful simplification – we can add: simplification of complex and over-complex facts. One form of this simplification is systematization, and that would mean: the classification of hopelessly unclear facts into comparatively simple, logically controllable and thus clear schemes. This self-stupefaction leads to the stupefaction also of the audience, by which one wants to be heard: With “uneducated” simplifications one can have a stronger impact, thus bringing the audience to follow the author unconditionally. Constraining people through simple morals is part of this. Today we call this manner populist. In philosophy, according to Nietzsche, people dumb each other down with morally constricted systems.

In *Beyond Good and Evil*, however, he considered, as explained above (see chap. XI.7.2), a “commanding” philosophizing when he wrote: “*The true philosophers are commanders and legislators.*” This seemed sound to him, if phi-

losophers, through their “creating,” reach “with a creative hand for the future” (BGE 211). But this creating is, for him, not to be done with systematizing, insofar as systematists like Kant or Hegel adhere to a traditional model of philosophizing. As for the “true” mode of philosophizing, the mode of creating values for the future, Nietzsche tells us nothing here or there. As far as over-complex facts are not reached by systematization, but rather disguised by it, it seems to him more moral, more decent, more righteous to write only for oneself, if one cannot make these facts clear to an insufficiently educated audience without the aid of systematization. Thus, the problem of note [S 2a-e], both intellectually and morally, is simplification and its impact on civilization theory. From this point of view, it was a mistake to even publish *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche’s most complex and demanding work according to both content and form. The audience was not ready for it, just as those taught by Zarathustra were not ready for his teachings.

However, Nietzsche does want to communicate. He only has to find the right way. And here, the “will to the system” is a strong temptation for him, too: He “avoids” or goes “out of the way” of systems and systematists. He avoids the “will to the system” without decisively affirming or denying it. And this evasiveness makes him struggle morally with himself, as the note’s revisions show. His self-assessment is not that he is *unable* to design a system, as often claimed, but that he *wanted* to, but did not *allow* himself to do so – though one cannot rule out that the moral argument is only a pretense, especially from Nietzsche’s point of view. Thus, his conclusion to retreat to writing without an audience and to write only for himself seems like a resignation.

This version is followed in a third workbook, W II 3, which Nietzsche used from November 1887 to March 1888, by another one, again with the initial remark “NB” (*nota bene*). The context here consists in remarks on the state as “organized immorality,” on the “military state,” and on the role of Christianity in it. This leads to the spirits that Christianity has “corrupted;” professing to it, he says, “compromises oneself once and for all.” And this “compromising” Nietzsche also inserts, later, into the system note, where the word “immorality” has likewise returned:

[S 3] NB I distrust all systematists and go out of their way.  
The will to the system is, for us thinkers at least, {something  
that compromises, a} form of immorality ... Perhaps one will

understand, {by looking under and} behind this book {by looking under and behind this book,} which systematist I {it itself} have {has} most {best} evaded {with effort} – myself ... (N November 1887 – March 1888, 11[410], KGW IX 7, W II 3, 7).

What is new now is that Nietzsche no longer rejects the audience, but includes its perspective and thus the communication with it. He no longer considers the audience as morally narrow-minded as before. Readers may include themselves in the plural “us thinkers,” if they dare to do so; the “one” (*man*) then designates a perspective that anyone could be expected to adopt. As Nietzsche now speaks, he exposes himself to the “gaze” of an audience that could recognize and see through his morality and his struggle with himself, and he reflects this perspective in turn from his perspective, the perspective of one who tries to resist the will to a system. The will to a system is placed into the context of perspectivism, into the “unhooking and hooking” of “perspectives” and “affective interpretations,” as Nietzsche describes it in HH I, Preface 6, and GM III 12. Given the author’s perspective of the possible perspective of a wiser audience, which would be capable of finding more in his texts than the author has written down, the speaker would betray himself with his will to a system and thereby morally compromise himself. Nietzsche would also be quite willing to do this, as he later writes about his “practice of war” in *Ecce homo* (Why I am so wise 7): “I have never taken a step in public that did not compromise me: that is *my* criterion for acting right.” To present oneself in public always involves the risk of exposing oneself and being attacked, and if one attacks, as the speaker here attacks “all systematists,” one challenges them to counterattack, especially if one betrays oneself as a systematist. Thus, it is not about shame, but now about an effective attack on the will to a system, which could be most convincing, if the one who speaks confesses that he too is tempted by it. The moral problem of simplification itself is put up for discussion.

With the next step, in the workbook W II 6 of spring 1888, Nietzsche provides the note for a collection of “Proverbs of a Hyperborean,” some of which will then enter the introductory chapter “Proverbs and Arrows” of *Twilight of the Idols*. Proverbs are meant to stand alone; thematic contexts are irrelevant. But they must be short: Nietzsche shortens the note – precisely by cutting the sentence that includes the audience’s perspective. Nevertheless, the audience does not disappear: in “us thinkers,” in the new introductory “We” and in

the “compromises” it remains – author and audience compromise themselves before each other.

[S 4] We distrust all systematists, we go out of their way. The will to a system is, for us thinkers at least, something that compromises, a form of immorality (N Spring 1888, 15[118], KGW IX 9, W II 6, 22).

Nevertheless, it could be dishonest to include the audience’s perspective in this way. For according to the first version of the note [S 1], the communicating ‘I’ does not really reckon with a sufficiently insightful audience. Nietzsche rewrites the corrected note on a loose sheet between July and beginning August 1888 and crosses it out as he did in workbook W II 3. He returns to the “I” and replaces the German “Unmoralität” with “Immoralität.” Nietzsche often uses the terms alternately. Here however, he may distance himself from moral evaluations in general by using “Immoralität” instead of “Unmoralität”; he may try to avoid the moral constraint as such, in which he risks remaining with the will to a system. But he keeps “us thinkers,” “compromises,” and “one (*man*):”

[S 5] I distrust all systematists and go out of their way. The will to a system is, for us thinkers at least, something that compromises, a form of our immorality. – Perhaps one can guess, by looking behind this book, which systematist I myself have avoided only with effort ... (N July – August 1888, 18[4], KGW IX 12, Mp XVI, 56r).

Here a manuscript with another revision could be missing. For in the sentence released for publication

[S 6] I distrust all systematists and go out of their way. The will to a system (*Der Wille zum System*) is a lack of righteousness. (TI, Proverbs and Arrows 26)

Nietzsche keeps the opening sentence, but deletes the rest. He discards all apparent communion with anyone else, including all perspectivizations by others, and no longer concedes to anyone the right to judge the morality or immorality of his writing. But now he introduces a new term, which is not prepared in the previous notes: he puts the moral point of view into a single



and resolute word, “righteousness” (*Rechtschaffenheit*). He seems to formulate the sentence in a dogmatic manner, like a doctrine for everyone that sets righteousness as a value in itself. Just in this way, though only with the second sentence, “The will to a system is a lack of righteousness,” is how the proverb is most often quoted. With the proverb promoted to print, Nietzsche seems to coarsen and dogmatize the thoughts that prepared it. “Righteousness” seems to be dogmatically asserted.

However, this is not true. The preceding notes tell a different story. The proverb does not summarize the thought dogmatically, but through omissions and pointed emphasis it becomes more succinct; in fact, if you read carefully, it says more than before. The speaker or writer still clearly indicates, with his “I,” a perspective that is his own, none blurred by a “we,” to which other perspectives, namely those of the “systematists,” would stand in opposition. Perspectivism remains, and as such it stands precisely against the will to a system, i.e., the will to a conceptual context that is uniform for all and detached from individual perspectives. The speaker does not directly attack the systematists who want to say “we” instead of “I.” He only expresses his mistrust toward them, which is also a mistrust toward himself. For he continues to “get out of their way.” Why, he does not say explicitly, and he does not need to do so, because it is clear: If one goes out of the way of someone or something, one wants to avoid unpleasant confrontations, including with oneself. And this is precisely how one compromises oneself: one has a problem and cannot cope with it. That, too, no longer needs to be said explicitly.

Against this background, the second sentence “The will to a system is a lack of righteousness” must be understood differently: It now entails a warning of the speaker against himself, against his own will to a system, against his own need to see and represent things not in all their individual perspectivizations, but as “one (*man*)” might perceive them and thereby forcefully establish a community in thought that relieves individual human beings of their own feelings, thoughts, and responsibilities. The dogmatically formulated moral norm is to protect the speaker from himself, as he holds it up to himself as a warning – he appeals to his own righteousness without being certain of attaining it, because he is wavering. This seems to be the point. But only if one looks back at the preceding notes and their contexts do such fine nuances become visible: The speaker does not fail before the task of a system; he would be able to deliver a system and would want to do so as well. But since he does not allow himself to do so, to

not constrain and stultify his mind, he appeals to his righteousness to prevent succumbing to the temptation. The proverb is not a dogmatic and systematic formulation. The preceding notes and their transformation reveal a psychic drama. And, according to Nietzsche, ‘good readers’ should be able to sense it.

To make ‘form’ out of ‘content’ was one of Nietzsche’s last maxims – without communicating it to the audience: “One is an artist at the price of perceiving what all non-artists call form as content, as the thing itself. With that, of course, one belongs to an inverted world.” (N July - August 1888, 18[6], KGW IX 12, Mp XVI, 56v) To explore this inversion of content into form, which has been neglected in Nietzsche research for so long, as interpreters have insisted above all on systematizable content, will be the task of a new, younger generation of Nietzsche researchers. We have only taken the first steps. To be sure, you must have ideas about the context of Nietzsche’s philosophy in order to be able to follow the development of his philosophizing, ideas such as those developed here in this orientation to the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. But one must be careful not to fix Nietzsche’s philosophy around these ideas, and instead always be prepared to question them, just as Nietzsche himself questioned his own ideas about his philosophy. Nietzsche published almost nothing the way he first noted it, and always transcended his publications with new thoughts. He certainly would have continued doing so if madness had not prevented him. What we can learn from Nietzsche, perhaps more than from others, is not, as Kant already taught, philosophy, but rather how to philosophize.

# Appendix I:

## Abbreviations of Nietzsche's Writings

AC	The Anti-Christ: A Curse on Christianity
AOM	Human, All Too Human II: Assorted Opinions and Maxims
BGE	Beyond Good and Evil
BT	The Birth of Tragedy
CV	Five Prefaces to Five Unwritten Books
CW	The Case of Wagner
D	Daybreak
DD	The Dionysian-Dithyrambs
DS	David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer (UM I)
DW	The Dionysian Worldview
EH	Ecce Homo: How to Become What you Are
GM	On the Genealogy of Morality
GS	The Gay Science
HH	Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits
HL	On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life (UM II)
N	<i>Nachlass</i> : Nietzsche's notes
PTAG	Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks
SE	Schopenhauer as Educator (UM III)
TI	Twilight of the Idols, or How to Philosophize with a Hammer
UM	Untimely Meditations
WB	Richard Wagner in Bayreuth (UM IV)
WS	The Wanderer and His Shadow
Za	Thus Spoke Zarathustra



# Appendix II:

## Tools for Nietzsche Research

### A. Quotable Editions

#### a. German

- KGW *Nietzsche, Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, founded by Giorgio Colli andazzino Montinari, continued first by Volker Gerhardt, Norbert Miller, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter and Karl Pestalozzi, then by Marie-Luise Haase, Hubert Thüring, Martin Stingelin, and Michael Kohlenbach on behalf of the Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin/New York: 1967ff.) [35 vls.; includes “Nachberichte”, i.e. subsequent philological reports of the editors].
- KGW IX *Der handschriftliche Nachlass ab Frühjahr 1885-1889 in differenzierter Transkription*, ed. by Marie-Luise Haase et al. (Berlin/New York: 2001ff.) [13 vls.; new edition of the late *Nachlass*].
- KGB *Nietzsche, Briefwechsel: Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, founded by Giorgio Colli andazzino Montinari, continued by Norbert Miller and Annemarie Pieper (Berlin/New York: 1975ff.).
- KSA *Friedrich Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 volumes*, ed. by Giorgio Colli andazzino Montinari (München/Berlin/New York: 1980) [includes KGW III-VIII, identical in text but not in pages with the KGW; additionally a commentary byazzino Montinari, a chronicle of Nietzsche’s life, and an index of names by Jörg Salaquarda].

KSB *Friedrich Nietzsche, Sämtliche Briefe. Kritische Studienausgabe in 8 Volumes*, ed. by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, Munich/ Berlin/ New York 1986 [only the letters of Nietzsche; text identical with the KGB; includes indexes of the addressees and names, written by Federico Gerratana et al.].

[www.nietzschesource.org](http://www.nietzschesource.org) [includes KSA and KSB in corrected versions]

## **b. English Translations**

*The Greek Music Drama* (1870):

- *The Greek Music Drama*, transl. by Paul Bishop, introd. by Jill Marsden (New York: Contra Mundum Press, 2013)

*The Birth of Tragedy* (1872):

- in: *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, transl. and ed. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Modern Library, 1967).
- in: *The Birth of Tragedy and the Case of Wagner*, transl., with commentary, by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage / Random House, 1967).
- in: *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, transl. by Ronald Speirs (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 1999) (also contains: “The Dionysiac World View” and “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense”)

*Untimely Meditations* (1873-76):

- *Untimely Meditations*, ed. by Daniel Breazeale, transl. by R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge et al: Cambridge University Press, 1997)
- *Unfashionable Observations*, transl., with an afterword, by Richard T. Gray (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995)

*Human, All Too Human* (1878) (including *Assorted Opinions and Maxims* [1879] and *The Wanderer and His Shadow* [1880], which Nietzsche added in 1886 as second part to HH with a new preface):

- *Human, All Too Human: A Book for free Spirits*, transl. by R. J. Hollingdale, introd. by Richard Schacht (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 1986)

- *Human, All Too Human II and Unpublished Fragments from the Period of Human, All Too Human II (Spring 1878 - Fall 1879)*, transl., with an afterword, by Gary Handwerk (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012)

*Daybreak* (1881):

- *Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality*, ed. by Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter, transl. by R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 1997)
- *Dawn: Thoughts on the Presumptions of Morality*, transl. by Brittain Smith, afterword by Keith Ansell-Pearson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011)

*The Gay Science* (I-IV: 1882, V: 1887):

- *The Gay Science*, transl., with a commentary, by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage / Random House, 1974)
- *The Gay Science*, ed. by Bernard Williams, transl. by Josefina Nauckhoff, Poems transl. by Adrian Del Caro (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 2001)

*Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883-85):

- in: *The Portable Nietzsche*, selected and transl. with an introd., prefaces, and notes by Walter Kaufmann (New York et al.: The Viking Press, 1954)
- *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and No One*, transl. with an introd. by R. J. Hollingdale (London et al.: Penguin, 1961)
- *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and Nobody*, transl. with an introd. and notes by Graham Parkes (Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press, 2005)
- *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None*, ed. by Adrian Del Caro and Robert B. Pippin, transl. by Adrian Del Caro (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 2006)

*Beyond Good and Evil* (1886):

- in: *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, transl. and ed. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Modern Library, 1967)

- *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*, transl. by R. J. Hollingdale, with an introduction by Michael Tanner (London et al.: Penguin, 1973)
- *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*, ed. by Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Judith Norman, transl. by Judith Norman (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 2002)
- in: *Beyond Good and Evil / On the Genealogy of Morality*, transl., with an afterword, by Adrian Del Caro (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014)

*On the Genealogy of Morality* (1887)

- in: *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, transl. and ed. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Modern Library, 1967)
- *On the Genealogy of Morality*, ed. by Keith Ansell-Pearson, transl. by Carol Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994)
- *On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic: By way of clarification and supplement to my last book Beyond Good and Evil*, transl. with an introd. and notes by Douglass Smith (Oxford et al.: 1996)
- in: *Beyond Good and Evil / On the Genealogy of Morality*, transl., with an afterword, by Adrian Del Caro (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014)

*The Case of Wagner* (1888):

- in: *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, transl. and ed. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Modern Library, 1967)
- in: *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings*, ed. by Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman, transl. by Judith Norman (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 2005)
- in: *The Case of Wagner / Twilight of the Idols / The Antichrist / Ecce Homo / Dionysus Dithyrambs / Nietzsche Contra Wagner*, ed. by Alan D. Schrift, transl. by Adrian Del Caro, Carol Diethe, Duncan Large, George H. Leiner, Paul S. Loeb, Alan D. Schrift, David F. Tinsley, and Mirko Wittwar (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2021)



*Twilight of the Idols* (1888)

- in: *The Portable Nietzsche*, selected and transl. with an introd., prefaces, and notes by Walter Kaufmann (New York et al.: The Viking Press, 1954)
- in: *Twilight of the Idols and Anti-Christ*, transl. by R. J. Hollingdale, introd. by Michael Tanner (London et al.: Penguin, 1990 [1968])
- *Twilight of the Idols, or, How to philosophize with a hammer*, transl. by Duncan Large (Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press, 1998)
- in: *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings*, ed. by Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman, transl. by Judith Norman (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 2005)
- in: *The Case of Wagner / Twilight of the Idols / The Antichrist / Ecce Homo / Dionysus Dithyrambs / Nietzsche Contra Wagner*, ed. by Alan D. Schrift, transl. by Adrian Del Caro, Carol Diethe, Duncan Large, George H. Leiner, Paul S. Loeb, Alan D. Schrift, David F. Tinsley, and Mirko Wittwar (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2021)

*The Antichrist* (1888):

- in: *The Portable Nietzsche*, selected and transl. with an introd., prefaces, and notes by Walter Kaufmann (New York et al.: The Viking Press, 1954)
- in: *Twilight of the Idols and Anti-Christ*, transl. by R. J. Hollingdale, introd. by Michael Tanner (London et al.: Penguin, 1990 [1968])
- in: *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings*, ed. by Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman, transl. by Judith Norman (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 2005)
- in: *The Case of Wagner / Twilight of the Idols / The Antichrist / Ecce Homo / Dionysus Dithyrambs / Nietzsche Contra Wagner*, ed. by Alan D. Schrift, transl. by Adrian Del Caro, Carol Diethe, Duncan Large, George H. Leiner, Paul S. Loeb, Alan D. Schrift, David F. Tinsley, and Mirko Wittwar (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2021)

*Ecce Homo* (1888)

- in: *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, transl. and ed. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Modern Library, 1967)

- in: *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings*, ed. by Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman, transl. by Judith Norman (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 2005)
- *Ecce Homo*, transl. by Duncan Large (Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press, 2007)
- in: *The Case of Wagner / Twilight of the Idols / The Antichrist / Ecce Homo / Dionysus Dithyrambs / Nietzsche Contra Wagner*, ed. by Alan D. Schrift, transl. by Adrian Del Caro, Carol Diethe, Duncan Large, George H. Leiner, Paul S. Loeb, Alan D. Schrift, David F. Tinsley, and Mirko Wittwar (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2021)

*Nietzsche contra Wagner* (1888):

- in: *The Portable Nietzsche*, selected and transl. with an introd., prefaces, and notes by Walter Kaufmann (New York et al.: The Viking Press, 1954)
- in: *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings*, ed. by Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman, transl. by Judith Norman (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 2005)
- in: *The Case of Wagner / Twilight of the Idols / The Antichrist / Ecce Homo / Dionysus Dithyrambs / Nietzsche Contra Wagner*, ed. by Alan D. Schrift, transl. by Adrian Del Caro, Carol Diethe, Duncan Large, George H. Leiner, Paul S. Loeb, Alan D. Schrift, David F. Tinsley, and Mirko Wittwar (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2021)

*Nietzsche's Notes*

CWN *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche* appears in 19 volumes, including Nietzsche's notes; so far available notes are:

- *Unpublished Writings from the period of Unfashionable Observations*, transl., with an afterword, by Richard T. Gray (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999)
- *Unpublished Fragments from the Period of Human, All Too Human I (Winter 1874/75–Winter 1877/78)*, transl., with an afterword, by Gary Handwerk (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2021).

- *Human, All Too Human II and Unpublished Fragments from the Period of Human, All Too Human II (Spring 1878 – Fall 1879)*, transl., with an afterword, by Gary Handwerk (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012).
- *Unpublished Fragments from the Period of Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Summer 1882–Winter 1883/84)*, transl., with an afterword, by Paul S. Loeb and David F. Tinsley (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019).
- *Unpublished Fragments (Spring 1885–Spring 1886)*, transl., with an afterword, by Adrian Del Caro (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019).

NBE *Nietzsche: Writings from the Early Notebooks*, ed. by Raymond Geuss and Alexander Nehamas, trans. by Ladislaus Löb, Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 2009). [Selection]

NBL *Friedrich Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks*, ed. by Rüdiger Bittner, transl. by Kate Sturge (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 2003). [Selection]

## B. Additional Tools

NWB *Nietzsche-Wörterbuch*, ed. by the Nietzsche Research Group (Nijmegen) under leadership of Paul van Tongeren, Gerd Schank and Herman Siemens (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2004ff.) (published so far: Vol. 1: *Abbraviatur – einfach*) [thorough elaboration and clear presentation of Nietzsche's use of selected terms; more articles on *nietzsche-online* at [www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/nietzsche/html](http://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/nietzsche/html); articles also include information concerning recent Nietzsche research].

BN *Nietzsches persönliche Bibliothek*, ed. Giuliano Campioni, Paolo D'Iorio, Maria Cristina Fornari, Francesco Fronterotta, Andrea Orsucci, in collaboration with Renate Müller-Buck (*Supplementa Nietzscheana*, Vol. 6), Berlin/New York (De Gruyter) 2003 [important for the research of Nietzsche's sources; includes the books

Nietzsche possessed, at least for some time, and indications of his annotations].

BNPC Thomas H. Brobjer, *Nietzsche's Philosophical Context: An Intellectual Biography*, Urbana/Chicago 2008. [chronological overview on Nietzsche's philosophical readings].

NK *Historischer und kritischer Kommentar zu Friedrich Nietzsches Werken*, ed. by the Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, 6 vls. (some of them in 2 vls.) (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter 2012ff.).

NHB *Nietzsche-Handbuch: Leben – Werk – Wirkung*, ed. by Henning Ottmann (Stuttgart/Weimar: Metzler, 2000, new edition 2022).

NLXN *Nietzsche-Lexikon*, ed. by Christian Niemeyer (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2009, corrected edition 2011).

NLXM Enrico Müller, *Nietzsche-Lexikon* (Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink / UTB, 2020).

WNB *Weimarer Nietzsche-Bibliographie*, on behalf of the Stiftung Weimarer Klassik – Herzogin Anna Amalia Bibliothek ed. by Susanne Jung, Frank Simon-Ritz, Clemens Wahle, Erdmann von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, Wolfram Wojtecki, 5 vls. (Stuttgart/Weimar: Metzler, 2000-2002). [continually updated at: [www.ores.klassik.stiftung.de](http://www.ores.klassik.stiftung.de)].

### C. Journals for Nietzsche Research

NSt *Nietzsche-Studien: Internationales Jahrbuch für die Nietzsche-Forschung*, founded 1972 by Mazzino Montinari, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, Heinz Wenzel, from 1999 until 2016 ed. by Günter Abel und Werner Stegmaier, since 2017 ed. by Christian J. Emden, Helmut Heit, Vanessa Lemm, and Claus Zittel (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter).

NF *Nietzscherforschung: Jahrbuch der Nietzsche-Gesellschaft*, founded 1993, ed. by Volker Gerhardt and Renate Reschke, since 2020 by Enrico Müller (Berlin: Akademie/De Gruyter).

- JNS *The Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, founded in 1991 by Howard Caygill, currently edited by Jessica N. Berry (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press).
- NNSt *New Nietzsche Studies: The Journal of the Nietzsche Society*, founded 1996, ed. by David B. Allison and Babette Babich (New York: Fordham University).
- Agonist *The Agonist. A Nietzsche Circle Journal*, founded in 2008 by the Nietzsche Circle in New York, currently published by Transnational Press in London; ed. by Yunus Tuncel ([www.agonist.nietzschercircle.com](http://www.agonist.nietzschercircle.com)).

#### **D. German and English Book Series on Nietzsche Research**

- MTNF *Monographien und Texte zur Nietzsche-Forschung*, founded 1972 by Mazzino Montinari, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, Heinz Wenzel, from 1999 until 2016 ed. by Günter Abel und Werner Stegmaier, since 2017 ed. by Christian J. Emden, Helmut Heit, Vanessa Lemm, and Claus Zittel (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter).
- SN *Supplementa Nietzscheana*, founded 1990 by Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, Karl Pestalozzi, ed. by Thomas Böning and Karl Pestalozzi (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter).
- INS *International Nietzsche Studies*, founded and edited by Richard Schacht (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press) [The series is closed since 2009].
- NT *Nietzsche Today*, established in 2011, ran out in 2016 (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter).
- NL *Nietzsche-Lektüren*, founded 2017, ed. on behalf of the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences and Humanities and the Friedrich Nietzsche Foundation by Andreas Urs Sommer, Sebastian Kaufmann, Katharina Grätz, Ralf Eichberg, and Christian Benne (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2017ff.).

- NN *Nietzsche Now*, founded in 2018, ed. by Stefan Lorenz Sorgner and Yunus Tuncel (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing).
- BFN *Beiträge zu Friedrich Nietzsche: Quellen, Studien und Texte zu Leben, Werk und Wirkung Friedrich Nietzsches*, founded 1999 (Basel: Schwabe).

**E. German and English Companions (Collections of Critical Essay)**

- Salaquarda, Jörg (ed.), *Nietzsche* (Series Wege der Forschung, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1980).
- Magnus, Bernd / Kathleen M. Higgins (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche* (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
- Richardson, John / Leiter, Brian (eds.), *Nietzsche* (Series Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press, 2001).
- Richard White (ed.), *Nietzsche* (Series The International Library of Critical Essays in the History of Philosophy, Dartmouth: Ashgate, 2002).
- Ansell Pearson, Keith (ed.). *A Companion to Nietzsche* (Malden, MA, et al.: Blackwell Publishing, 2006).
- Bishop, Paul (ed.). *A Companion to Friedrich Nietzsche: Life and Works* (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2012).
- Gemes, Ken / Richardson, John (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche* (Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press, 2013).
- Stern, Tom (ed.). *The New Cambridge Companion* (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

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One may suppose that everything has been said about Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy. But the dynamism and openness of his philosophizing continue to undermine the usual interpretations based on dogmatic doctrines. Nietzsche's critical philosophical power cannot be adequately understood without his life experiences on the one hand and the forms of his philosophical writing on the other; the contexts and the making of his thoughts must be attended to. This introduction, translated from the German original, provides a well-founded overview of Nietzsche's main philosophical distinctions, a guide to a methodical Nietzsche interpretation, and a new understanding of his famous concepts of the will to power, the overman, the eternal return of the same, and others. It simultaneously opens up Nietzsche's philosophical cosmos to our current orientations. The English version adds a postscript on how to study Nietzsche today, after his posthumous notes have been edited in completely revised transcriptions revealing in which ways he actually oriented himself philosophically. From them, we may learn more not only about philosophy, but also, as Kant already taught, about philosophizing.



Werner Stegmaier, born 1946 in Ludwigsburg, Germany, was founding director of the Institute of Philosophy at the University of Greifswald and full professor of philosophy with a focus on practical philosophy. For eighteen years, he was editor-in-chief of the international *Nietzsche Studien*. He became one of the world's best-known and most respected Nietzsche scholars, setting milestones with his *Philosophy of Fluctuance in Dilthey and Nietzsche*, his interpretation of Nietzsche's

*Genealogy of Morality*, his comprehensive contextual interpretation of the V. Part of *The Gay Science* ("We Fearless Ones"), and with his major study on our current philosophical *Orientation in Nihilism* ("Luhmann meets Nietzsche"). Simultaneously, he elaborated his own *Philosophy of Orientation* and reinterpreted the development of Western philosophy from the forms of philosophical writings that great philosophers created for communicating their new ideas. With Tina and Mike Hodges and Reinhard G. Mueller, he founded the Hodges Foundation for Philosophical Orientation in Nashville, Tennessee. [www.stegmaier-orientierung.de](http://www.stegmaier-orientierung.de) + [www.hfpo.com](http://www.hfpo.com)

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